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Abstract
Internal and external migrations are a phenomenon of growing magnitude within the
European continent. Most importantly, the last decades have once and for all destroyed
the illusion of the transience of immigration settlement, raising concerns on the lack of
integration of long term immigrants in host societies. In particular, migrant educational
disadvantage is a serious issue in most European countries, as shown by international
assessments on students’ competencies. In the last years, public debates have called
attention to the need of identifying institutional features able to endow children of mi-
grants with equal chances to succeed in school compared to their native peers. However,
empirical evidence on the role of educational systems in worsening or mitigating migrant
learning disadvantage is still inconclusive.
In this dissertation, I conduct a systematic investigation of whether and why second-
generation immigrants experience diﬀerent achievement penalties in 17 Western Euro-
pean countries. The research design is based on a two-step, mixed methods approach.
In the first step I provide a comparative assessment of migrant-specific penalties in ed-
ucational achievement. The cross-country variability of migrant achievement penalties
becomes the explanandum in the second step of analysis, when I assess the role of theo-
retically relevant characteristics of educational systems as potential explanantes. At each
step of the analysis, I rely on methodological triangulation—by using variable-oriented
and diversity-oriented methods—in order to improve the overall robustness of the empir-
ical findings.
By using the 2006 and 2009 waves of the PISA survey, I analyze the relative dis-
advantage of 15-year-old students of immigrant vs. native origin in the literacy do-
mains of mathematics, science, and reading. With a novel measure of migrant-specific
penalty—revealing the relative of immigrant students within the achievement distribu-
tion of comparable natives—I show that second-generation immigrants dramatically lag
behind their native peers, despite having been fully exposed to the same educational
system. This underachievement can only be partially explained by traditional mecha-
nisms of stratification by social class broadly defined. On the contrary, migrant-specific
penalties and socio-economic penalties come forth as two distinct dimensions of educa-
tional inequalities. Even if all Western European countries experience some degree of
migrant penalties, sharp cross-country diﬀerences exist in their intensity. Moreover, as
shown with additional analyses on Turkish second-generation immigrants, such cross-
country diﬀerences cannot be reduced to the diﬀerent origin compositions of immigrant
populations.
Moving from four theoretical dimensions (school duration, stratification, standard-
ization, and resources allocation), I identify as potentially relevant characteristics of the
educational system: (i) the entry age in the (pre)school system; (ii) the age at which stu-
dents are tracked into diﬀerentiated curricula; (iii) the degree to which second-generation
immigrants are marginalized in low-quality schools. After investigating the relevance of
these factors with several statistical and set-theoretic methods, I apply fuzzy-set Qual-
itative Comparative Analysis (fs-QCA) in order to systematically assess which kinds of
educational systems—conceived as configurations of institutional elements embedded in
national contexts—bring about severe migrant achievement penalties, and which do not.
My findings indicate that several combinations of conditions can alternatively lead to
equally severe penalties. In post-war immigration countries, early tracking into diﬀer-
entiated curricula produces severe penalties only when it marginalizes second-generation
immigrants in second-tier tracks, and consequently low-quality schools. On the contrary,
in new-immigration countries tracking by itself is suﬃcient to bring about severe penal-
ties, while in Scandinavian countries—where most immigrants speak a language that is
very distant from the national one—the decisive detrimental factor is the delayed entry
of pupils into (pre)school. In order to avoid severe penalties, educational systems must
be designed in a way to include children at a relatively young age. In post-war immigra-
tion countries where linguistic distance is low, this element is suﬃcient to avoid severe
achievement penalties, but new immigration societies have more complex institutional
pathways, since they combine a not-late entry in the (pre)school system with a late track-
ing into diﬀerentiated curricula and a low degree of marginalization of second-generation
immigrants.
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Chapter 1
Framing the substantive and
methodological questions
1.1 Educational opportunities for children of migrants in
Western Europe
1.1.1 Policy relevance
In the last decades, the field of education has become an increasingly important element
of social policy in Europe, as part of the new perspective of “social investment” (Fer-
rera, 2009; Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2012; Nolan, 2013). The social investment
strategy has been actively supported by international organizations like the OECD since
the late 1990s (OECD, 1997) and has recently gained a renewed impetus with the adop-
tion of a specific package by the European Commission (European Commission, 2013).
The underlying idea is that welfare-state systems could be recalibrated giving a greater
importance to the life course perspective, and focusing on the roots of social problems.
Hence, social policies would shift from compensation towards prevention (Ferrera et al.,
2000; Room, 2002; Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003). In this sense, educational pol-
icy—including early child education and care, and support to lifelong learning—has a
pivotal role in human capital investment, sustaining the development of individual skills
to improve future life prospects and reducing social risks.
The social investment perspective also maintains a strong focus on inclusion and co-
hesion. As a consequence, international organizations have repeatedly called for reforms
in European educational and training systems fostering quality and equity at the same
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time (European Commission, 2006; OECD, 2012). School systems should provide equal
learning opportunities to all students, including the more disadvantaged ones. Among the
latter, students of immigrant background constitute a special focus of attention. They
are often at risk of underachievement and early dropout, and are considered one of the
most important categories to target in the next future (European Commission, 2008).
In eﬀect, internal and external migrations are a social phenomenon of growing mag-
nitude in the European continent. Most importantly, the last decades have once and for
all destroyed the illusion of the transience of immigration settlement, raising the issue
of new risks connected to the lack of integration of long-term immigrants in the host
societies. New dividing lines in the stratification patterns of life chances have been un-
covered, emerging as a problem of collective relevance to be targeted by public policy
(Castles and Miller, 2003). In public debates, whether or not second-generation immi-
grants are well integrated in the school system is often pointed out as a crucial issue to
be addressed. Indeed, endowing children of migrants with equal chances to succeed in
school compared to their native peers could be a major step toward their economic and
social integration.
But what kinds of educational systems are more eﬀective in mitigating the educational
disadvantage experienced by children of immigrants? Traditionally, research on the role
of institutions in aﬀecting the equality of educational opportunity has focused on stratifi-
cation by social class and socio-economic resources. Some findings—like the detrimental
role of tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula for students of lower social strata—are quite
consolidated in the literature, to the point that they have already inspired policy reforms
pursuing a greater equity of the school system (for instance in Germany, cf. Freitag and
Schlicht, 2009). On the contrary, educational inequalities associated to migratory sta-
tus are a much more recent concern. Up to this moment, literature has addressed this
theme to a limited extent. Several policy briefs supported by the European Commission
have reviewed empirical literature from educational science, psychology, labor economics,
and sociology of education in an attempt to identify institutional aspects and teaching
practices apt at reducing migrant learning disadvantage (EACEA, 2004; Christensen and
Stanat, 2007; NESSE Network, 2008; Nusche, 2009). However, these works often focus
on very specific interventions and lack a comprehensive theoretical framework necessary
in order to generalize the eﬀectiveness of a given policy instrument beyond the context it
was designed for. At the same time, publications from the OECD have focused on some
specific aspects of educational systems that are found to be positively associated with the
performance of immigrant students in internationally standardized tests (OECD, 2006,
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2010; OECD, 2010). These studies are praiseworthy in shedding light on some institu-
tional features that might be especially beneficial for immigrant students. Nevertheless,
they look at mere correlations between institutions and outcomes across a variety of
countries that are very heterogeneous in several respects. In this work I argue that, so
far, no established evidence indicates the direction that educational policy should take
in order to enhance the educational opportunities of children of immigrants.
The present dissertation speaks to these debates by illuminating the central role of
national education systems in influencing the school performance of second-generation
immigrants in Western Europe. This work contributes to the existing knowledge first
of all by providing a theoretical reflection on the dimensions of educational systems
specifically relevant for children of immigrants. Secondly, it brings new empirical evidence
in by systematically analyzing which kinds of educational systems, and under given
contextual conditions, lead second-generation immigrants to severely underperform their
native peers.
1.1.2 Explanandum: migrant achievement penalties
A first order of research questions addressed in this dissertation concerns the magnitude
of migrant learning disadvantage in Western Europe: do students of immigrant origin lag
behind their native peers everywhere? In which countries do they perform worst? Are
cross-country diﬀerences merely driven by diﬀerent demographics? Given the focus of
interest of many scholars in the micro-level determinants of migrant learning disadvantage
(Heath and Brinbaum, 2007), previous studies were prevalently conducted at a national
rather than international level, with obvious implications for the lack of comparability of
their results. With few exceptions (Schneeweis, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2012a), the limited
number of studies carried out at an international level aimed at testing hypotheses on
micro-level factors across diﬀerent contexts, rather than at comparatively assessing the
educational performance of immigrant students as such. As a consequence, the question
of how large is migrant educational disadvantage in diﬀerent European countries has
remained largely unresolved.
Moving from Coleman (1968), I consider that a key element to understand equal-
ity of learning opportunities is given by structural diﬀerences in educational outcomes
between distinct students’ categories, defined according to family background. For this
reason, migrant learning disadvantage is here conceptualized as the relative educational
achievement of immigrant students, compared to their native peers. In order to be truly
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comparable, the two categories must have developed their educational careers within
the same school system. Accordingly, I restrict my focus to second-generation immi-
grants strictly defined, i.e. individuals born in the destination country from parents born
abroad, who have therefore been fully exposed to the same educational system as their
native peers have. Educational outcomes involve two main dimensions: attainment (i.e.
the formal progression through the school system) and achievement (i.e. the skills and
knowledge actually acquired). Due to the diﬀerent designs of educational systems, it is
hard to compare educational attainment across countries. On the contrary, international
assessments on students’ performance oﬀer a standardized framework for cross-country
comparisons on educational achievement. Therefore, in this dissertation educational out-
comes are restrictively conceived in terms of achievement. More specifically, I look at
the educational skills achieved by the age of 15, encompassing the whole period spent by
pupils in compulsory schooling.
In order to identify the educational disadvantage actually stemming from the migra-
tory status of students, it is essential to consider other individual characteristics that
might influence the educational achievement of both natives and immigrants. Indeed,
as documented by previous research, the reasons why children of immigrants tend to
underperform natives can be partially ascribed to their lower socio-economic resources
(Kristen and Granato, 2007; Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen, 2007). Still, after
controlling for socio-economic diﬀerentials, a residual educational disadvantage of mi-
grants persists (Rothon, 2007; Heath et al., 2008). The focus of interest of the present
dissertation lies precisely on this migrant-specific disadvantage, which some scholars la-
beled “migrant penalty” (Heath and Cheung, 2007; Heath et al., 2008). Accordingly, I
propose a measure of migrant penalty in educational achievement revealing the relative
position of second-generation immigrants within the achievement distribution of native
students sharing the same socio-economic background.
The scope of this dissertation is limited to Western Europe, which provides the frame-
work for a meaningful comparison of receiving societies. Beyond the societal and institu-
tional similarities, these countries share a history of post-war labor immigration, preva-
lently composed by individuals coming for economic and family reasons, as opposed to
traditional settlement countries like the US or Australia. Yet, immigrant populations
across Western Europe are diverse in terms of origin. In order to deal with this remain-
ing composition issue, I check the robustness of my findings with additional analyses on
second-generation immigrants of Turkish origin only, an immigrant group that is often
considered as well comparable across destination societies(Schneider and Crul, 2009).
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To sum up, in the first part of this dissertation I analyze individual student achieve-
ment near the end of compulsory schooling in 17 Western European countries, with the
aim of quantifying migrant achievement penalties, i.e. the relative disadvantage experi-
enced by second-generation immigrants, specifically in reason of their migratory status.
Migrant achievement penalties constitute my explanandum. The second part of the dis-
sertation is dedicated to explain the variability of migrant achievement penalties: why
do second-generation immigrants experience severe penalties in some Western European
educational systems, but not in others?
1.1.3 Explanantes: potentially relevant dimensions of educational sys-
tems
The empirical evidence collected in the first part of the dissertation raises a second order
of questions: do educational systems play any role in explaining the cross-country vari-
ability of migrant achievement penalties in Western Europe? Which structural features
are particularly detrimental (and which beneficial) for children of immigrants? How do
they combine in the diﬀerent institutional structures of educational systems? Do these
features matter in all the countries considered, or does their relevance depend on con-
textual elements? Although some works have already tried to address similar questions
(Levels et al., 2008; Schneeweis, 2011; Fossati, 2011; Cobb-Clark et al., 2012; Dronkers
et al., 2012b), empirical evidence on the role of educational systems in worsening or
mitigating migrant learning disadvantage is still inconclusive.
In order to derive my hypotheses on the role of specific institutional features—my ex-
planantes—I draw on the work of Turner (1960) on the manifest functions of educational
systems, and on the typologies proposed by Sorensen (1970) and Allmendinger (1989),
resting on the key dimensions of school stratification (i.e. the structural diﬀerentiation
of students within given grades), and standardization (i.e. homogeneity in the quality
of education provided nationwide). Nevertheless, this literature was developed having
in mind educational inequalities occurring along more traditional lines of stratification,
notably social class and socio-economic background. Given the specificity of educational
inequalities stemming from migratory status, I have to adapt my theoretical framework to
make it more coherent with the micro-foundations of migrant learning disadvantage. In
some Western European countries, second-generation immigrants certainly face the risk
of marginalization in low-quality schools, which might be harmful to their educational
careers. Hence, I retain standardization and stratification as potentially relevant dimen-
5
sions, because they aﬀect students’ sorting into schools, as well as the heterogeneity of
curricula and the allocation of human and financial resources. My theoretical framework
is then enriched by an additional dimension that is likely to be specifically relevant for
second-generation immigrants. This is the duration of schooling, and in particular the
starting age of (pre)school: an early inclusion of children of immigrants in the educational
system could promote their cognitive, linguistic, and social development, with positive
spillovers on future educational outcomes.
Along with the institutional dimensions, I consider the role played by the national
context in setting the conditions under which the aforementioned dimensions of educa-
tional systems may worsen or reduce migrant achievement penalties. In particular, I take
into consideration the linguistic distance between the host country language and those
of the immigrant population. By including this dimension in my theoretical model, I ac-
knowledge that the linguistic composition of immigrant populations can aﬀect a country’s
capability to integrate their children in the school system. For instance, countries where
immigrants prevalently speak a close relative of the host language, or coming from former
colonies where the host language is still broadly spoken, most probably have an easier job
than countries where the host language is very diﬀerent from those of most immigrants,
no matter the structure of the educational system. At the same time, some features
of educational systems—notably an early inclusion of children in (pre)school—are likely
to be particularly salient in countries where linguistic distance is high. A second con-
textual element that I consider as potentially aﬀecting a country’s capability to tackle
migrant penalties is the history of immigration. Despite the fundamental comparability
of Western European countries, it is important to diﬀerentiate among them according to
the moment immigration became massive. Indeed, irrespective of the formal structure of
educational systems, in countries where immigration started already in the post-war pe-
riod, eﬀective teaching practices to deal with immigrant students might have informally
been developed.
From this theoretical framework, I derive several working hypotheses on the role of
educational systems, which I subsequently test with a variety of methods based both
on variable-oriented and diversity-oriented approaches. More specifically, I first explore
how explanatory variables are correlated to diﬀerent degrees of migrant penalties. Next,
I investigate the asymmetrical relations between diﬀerent configurations of institutional
and contextual conditions on the one hand, and the occurrence of severe migrant penalties
on the other hand. This exploration helps me to refine the theoretical framework making
it more sound for the specific contexts of Western European countries.
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In a nutshell, the second part of my dissertation is dedicated to develop a theoretical
framework for the explanation of migrant penalties and then to examine its empirical
relevance in Western Europe. First, I identify dimensions of educational systems and
contextual conditions that could be specifically relevant for the educational achievement
of second-generation immigrants. Second, I investigate which kinds of educational sys-
tems—conceived as complex entities of interconnected elements—produce severe migrant
penalties, and which do not.
1.2 Methodological issues in comparative educational re-
search
A third order of research questions at stake is of methodological nature and relates to the
explanatory phase of the dissertation in particular: to what extent are mainstream statis-
tical analyses helpful to scholars interested in the cross-country comparison of educational
systems? What is the added value of diversity-oriented methods? Can methodological
triangulation provide a better understanding of the complex causal patterns leading
from the institutional structure of educational systems to students’ outcomes? With
its mixed-methods research design, this dissertation provides an excellent framework to
address these questions.
1.2.1 Limitations of mainstream statistical analysis
The field of comparative studies on educational systems, especially when focused on pol-
icy outcomes, is dominated by quantitative scholars (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2011).
The quantitative approach to comparative educational research incurs in a number of
issues that I will briefly discuss in what follows.
In the first place, these studies are typically based on cross-country regression models
aimed at identifying the net eﬀects of single institutional features on educational out-
comes. Therefore, they implicitly assume that educational systems are simply a sum of
independent features, whose eﬀect on students’ outcomes is nothing but additive: the
impact of each institutional characteristic is assumed to be homogeneous across con-
texts, and the combination of two or more constitutive aspects of educational systems
is not taken into consideration. This is a common implicit assumption in most variable-
oriented studies, and even more so if they are cross-country comparisons. Indeed, the
limited number of countries results in small sample sizes, which make it impossible to
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estimate significant interaction terms.
More generally, it is usually diﬃcult for mainstream statistical analysis to detect
patterns of complex causation (Braummoeller, 2003). By assuming additivity, one rules
out for the possibility of several explanatory factors to act in combination—what John
Stuart Mill called “chemical causation” (Mill, 1868). Another homogenizing assumption
typically hidden in regression analysis is that there is a single model applicable across
all observations. In a search for generalizable causal explanations, context and country
specificities are reduced to the status of noise. Finally, like all other techniques funda-
mentally based on correlation, regression analysis looks for association patterns, and thus
assumes that causal relations are always symmetrical: in other words, if a given cause
generally produces a given outcome, then that outcome is to be generally explained by
the same cause.
A final shortcoming of variable-oriented approaches derives from limited diversity, i.e.
the fact that the universe of relevant cases is typically too small to cover the property
space entailed by the interplay of potential explanatory factors (Lazarsfeld, 1937). This
is an inherent (but overlooked) issue in comparative social science, regardless of the
methodological approach chosen. However, in order to deal with it, quantitative scholars
typically make restrictive assumptions that—although invisible to most readers—rely
on “extreme counterfactuals” (King and Zeng, 2006). The few studies that have so far
investigated the role of educational systems to explain migrant learning disadvantage
incur in problematic issues when trying to deal with limited diversity (Levels et al., 2008;
Schneeweis, 2011; Fossati, 2011; Cobb-Clark et al., 2012; Dronkers et al., 2012b). On
the one hand, in order to increase the number of observations, they group together very
heterogeneous countries. On the other hand, in order to reduce the number of parameters
to be estimated, they make restrictive—and often hardly tenable—assumptions on the
eﬀects of individual-level and country-level independent variables.
1.2.2 The promise of configurational comparative methods
Since their introduction more than two decades ago (Ragin, 1987), configurational com-
parative methods have been increasingly viewed as a powerful analytical framework in
order to address the problematic issues of variable-oriented comparative research (?).
These methods permit a systematic analysis of statements of necessity and suﬃciency,
which pervade social sciences, although in a not obvious way (Schneider and Wagemann,
2012). Therefore, causal relations are here conceived in terms of subset/superset re-
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lations, rather than as symmetrical associations. Besides asymmetry, configurational
comparative methods are able to detect other forms of causal complexity, notably equi-
finality and chemical causation. As for the first, through the use of the set union logical
operator, it is recognized that diﬀerent causal paths may lead to the same outcome. Sec-
ondly, causal conditions are allowed to operate in combination with each other by set
intersection. It is important to note that these methods do not assume causal complex-
ity, but simply allow for it, by relaxing the restrictive assumptions of additivity, unit
homogeneity, and uniformity of causal eﬀects typically made by mainstream statistical
analysis.
Another reason why comparative configurational methods are attractive to compar-
ative scholars is that they are suitable to conduct research with a limited number of
cases, unlike statistical inferential techniques. This is possible for two reasons. First
of all, they openly address the issue of limited diversity with the use of counterfactual
thinking. Researchers are asked to reflect upon the assumptions they make and to jus-
tify their plausibility (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Theoretical and case knowledge
are not disregarded, but can be called in to produce more parsimonious explanatory
models (Ragin and Sonnett, 2004). A second reason why comparative configurational
methods are able to deal with small-N research designs is that—as made clear by their
creator, Charles C. Ragin—their goal is not straight causal inference, but rather “to aid
causal interpretation, in concert with knowledge of cases” (Ragin, 2008, 141). Through
the systematic analysis of set relations, we can identify possible triggering and enabling
conditions for the phenomenon of interest (Befani et al., 2007), but the framework is
more exploratory than confirmatory. After all, the fact that scholars engage in research
in order to test preexisting theories is nothing but “a folklore” (Ragin, 1987, 164). In
most cases, the investigation of social phenomena is somehow empirically grounded, and
research processes are to some extent inductive. Scholars using comparative configura-
tional methods make this “dialogue between ideas and evidence” explicit: concepts and
hypotheses are open to reformulation during the research process. As a consequence, the
resulting findings are not law-like regularities, but provide a deeper understanding of the
processes underway for the cases of interest.
Conducting analyses on a limited number of cases is not only possible, but also rec-
ommended when adopting this methodological framework, which has a strong focus on
cases and is diversity-oriented. Indeed, a good knowledge of single cases is needed since
configurational comparative methods combine an analytical strategy with a holistic con-
ception of social phenomena: cases are seen as configurations of constitutive properties.
9
Moreover, such properties are carefully operationalized based on their qualitative mean-
ing.
Despite the sharp increase in the use of configurational comparative methods ex-
perienced in the last years (Rihoux et al., 2011), empirical applications in the field of
comparative educational research are lacking (with the exception of Freitag and Schlicht,
2009). The explanatory part of this dissertation relies to a large extent on such methods,
and in this way contributes to the assessment of their added value in this field of research.
1.2.3 A two-step, mixed-methods research design
The overarching research question of this dissertation is why Western European coun-
tries display diﬀerent degrees of migrant achievement penalties. This corresponds to
a “causes-of-eﬀects” research design, an approach to explanation that is more common
among qualitative than quantitative scholars (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). However, my
methodological approach is neither strictly qualitative nor quantitative. On the contrary,
I deliberately adopt a pluralistic strategy in order to explore potential explanations of the
phenomenon of interest. I do so because I believe that—especially in the field of public
policies, where the multiplicity of interpretative accounts often prevents the cumulation
of established evidence—mixed-methods designs are better equipped than single-method
designs to validate collective knowledge. Through methodological triangulation, scholars
not only improve the overall confidence of their empirical findings, but are forced to pur-
sue a greater precision in conceptualization, measurement, hypothesis formulation, and
interpretation.
In particular, my research design is based on a two-step, mixed-methods approach:
in the first step I construct the explanandum, i.e. the variability of migrant achievement
penalties in Western Europe; the second step is instead devoted to the investigation of
potential explanantes, i.e. characteristics of educational systems as well as contextual
conditions. In the first step, I mainly rely on statistical methods, in order to measure
migrant penalties as the achievement disparity between natives and second-generation
immigrants net of socio-economic background. However, a parallel investigation using
the novel technique of fuzzy-set coincidence analysis allows to enrich the understanding
of migrant learning disadvantage in relation to the disproportionate cumulation of factors
of disadvantage existing among immigrant parents. In the second-step, I investigate the
institutional determinants of cross-country diﬀerences in migrant penalties. In order to
mitigate the issue of limited diversity, I develop a theoretical reflection that allows me
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to identify a reduced number of explanantes. Next, I systematically assess how these ex-
planatory factors combine in influencing the emergence of migrant penalties in Western
Europe. Again, my analytical strategy is based on both variable-oriented and diversity-
oriented methods, though the latter play a more important role in this phase. I use
configurational comparative methods—and notably fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (fs-QCA)—to explore which kinds of educational systems systematically lead
to severe penalties, and which on the contrary are able to avoid them. In this frame-
work, educational systems are conceived as configurations of institutional characteristics
embedded in national contexts. Yet, in this phase I also use variable-oriented methods,
to explore the association patterns between institutional variables and the outcome. In
particular, I rely on regression-tree analysis, a recursive partitioning technique able to
detect complex interaction patterns between explanatory variables.
1.2.4 Outline
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes
the conceptual framework, relying on a multi-disciplinary perspective on sociology, eco-
nomics and political science. More precisely, in Section 2.1 I define the main concepts
concerning educational outcomes and opportunities used throughout the dissertation
and discuss them in the light of the theoretical debate on the process of intergenerational
transmission of educational inequality. This leads to the question of how educational
institutions interact with individual factors in this process and whether the structure of
educational systems makes the diﬀerence. Hence, in Section 2.2, I review institutionalist
accounts of the historical development of educational systems, as well as contributions
that highlight the impact of partisan politics on this development. I then consider several
classifications of educational systems and call attention to four institutional dimensions
that are particularly relevant for the purposes of this dissertation. In Section 2.3, I dis-
cuss the concepts of “children of immigrants” and “second-generation immigrants”, and
clarify the definitions adopted in this thesis. I also present two rival perspectives on the
assimilation paths of immigrants’ descendants. Finally, Section 2.4 is devoted to give
an account of political-science standpoint on migration studies. This oﬀers a theoretical
framework for the definition of my scope conditions and my case selection.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the explanandum. In the first part of the chapter, I ex-
tensively review previous studies looking for micro- and meso-level determinants of
migrant learning disadvantage. In particular, in Section 3.1.1 I report empirical evi-
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dence—mainly stemming from single-country studies—on the role of socio-economic re-
sources and migrant-specific resources, including their possible interactions. In doing so,
I diﬀerentiate studies according to their emphasis on educational attainment, achieve-
ment, or choices. Next, in Section 3.1.2, I examine empirical contributions focusing
on meso-level determinants of migrant learning disadvantage, specifically on the role of
teachers, classrooms, and schools. Section 3.1.3 reviews studies of comparative nature,
by highlighting cross-country diﬀerences in migrant-learning disadvantage. In the second
part of the chapter, I present my own empirical analyses on migrant achievement penal-
ties in Western Europe. In Section 3.2.1, my research questions and hypotheses are laid
out. Section 3.2.2 specifies my analytical strategy, including a novel measure of migrant-
specific penalties. Section 3.2.3 describes the data used, as well as the construction of
the variables and the models. In Section 3.2.4 I present and discuss my results, while in
Section 3.2.5 I test the robustness of my findings against alternative model specifications.
Finally, in the third part of the chapter, I present additional analyses further exploring
the diﬀerential accumulation of factors of advantage and disadvantage for native and im-
migrant students. In 3.3.1 I spell out my research questions, while in 3.3.2 I describe by
analytical strategy and in particular the original method of fuzzy-set coincidence analy-
sis. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 present the operationalization of fuzzy sets and the empirical
results.
In Chapter 4, I shift my focus towards institutional explanantes. In Section 4.1, I
examine previous works looking for macro-level determinants of educational inequalities.
While most literature has focused on inequalities driven by socio-economic diﬀerentials,
other lines of stratification, like gender, and, notably, migratory status have remained un-
explored to a large extent. The few works attempting to relate cross-country variability
in migrant learning disadvantage to institutional aspects incur in a number of limitations,
which I discuss in Section 4.1.3. Next, in Section 4.2 I develop a theoretical framework of
the institutional and contextual dimensions that are specifically liable to aﬀect migrant
achievement penalties, from which I derive four working hypotheses. In Section 4.3 I
delineate my analytical strategy, which is based on methodological triangulation. With
variable-oriented and diversity-oriented approaches I explore how theoretically relevant
dimensions of educational systems are related to more or less severe migrant penalties.
The construction of country-level indicators and their calibration into fuzzy sets are doc-
umented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 reports results from the variable-oriented approach,
including bivariate correlations, exploratory OLS regressions and regression-tree analysis.
Section 4.6 reports results from the diversity-oriented approach, in particular the tests for
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individual necessity and suﬃciency of single institutional conditions, the exploration of
institutional configurations, and results from fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(fs-QCA). I document in detail the “dialogue of ideas and evidence”(Ragin, 1987, 164-71)
through which I developed my fs-QCA. Final results of fs-QCA are presented in Section
4.6.4.
Chapter 5 oﬀers a comprehensive framework for discussing the main findings of this
dissertation. I put forward the substantive (Section 5.1) and methodological (Section
5.2) contributions of this dissertation for the study of educational inequalities and their
institutional determinants. In the concluding sections, I discuss the implications of my
findings from a policy-oriented perspective (Section 5.3) and sketch possible directions
for future research (Section 5.4).
13
14
Chapter 2
Conceptual framework and case
selection
In this chapter, I oﬀer a broad overview of the theoretical arguments and concepts em-
ployed in this dissertation. By presenting the state of the art of the theoretical debates
on educational inequalities and migrant integration, this chapter provides the grounds to
discuss how educational systems mediate the reproduction of educational inequalities for
natives and migrants. Given the two-step nature of the research design of this disserta-
tion, in this phase I do not develop structured hypotheses on the micro- and macro-level
mechanisms behind migrant achievement penalties. They will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively.
2.1 Inequalities in educational opportunities
In an accompanying note to his renowned 1966 report, James Coleman illustrates the
historical evolution of the concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman,
1968). In particular, he highlights how, over time, the emphasis shifted from the equal
access to schooling towards its actual outcomes. In the United States of the early 19th
century, Equality of Educational Opportunity (EEO) implied the public provision of free
and compulsory education in the form of standardized curricula, regardless of children’s
background. By the time Coleman was writing, however, EEO had evolved towards a
more progressive conception which encompassed “not merely the equality of educational
inputs, but also the intensity of the school’s influences, relative to the external divergent
influences. That is, equality of output is not so much determined by equality of resource
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inputs, but by the power of these resources in bringing about achievement” (Coleman,
1968, 22). A perfect EEO would then imply that, as children progress in their edu-
cational career, the school system is able to compensate—also by means of diﬀerential
treatment—for any initial disparity. Clearly, this does not entail equality of educational
outcomes across all individuals, but only between groups defined according to some as-
cribed characteristic such as social background, gender, or race (Coleman, 1968, 21).
Educational outcomes, in turn, comprise two dimensions: on the one hand, educa-
tional attainment, i.e. the progression of students through the schooling system; on the
other hand, educational achievement, i.e. the skills and knowledge they actually acquire.
Common indicators of attainment are school completion, level of qualifications, grade
retention, school delay, and dropout risks. Conversely, achievement is usually opera-
tionalized in terms of marks or standardized test scores.
Empirical evidence undoubtedly shows that EEO is subject to violations in all in-
dustrialized societies (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Breen et al., 2009). But how does the
process of intergenerational transmission of inequality work? According to the seminal
work of Boudon: “Inequality of educational opportunity is generated by a two-component
process. One component is related mainly to the cultural eﬀects of the stratification sys-
tem. The other introduces the assumption that even with other factors being equal,
people will make diﬀerent choices according to their position in the stratification sys-
tem” (Boudon, 1974, 36). Under the first component, that he labels “primary eﬀects”, lie
all the influences that family background exert on pupils’ cognitive skills and, through
them, on their educational attainment. Vice versa, “secondary eﬀects”, which relate
to the latter component, represent the direct eﬀects of family background on students’
progression through the school system, irrespective of their cognitive skills. From this
framework, aside the dimensions of achievement and attainment, emerges the importance
of educational choices at crucial transitions.
Except for genetic endowments, human capital is not directly transferable across
generations. Therefore, primary and secondary eﬀects operate via more or less aware
parental behaviors. First of all, as suggested by the economics of education, families
make rational investment choices in the education of their oﬀspring, in terms of financial
aid, but also of personal involvement, encouragement, aﬀective and material support in
coping with school diﬃculties (Becker, 1964). Choices are partially driven by perceived
direct and indirect costs and by the value attached to each educational choice (Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1997).
Clearly, since resources are unevenly distributed across families, these behaviors repro-
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duce educational inequality through primary eﬀects: children of advantaged background
benefit of a favorable home learning environment, which parallels and often precedes
the school environment. Moreover, highly educated parents possess the necessary infor-
mation to navigate the school system and therefore to support their children in crucial
educational transitions. Hence, the intergenerational transmission of human capital can
also be produced by secondary eﬀects, i.e. irrespectively of students’ actual ability.
Nevertheless, parents of diﬀerent background may have diﬀerent perceptions of the
utility derived from investing in their children’s human capital. In eﬀect, a theory of
agency based on pure rational choice is not able to account for the fact that, despite their
children are those who benefit most of the exposure to schooling, low educated parents
generally invest considerably less in their human capital, as opposed to highly educated
ones, even when financial costs are contained. Indeed, as pointed out by Coleman (1988),
human and social capital interact in aﬀecting the cognitive development of children, as
well as the formation of educational aspirations. The complementarity of social capital
(both within and outside the family) in producing more or less successful educational
outcomes involves rational choice components, but also obligations and expectations,
which in turn depend “on trustworthiness of the social environment, information-flow
capability of the social structure, and norms accompanied by sanctions” (Coleman, 1988,
S119). Here again, it is clear that the combined influence of human and social capital
on educational attainment can be direct or indirect. On the one hand, it can operate
independently of previous ability; on the other hand, it also operate through the creation
of higher cognitive performance. When analyzing the educational outcomes of children
of immigrants, Coleman’s framework is particularly useful in the sense that ethnic com-
munities could be used as a source of human and social capital or, in other words, could
constitute a form of “ethnic capital” (Borjas, 1992). Therefore, ethnic networks char-
acterized by strong ties, access to capital and openness might play an important role
in boosting educational opportunities for children of migrants (Borjas, 1992; Portes and
Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou, 1997; Hatton and Leigh, 2011).
Finally, the intergenerational transmission of educational inequality can also work
through the more subtle mechanism of inherited “cultural capital” (Bourdieu and Passeron,
1977, 1979). According to this framework, the school system operates in order to repro-
duce the existing social stratification. On the one hand, the values, attitudes and be-
haviors—constituting the habitus—acquired during socialization have a direct influence
on educational success. Indeed, children from high and middle classes are more likely to
master the cultural codes underlying the educational system and find it easier to cope
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with its implicit expectations. Hence, cultural capital has an impact on educational
achievement and, through primary eﬀects, on final attainment. Secondly, irrespective of
students’ educational performances, teachers are more inclined to reward cultural capital
since they are themselves part of the dominant classes. By raising teachers’ expectations
towards children of advantaged background, cultural capital can therefore have an impact
on educational choices of students and then, through secondary eﬀects, on their attain-
ment. Moreover, also students’ achievement can be aﬀected by the way the educational
system rewards cultural capital, because teachers may spend more energy in motivating
and supporting those who they perceive as gifted students.
The empirical analyses of this dissertation are based on the educational achievement
of two groups of students (natives vs. migrants) near the end of compulsory education.
As a consequence, against the theoretical framework just outlined, my main interest
lies in the intergenerational transmission of cognitive abilities through primary eﬀects
and in the role of educational systems in mediating this process. However, in some
countries examined in this dissertation, the achievement of 15-year-old students is also
partially aﬀected by previous educational choices. In turn, choices are aﬀected by family
background through both primary and secondary eﬀects.
2.2 The structure of educational systems
Educational systems set the opportunity structure where students with diﬀerent back-
grounds have access to school, develop their cognitive skills and proceed through grades.
Unfortunately, theoretical reflections on the structure of educational systems and on their
implications for individual educational outcomes are limited. Within political science,
the study of education has always been a neglected field (Jakobi et al., 2009). For a
long time, welfare state research disregarded education as a subject of study. Only in
the UK education policy was viewed as a constitutive component of social policy (Finch,
1984). More generally, as lamented by Busemeyer and Trampusch (2011, 432), even
within disciplines where empirical educational research is more developed, “there is an
enormous disproportion between investments in data analysis and in theories” which can
partially explain the inconsistency of results on the role of specific institutional features
in shaping educational outcomes. The studies reviewed in the following paragraphs are,
nevertheless, helpful in setting a suitable theoretical framework for the empirical ques-
tions addressed in this thesis.
When approaching this field, one should first of all recognize that the diﬀerent insti-
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tutional designs of educational systems have specific historical roots. From a perspective
of historical institutionalism, several scholars from political science and macro-sociology
have traced the development and expansion of higher education systems in Europe and in
other industrialized countries. Heidenheimer (1973, 1981) opened up the field by explor-
ing the social and political determinants of educational expansion in the United States,
Britain, Sweden, and Germany. His work shows how diﬀerences in interest group pow-
ers have shaped divergent educational policies on the two sides of the Atlantic. Other
scholars have expanded this line of research by looking at specific sectors of the school
system, such as higher education (Heidenheimer, 1997; Windolf, 1997) and vocational
training (Thelen and Ikuo, 1999; Thelen, 2004).
The way an educational system is organized depends not only on its historical de-
velopment, but also on present-day choices of policy-makers. In this perspective, an
important concern is how the partisan politics of educational reform takes place. Sev-
eral studies focus on the role of political actors in promoting or opposing reforms to
increase choice in general education (Ball, 1993; Lundahl, 2002; Klitgaard, 2007, 2008),
while others concentrate on the development of the system for vocational education and
training (Ahier and Esland, 1999; Flude and Sieminksi, 1999). Moreover, several studies
investigated the determinants of recent changes in the governance of higher education
in a comparative framework (Braun and Merriem, 1999; Kogan et al., 2006). Generally
speaking, the privatization and the internationalization of higher educational systems
are privileged topics for political scientists who adopt a governance perspective (Jakobi
et al., 2009). Beyond educational reform, another subject of investigation is the dis-
tributive politics of education. A number of studies have investigated the importance of
partisan politics on educational spending (Castles, 1982; Boix, 1997, 1998; Busemeyer,
2007; Schmidt, 2007; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Ansell, 2008). In particular, a pop-
ular subject of analysis is whether the political preferences of social-democratic parties
in the field of education reflect those in other domains of social policy. Indeed, the re-
distributive consequences of educational expansion are not obvious. Hence, especially
as far as investments in higher education are concerned, left-wing parties may not push
for expansive policies (Ansell, 2007, 2008; Jensen, 2011). However, when considering
overall educational spending, there seem to be a positive correlation with the presence of
social-democrats in government cabinets (Busemeyer, 2009). According to Boix (1997,
1998), investments in human capital are appealing to social-democrats because they are
increasingly seen as a supply-side instrument to promote economic growth.
A similar perspective on human capital investment is provided by a recent strand
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of literature focused on the “recalibration” of the welfare state (Ferrera et al., 2000;
Room, 2002; Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003). According to these authors, the policy
reforms implemented in Europe in the last decades envisage a shift of the welfare system
from “compensatory” to “preventing” policies. Education is the privileged field of action
for this policy strategy, because—by investing in the early life stages of individuals—it
is expected to prevent social risks associated to health, employability, and poverty in
the long-run. Given that educational and training systems diﬀer among industrialized
countries, Allmendinger and Leibfried (2003) and Iversen and Stephens (2008) follow
Esping-Andersen (1990) and talk about “diﬀerent worlds” of competence production or
human capital formation. With an empirical exploration, Peter et al. (2010) find support
for the application of the original “three worlds” distinction made by Esping-Andersen
to the field of education. Indeed, between-school educational inequality is highest in
conservative welfare states and lowest in social democratic countries. Willemse and
de Beer (2012) develop the theoretical framework initiated by these authors and construct
a typology of higher educational systems in Western Europe based on the two central
concepts of welfare state identified by Esping-Andersen: decommodification—referred to
the market structure—and stratification—referred to the status hierarchy produced by
the system. In a recent contribution, Beblavý et al. (2013) show that while generally
each European state has a single “policy culture” on education and pensions with regard
to decommodification, there is much less consistency between these two policy sectors in
the stratification produced. Overall, these authors call for an integration of the study of
education systems into comparative welfare state research.
The structure of educational systems has been studied not only in terms of its histori-
cal and political determinants, but also from the perspective of its potential consequences
on equality of educational opportunities. Turner (1960) postulated two idealtypical kinds
of systems, based on the normative views on upward social mobility prevalent in a given
country. On the one hand, views of upward mobility as a “contest” lead to competence-
based educational systems, best exemplified by the case of United States; on the other
hand, credentialist systems like the English one stem from “sponsored” conceptions of
upward mobility. Hopper (1968) further developed Turner’s intuition by putting for-
ward a typology of educational systems based on two normative dimensions underlying
school selection processes: on the one hand, their overall individualistic vs. collectivis-
tic ideology; on the other hand, particularistic views on learning—generating diﬀuse
skills—as opposed to universalistic views—generating more technical skills. The inter-
section of these two dimensions produces four idealtypical kinds of educational systems:
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aristocratic, paternalistic, meritocratic and communistic. Sorensen (1970) argued that
the extent of organizational diﬀerentiation of students is a constitutive feature of educa-
tional systems. In particular, he distinguished between vertical diﬀerentiation, that takes
place within schools among diﬀerent ability groups, from horizontal diﬀerentiation, that
on the contrary concerns the division of student cohorts into diﬀerent kinds of school cur-
ricula. Allmendinger (1989) stressed that beyond the dimension of diﬀerentiation—or,
as she defines it, stratification—another one is important if one is interested in the inter-
generational transmission of inequality. This is the degree of standardization of quality
standards nationwide: curricula, school leaving examinations, teachers’ training and fi-
nancial resources may diﬀer between areas of the country or from school to school. In
a recent contribution, Nelson (2008) further extends these conceptualizations by adding
up two institutional dimensions relevant to understand the relationship between educa-
tion policy and labor market integration: on the one hand, the importance of vocational
training, and on the other hand the kind of credentials certification.
The various classifications of educational systems presented in the previous paragraph
explicitly or implicitly refer to the three manifest functions of educational systems iden-
tified by Hopper (1968, 30): (i) the selection of students, i.e. their sorting according
to ability; (ii) their instruction according to national standards and (iii) their alloca-
tion into occupational roles. Figure 2.1 summarizes the relations between institutional
dimensions and functions by means of a Venn diagram. Some dimensions refer to one
function only; for instance, the importance of vocational training is mostly relevant for
the allocative function. Most of them, however, refer to multiple functions at the same
time; for instance, the degrees of standardization and diﬀerentiation are important for
the three functions altogether, while the credentials certifications are important for both
the selection and the allocation of pupils, but not so much for their instruction.
In the diagram, I highlighted the set corresponding to instruction, because this is
the most relevant function when studying educational achievement. Hence, four dimen-
sions pertain to the theoretical framework of my empirical analyses: (i) the duration of
schooling, i.e. the amount of time pupils spend in the educational system; (ii) its degree
of stratification, i.e. the structural diﬀerentiation of students within given grades; (iii)
the allocation of human and financial resources; (iv) the degree of standardization in
the quality of education provided nationwide. I will elaborate more on them in chapter
4, where I will outline specific hypotheses on the importance of educational systems to
explain cross-country variation in migrant achievement penalties.
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SELECTION
INSTRUCTION
Duration
Standardization
Human and financial resources
Importance of 
vocational training
Credentials 
certification
Selection ideology
Stratification
Figure 2.1: Venn diagram depicting the institutional dimensions (in textboxs) theoretically relevant for one or
more manifest functions of educational systems (Hopper, 1968). The inner set pertains to the instruction function,
the right-side set to the allocation function, and the lower-side set to the selection function. Set intersections
correspond to the joint relevance of multiple functions (ex. lower-right corner, outer set: selection and allocation,
but not instruction). Own elaboration.
2.3 Children of immigrants’ categories and their integration
in the host society
Another important aspect of my theoretical background concerns the definition of chil-
dren of immigrants (or second-generation immigrants) and the hypotheses on their as-
similation with respect to the reference group in the host society.
In order to designate individuals of immigrant origin, one could rely on several cri-
teria, such as nationality, ethnic origin, descent, place of birth, or self-assessment. Nev-
ertheless, the self-assessment of national, ethnic, or generically migration origin is often
taken as a proxy of identity rather than an an objective criterion to define immigrant
status (Schneider et al., 2012). Ethnic origin is sometimes used as a defining criterion,
especially in the American or British literature, irrespective of the disciplinary aﬃlia-
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tion (Abbas, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2010; Strand, 2011). Nationality is a widely used
concept to define immigrant status, but it is problematic when referred to children of
immigrants, because if individuals of immigrant origin gain the right to citizenship—by
birth, residence or marriage—they cannot be distinguished anymore from the reference
group. Moreover, when interested in comparing the experience of children of immigrants
across countries with diﬀerent citizenship regimes, the use of nationality poses a second
challenge to the identification of children of immigrants, because the same concept has
diﬀerent meanings according to the host society considered. The most common defin-
ing criteria used in comparative studies are descent and place of birth: an individual is
considered of immigrant origin if she was born abroad of if her parents were.
In turn, children of immigrants are usually diﬀerentiated according to their genera-
tional status. Strictly speaking, first-generation immigrants (G1 ) are those who actually
moved from the origin- to the destination-country, while second-generation immigrants
(G2 ) were born in the destination-country from immigrant parents. There are good the-
oretical reasons to keep these two categories as distinct when studying their integration
within the school system: while G1 have directly undergone the migration experience and
the ineluctable trauma connected to it, G2 can only experience it through the memories
of their parents; G1 are likely to suﬀer from greater linguistic and cultural diﬃculties than
G2, not only because they have been exposed to the receiving society for a shorter period,
but also because—in most cases—so have their parents; finally, G1 may put more eﬀort
in schooling than G2, because newly arrived migrants generally have high expectations
about their children’s upward mobility (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997; Portes and
Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut and Portes, 2001). Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 3, their ed-
ucational outcomes (in terms of achievement, attainment and choices) diﬀer considerably.
When studying children and adolescents, some adopt a broader definition of G2 including
those who migrated at very early age (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Farley and Alba, 2002;
Heath et al., 2008; Alba and Waters, 2011). As an alternative, other scholars opt for a
more fine-grained distinction of first-generation immigrants according to time spent in
the receiving society, following the framework proposed by Rumbaut (2004): immigrants
of “generation 1.75” arrived in the destination-country when aged 0-5 years; “generation
1.5” when aged 6-12, “generation 1.25” when aged 13-17 and the proper “generation 1”
when aged 18 o more. Accounting for age at arrival of first-generation migrants—be it
in a categorical framework like the one just outlined or in a metric framework like many
econometric studies do (see Section 3.1.1)—is important because early socialization with
native peers is crucial for the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills of mi-
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grant students (Schofield, 2006) and diﬃculties in foreign language acquisition increase
harshly with age (Johnson and Newport, 1989; Larsen-Freeman and Long, 1991; Hakuta
et al., 2003; Birdsong, 2006; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). In this dissertation, I define
children of immigrants as individuals whose parents were both born abroad. My empirical
analyses are based on second-generation immigrants strictly defined, i.e. those children
of immigrants who were born in the host society.
The question of whether and how children of immigrants integrate in the host society
can be framed according to two competing theoretical frameworks. On the one hand,
according to the assimilation perspective, second- and especially third-generation mi-
grants are subject to a long-run process that makes them increasingly similar to natives
in terms of values, behaviors, statuses and even identities. Moreover, according to the
framework provided by Gordon (1964), an important facet of this process is structural
assimilation, which implies a gradual equalization of migrant descendants with respect to
core institutions of the receiving society, including the educational system. This vision of
straight-line assimilation fell into disrepute after the spread of non-White immigrants in
the US. However, during the 1990s, some scholars claimed the continuity of long-run pat-
terns of integration between traditional and contemporary immigrants to the US (Alba
and Nee, 1997; Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Farley and Alba, 2002; Esser, 2004).
According to this “new assimilation theory”, children of immigrants become increasingly
similar to natives, since (i) they invest on human capital via language acquisition and
schooling, (ii) they gain access to social networks and (iii) they build cultural capital
specific to the host society. Diﬀerences in the distribution of characteristics consist more
and more of individual within-group variances, while between-group variances tend to
disappear. From the perspective of this dissertation, it is worth noticing that the long-
term situation envisaged by new-assimilation theorists corresponds to a perfect equality
of opportunity of the kind advanced by Coleman (1968).
On the other hand, according to the theorists of segmented assimilation (Portes and
Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut and Portes, 2001), struc-
tural factors penalizing immigrants tend to persist over time. According to these scholars,
second-generation immigrants can face three diﬀerent paths of assimilation: (i) growing
acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class, i.e. “upward assim-
ilation”; (ii) permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass, i.e. “downward
assimilation”; (iii) rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the im-
migrant community’s values and tight solidarity, i.e. “selective acculturation”. However,
socio-economically disadvantaged oﬀspring of immigrants are most likely to get trapped
24
in the pathway of downward assimilation. Whether children of migrants will follow a
path or another depends on three key factors: parental educational and occupational
level, family structure, and society modes of incorporation. It is interesting to point out
that—while the first two aspects closely remind of human and social capital as Coleman’s
mechanisms for the intergenerational transmission of educational inequality—the third
aspect is specific to the experience of students of immigrant origin. By including modes
of incorporation as a potential explanatory factor behind diﬀerent paths of assimilation,
these scholars explicitly account for the importance of the institutional, societal, and
community context in mediating the reproduction of inequalities by migratory status.
2.4 Case selection: comparing immigration countries
The integration of immigrants in the host societies has been studied from a variety of
disciplines and perspectives, but most of the times the focus in on single countries rather
than on international comparisons. A considerable contribution to the comparability of
immigration countries comes from political scientists and, more specifically, from scholars
who adopt a historical institutional perspective.
Freeman (1995) first distinguished traditional settlement countries (Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, and USA) from states with post-war labor recruitment (continental Eu-
rope, the UK, and—to a lesser extent—Nordic countries) and new immigration countries,
which have turned from emigration- into immigration-societies in the 1980s (Italy, Spain)
or even late 1990s (Greece, Ireland, Portugal). While for the first group of countries immi-
gration has been a fundamental factor of development, in Europe mass immigration has
occurred within fully developed economies. Partly overlapping categorizations are based
on citizenship regimes, like the one proposed by Safran (1997), contrasting ius sanguinis
and ius soli as deriving from the historical conception of the nation state as “ethnic” or
“civic”, with Germany and France being the obvious antithetic ideal types. Still other cat-
egorizations of immigration states consider not only citizenship and naturalization rules,
but also the political, social, and economic incorporation of immigrants. Soysal (1994)
defined four incorporation regimes: the corporatist one, exemplified by Sweden and the
Netherlands, the individualist one (Switzerland and Great Britain), the state-centralised
one (France) and the mixed statist-corporatist one (Germany). However, probably the
most well-known classification of integration modes is the one proposed by Castles and
Miller (2003), who distinguished between assimilationism (prevalent in former colonial
countries and especially in France), diﬀerential exclusion (characteristic of guestworkers
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countries), multiculturalism (typical of the USA and Canada and subsequently imported
by the UK, Netherlands, and Sweden).
However, as pointed out by several authors, since the 1990s European regimes are
converging both in citizenship (Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Brochmann, 2002; Cas-
tles and Miller, 2003) and incorporation (Favell, 2002, 2005; Castles and Miller, 2003;
Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Freeman, 2004; Oloski, 2012) regimes. Public policies in
these domains are converging partially due to a “thin Europeanization” occurring in in
EU-promoted free movement agendas, inclusion measures and anti-discrimination pro-
grams (Geddes, 2000). On the contrary, the divide with non-European countries has
grown deeper, with the latter still encouraging immigration for permanent settlement
on a significant scale, while European countries have been focusing on restraining not
only undocumented, but also labor, family-reunification and humanitarian immigration
(Geddes, 2000; Favell, 2005).
As a consequence, within migration studies, rigid classifications of immigration coun-
tries have been criticized for their limited heuristic value by scholars of public policy. The
latter have opened up the ground to other subfields of research, investigating (i) which
policy mixes are actually implemented in the domains of immigration and incorporation
policies; (ii) how liberal democracies deal with the tension between immigration and wel-
fare, which challenges traditional notions of territoriality, citizenship and solidarity; (iii)
how interests, ideas, and institutions shape immigration and incorporation policies at a
national and supranational level; and finally (iv) which are the outcomes of such policies.
Although these questions delineate a field which is largely unexplored, it is worth-
while mentioning the work of Bommes and Geddes (2000), who collected contributions by
several scholars from political science, government and political economy and provided
an articulate reflection on whether migration constitutes a threat to the survival of na-
tional welfare states. In particular, Halfmann (2000) argues that the fundamental reason
why migration poses a challenge to the sovereignty of nation states is that it violates the
univocity of the relation between the state and the people residing in its territory. This
tension has generally brought to an ambivalent movement in immigration policies: on
the one hand, chances for social inclusion in national welfare states have progressively
been extended to non-national legal residents, providing a partial membership denoted
with the status of “denizenship”. On the other hand, restrictive policies for the control
of immigration flows have been put in place. Nevertheless, as made clear throughout the
volume, national welfare states have put in action diﬀerent strategies to face this chal-
lenge, depending on the historical, social and political contexts and, more specifically, on
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the role of territoriality and the institutional configuration of welfare regimes. Moreover,
as argued by Banting (2000), the depiction of migration as a threat to welfare systems is
far too simplistic, and should be framed within broader debates on welfare state devel-
opment, such as the pressures of subnational and supranational actors who contribute
to the transformation of the notion of social citizenship. On the one hand, regionalis-
tic claims in countries like Belgium, Canada, Spain, and the UK emerged as powerful
forces able to redefine the conception of political community within which redistribution
should take place. On the other hand, EU Member States have yielded part of their
sovereignty in a number of policy domains which are likely to influence to a great extent
the way nationals and immigrants benefit of their social rights. Similarly, Brochmann
(2002) developed the case for an interplay among the process of European integration,
migration, and welfare state transformation, by pointing out that—in the absence of a
common social policy regime—the role of the EU has ambiguous consequences on the
broader issues of citizenship and inclusion in European welfare states. On the one hand,
the realization of the single market and the creation of the European citizenship have led
to a growing importance of the supranational level to the detriment of national contexts
of belonging. On the other hand—since social rights are dispensed mainly at a national
level—for immigrants, membership in nation-states is still a political theme.
The acknowledgment that immigrant and incorporation policies have strong distribu-
tive implications raises another kind of question: what are their political determinants?
Unfortunately, this point has raised little interest among political scientists, with the
praiseworthy exception of Hollifield (2008), who has studied the relations between policy
inputs, outputs and outcomes in traditional and new immigration countries. Hollifield
moved from the work of Freeman (1995), who argued that the typical mode of im-
migration politics in the liberal democracies is client politics, because the benefits of
immigration tend to be concentrated, while its costs are diﬀuse. However, he extended
this framework, by claiming that not only interests, but also rights and ideas matter
in explaining incorporation regimes. Countries of liberal and republican tradition, like
the United States, France, and Germany, have seen an expansion of political and social
rights of immigrants, allegedly due to institutional and judiciary processes, limiting the
ability of executive and legislative authorities to restrict such individual rights. Indeed,
“rights have a very long life in liberal democracies. Once they are extended and institu-
tionalized, it is extremely diﬃcult to roll them back” (Hollifield, 2008, 163). However,
his framework is not a historical deterministic one, since the pressures of political ac-
tors can become so compelling to overcome the stickiness of institutional mechanisms.
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This is especially the case when the lack of socio-economic assimilation of immigrants
unambiguously highlights that, within the majority ethnic group, some win and some
lose from the progression of the immigration phenomenon. Finally, the role of ideas
in shaping immigration and incorporation policies and their consequences is not trivial,
since: “Migration policy (...) is heavily influenced by national or founding myths, which
are codified in citizenship and nationality laws. These myths about the national identity
are fungible, subject to manipulation, and involve strong elements of symbolic politics”
(Hollifield, 2008, 162).
From my perspective, the main contribution of political science to migration studies
has been to provide a theoretical framework for the comparison of immigration coun-
tries, based on the one hand on the historical development of immigration flows and the
policies governing them, and on the other hand on the institutional settings designed
to incorporate immigrants in the political, cultural and socio-economic spheres. Regret-
tably, so far the study of the consequences of public policies in terms of incorporation of
immigrants in the host society is still underdeveloped.
The theoretical framework just outlined guided me in the definition of my scope
conditions and case selection. By embracing the idea of a “thin Europeanization” in the
domain of immigration and incorporation policies, I argue in favor of the fundamental
comparability of immigration societies in Western Europe, as opposed to Eastern and
Central European countries and traditional settlement societies (Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and USA). Hence, my dissertation can be seen as a bounded regional comparison.
In other words, the generalizability of my empirical analyses is not meant to go beyond
the scope of Western European countries. In the phase of case selection, I have tried
to include the whole set of Western European countries. However, in order to ensure a
suﬃcient degree of precision of the estimates, I excluded those countries where the sample
sizes for second-generation immigrants are too small. My final case selection includes:
Austria, Belgium (split into Belgium-Flanders and Belgium-Wallonia, in reason of their
diﬀerent educational systems), Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy1, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and England
1As for Italy, the sample was split in North and Center on the one hand, and South on the other
hand. This choice was made because of the well known territorial divide (students from the South
perform much more poorly) and the limited presence of second-generation migrants in the South. An
accurate measure of relative disadvantage must contrast second generation migrants with their native
peers (therefore, natives in Northern and Central Italy). Since Southern Italy displayed too few G2, it
was excluded from the analyses. Consequently, results for Italy refer exclusively to Northern and Central
Italy.
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and Wales. Iceland, Ireland, Scotland and Northern Ireland were excluded because of the
small sizes for second-generation migrants. In order to make the case selection process
more transparent, I anticipate here part of the data used in Chapter 3. As can be seen
in Table 2.1, which displays the sample sizes of G2 in all Western European countries, I
selected only those countries with more than 50 observations.
selected countries N excluded countries N
Austria 869 Iceland 21
Belgium Flanders 380 Italy (South) 42
Belgium Wallonia 683 Northern Ireland 28
Switzerland 3066 Scotland 46
Germany 763
Denmark 1109
England and Wales 556
Spain 396
Finland 69
France 831
Greece 194
Italy (North and Center) 306
Luxembourg 1910
Netherlands 764
Norway 307
Portugal 247
Sweden 609
Table 2.1: Source: PISA 2006-2009, unweighted. Sample sizes of of G2 in all Western European countries.
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Chapter 3
The educational achievement of
second-generation immigrants in
Western Europe
What is the situation of students of immigrant origin in Western Europe? What are
their outcomes, with respect to educational attainment, achievement and choices? How
do they perform when compared to their native peers? Do they fare similarly across
countries, or rather their educational outcomes change when considering international
comparisons? The present chapter addresses these questions (i) by reviewing the state-
of-the-art literature from the sociology and the economics of education and (ii) by pre-
senting original analyses focused on the relative disadvantage in educational achievement
experienced by second-generation immigrants when compared to their native peers. In
doing so, I lay bare the explanandum of my thesis: migrant achievement penalties, which
diﬀer considerably across Western European countries. This raises the question of why
this variation occurs and whether it can be traced back to diﬀerent kinds of educational
systems. Throughout the chapter, I refer to educational systems as potential explanantes.
However, the explanation of cross-country variation in migrant penalties is addressed in
a more systematic way in Chapter 4.
3.1 Previous studies
The learning disadvantage of children of immigrants has been extensively studied by
sociologists as well as by economists of education. The literature review presented in
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this section is organized by topic rather than by discipline. In other words, I try to
highlight commonalities and divergences in the empirical findings of both sociological
and econometric studies addressing similar research questions. However, it should be
noted that—though really interested in the same empirical phenomenon—scholars from
the two disciplines frame it diﬀerently.
Within sociology, asymmetries in the educational outcomes of students of native and
immigrant origin are conceptualized as the result of a stratification process. To start
with, stratification underlies one of the key questions of the current integration debate,
that we can think of as part of a general resources framework (Kristen et al., 2011): can
the resources and opportunities available within the immigrant group provide favorable
conditions for educational success? While segmented assimilation theory predicts that
ethnic resources, in terms of relationships, networks, orientations, identities, and lan-
guage use, compensate for structural disadvantages (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997;
Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut and Portes, 2001), assimilation and new assimi-
lation theories predict that the lack of linguistic, cultural, relational, and informational
resources relevant to the host society is disruptive in hindering the educational oppor-
tunities of children of immigrants (Alba and Nee, 1997; Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997;
Farley and Alba, 2002; Esser, 2004). Hence, a special attention is reserved to diﬀer-
ences in educational outcomes between ethnic groups, in so far as they can be traced
back to resources available to the diﬀerent communities. Beyond its relevance for the
integration debate, the perspective of stratification is important because the education
system is fundamentally conceived by sociologists as a mediating factor in the process
of intergenerational reproduction of inequalities. While sociologists recognize that com-
petences acquired during schooling are important for future life chances, they generally
focus more on the benefits associated to educational qualifications and certificates. Ac-
cordingly, when studying the educational careers of children of immigrants, sociologists
privilege the dimensions of educational attainment and choices as opposed to the one of
achievement.
On the contrary, within economics, education is understood in terms of human capital
production. In this process, families invest monetary and non-monetary resources in
order to build up their children’s human capital (Becker, 1964). Empirical studies are
based on educational production functions relating various inputs aﬀecting students’
human capital to measured outputs such as educational achievement, attainment or even
subsequent labor market outcomes. Inputs generally include individual attributes, such
as measures of previous ability, gender, family background, parental behavior and, clearly,
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migratory status, but also characteristics of peers, neighborhoods and schools. Estimated
marginal eﬀects provide the size of diﬀerent channels of intergenerational transmission
of inequality. Given the importance of human capital formation in this perspective,
economists chiefly study migrant/native achievement gaps, while the study of diﬀerences
in attainment or school choice is far less common within this discipline.
Though moving from diﬀerent theoretical frameworks, these two streams of research
share broad common interests in the study of the sources of migrant learning disad-
vantage. More precisely, when investigating its individual-level determinants, they aim
at disentangling what stems from: (i) less favorable endowments in conventional socio-
economic resources, (ii) diﬀerential returns to such resources, and (iii) counterproductive
migrant-specific resources. This implies looking at the eﬀects of socio-economic back-
ground and migratory status both independently and in interaction with each other.
Moreover, scholars from both disciplines are interested in the institutional determinants
of migrant learning disadvantage. While studies specifically aimed at understanding the
role of educational systems will be discussed in Chapter 4, in this section I present stud-
ies that—although mainly focused on individual-level processes and determinants—take
into account what happens in the educational system, most notably the relevance of
interactions with teachers and peers. Since educational systems are fairly stable across
time, while they vary considerably across countries, these factors are best understood in a
comparative framework. However, within economy of education natural experiments—as
well as other counterfactual techniques for causal inference—are often used to estimate
the impact of educational institutions on migrant achievement. Therefore, the role of
specific features of educational system in mediating inequalities can also be assessed by
single-country studies.
3.1.1 The double educational disadvantage of children of immigrants
A common finding of empirical works on the educational careers of children of immi-
grants is that the latter, when compared to their native peers, generally face a double
disadvantage: the first one is associated with the lower socio-economic and cultural
resources—since immigrant families are generally concentrated towards the bottom of
the class structure—while the second one is specific of migrant status. Within this lit-
erature, social background is variously defined, emphasizing cultural and social, along
with economic, resources. So, parental educational level is often used as a proxy for
cultural capital, whereas status and wealth are typically operationalized by means of
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socio-economic indexes and occupational class categorizations. These factors generally
explain the lower educational attainment of immigrants to a great extent. However, a
residual disadvantage persists even after controlling for such factors. In other words, an
additional disadvantage is associated to the migratory status as such, sometimes referred
to as “ethnic penalty” (Heath and Cheung, 2007; Heath et al., 2008). Therefore, em-
pirical evidence partially confirms the pessimistic predictions of segmented assimilation
theory. However, many works have documented that second-generation immigrants gen-
erally perform better than first-generations immigrants and that among the latter, early
arrival in the host society acts as a mitigating factor of educational inequality. Hence, a
partial and progressive assimilation process seems to be in place.
Two other peculiar findings are worth mentioning. First of all, a common subject of
inquiry are the (diﬀerential) educational returns to parental socio-economic status (SES )
for immigrant and natives. Several of these studies show that the former indeed benefit
to a lesser extent than the latter of their endowments in economic, social, and cultural
capital. Second, when studying track placement as a consequence of educational choices
by students and their families, a number of scholars found that, although students of
immigrant origin are overrepresented in vocational tracks, when they are compared to
natives with similar academic performance, they generally opt for more prestigious tracks.
However, as detailed in what follows, these two findings are not fully established yet,
because they are only substantiated by studies conducted in some countries. Moreover,
other studies fail to detect significant diﬀerences between natives and immigrants in the
returns to SES or in their educational aspirations.
Educational attainment
By using national administrative data, Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and Riphahn
(2003) show that in Germany the disadvantage of students of immigrant origin in ed-
ucational attainment is a serious issue. Although the gaps are more pronounced for
first-generation immigrants, also German-born children of immigrants substantially fall
behind. However, Kristen and Granato (2007) showed that the attainment gap of
second-generation immigrants results primarily from socio-economic rather than ethnic-
specific inequalities. Indeed, second-generation young adults—in particular Turks and
Italians—experience pronounced disadvantages in comparison to their German peers in
terms of attending or completing the highest schooling track leading to the Abitur. How-
ever, initial diﬀerences in the chances of attaining the Abitur disappear after considering
34
parental education and social class, with the exception of Italian young adults. These
conclusions are partially supported by Kalter et al. (2007) who directly confronted the
experiences of first- and second-generation immigrants in Germany with respect to edu-
cational and occupational outcomes. While it is confirmed that socio-economic resources
explain migrant disadvantages to a significant extent, they find that ethnic specific penal-
ties are in place, in particular for students of Turkish origin, and especially so for first-
generation immigrants.
Analogous results emerge from research carried out in Belgium, where Timmerman
et al. (2003) and Phalet et al. (2007) document a partial assimilation of second-generation
immigrants, a growing proportion of whom is gaining access to higher secondary educa-
tion and beyond. Here again, Turkish youngsters appear to lag behind other minority
groups, such as Moroccans, in reason of their particularly deprived socio-economic back-
ground.
For Denmark, Colding (2006) finds that children of immigrants are more likely than
natives to dropout from upper secondary education, even after accounting for parental ed-
ucational, occupational and income situation, for family structure, and for neighborhood
characteristics. Jakobsen and Smith (2003) trace the poor attainment rates of immi-
grants in Denmark precisely to high dropout rates, which in turn are found to depend on
parental human capital, on age at first marriage and on the attitude of the parents to-
wards education. This also explains the worse performance of students of Turkish origin
as opposed to other minorities.
Therefore, dropping out of secondary schooling can dramatically decrease immigrants’
employability. In line with that, Laganà et al. (2013) found that, in Switzerland, chil-
dren of immigrants are more likely than natives to be “Not in education, employment,
or training” (NEET ), and that the role of socio-economic background in explaining the
transitions into NEET is not decisive since, especially for some minorities (Portuguese,
former-Yugoslav, Albanian, and Turkish immigrants), a residual disadvantage persists.
Bauer and Riphahn (2007) further investigated the educational disadvantage of children
of immigrants in Switzerland by questioning the role of ethnic resources. According to
Borjas (1992), ethnic capital acts as a positive externality in the human capital accu-
mulation process and therefore can account for heterogeneity in the intergenerational
transmission of educational inequality. By focusing on migrant/native attainment gaps,
Bauer and Riphahn (2007) found only partial support for this hypothesis: costs of edu-
cation and family size do aﬀect educational mobility, but—even in situations of low costs
and few siblings—the impact of parental education is still considerable. Moreover, they
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find no eﬀect of country-of-origin characteristics and ethnic capital in interaction with
the parental educational level: the predicted probability of high educational attainment
is higher for those with little ethnic capital, independent of parental education. On the
contrary, Gang and Zimmermann (2000) had found that, in Germany, the size of the
ethnic network has a positive eﬀect on educational attainment.
Several studies from the sociology of education indicate that also in the Netherlands
children of migrants suﬀer from a specific disadvantage that cannot be reduced to socio-
economic background (Tolsma et al., 2007; van Niekerk, 2007; Crul, 2009). These results
are backed up by econometric studies. In particular, Van Ours and Veenman studied the
educational attainment of native and immigrant students aged between 15 and 29 and
documented the existence of a specific disadvantage associated with migratory status,
net of socio-economic background (van Ours and Veenman, 2003, 2006). Educational
careers of migrant students are aﬀected by their national origin, with Turkish-origin
students emerging as a particularly problematic minority (Crul, 2009), while children of
post-colonial immigrants, like Caribbeans, are less disadvantaged (van Niekerk, 2007).
Moreover, in the Netherlands, migrant-specific disadvantage in educational attainment
has not decreased over time, unlike other forms of educational inequality, notably class-
based and gender-based (Tolsma et al., 2007).
In Austria too, students of Turkish origin experience the greatest diﬃculties in at-
taining educational qualifications beyond compulsory education (Herzog-Punzenberger,
2003). Not many studies focus on immigrant integration in Austria. Nevertheless, the
situation of children of immigrants in the Austrian educational system is very poor, since
three quarters of workers of immigrant origin have attained only the lowest qualifications
(Fassmann and Reeger, 2007).
In Italy, research on educational disadvantage of children of immigrants is a relatively
new field: recent studies (Canino, 2010; Azzolini and Barone, 2013) document a substan-
tially higher risk for immigrant vs. native students to dropout from secondary school
without attaining any diploma, while according to Casacchia et al. (2008) and Barban
and White (2011), children of immigrants perform worse than native-Italian students
also in terms of grades. In both cases, migrant educational disadvantage is higher for
first-generation than for second-generation immigrants. Moreover, it is partially but not
completely explained by poor socio-economic resources.
Conversely, in France the educational disadvantage of second-generation students
seems to be fully traceable to resources diﬀerentials. Indeed, Vallet and Caille (1999)
found that, given social background and family environment, immigrants are even more
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successful than natives in the baccalauréat, i.e. the secondary school exit examination.
The authors illustrate that strong educational aspirations of immigrant families have a
mediating eﬀect and partly explain the more favorable school trajectories of their children.
Also in the very selective educational system of England andWales, aspirations—along
with economic, social, and cultural capital—are found to be crucial to attain educational
success for children of immigrants (Abbas, 2007). Furthermore, just like in the case of
France, when taking into account social class belonging, migrant educational disadvan-
tage disappears, even if not so for all minority groups (Connolly, 2006; Strand, 2011).
Therefore, with the partial exception of France and England and Wales, children of
immigrants suﬀer from a double disadvantage in educational attainment, which cannot be
explained by their lower socio-economic resources only. This “residual disadvantage”, or
“migrant penalty” could derive from deficits associated to their status of immigrants, for
instance insuﬃcient linguistic skills or a lack of cultural knowledges and codes specific to
the host society. Additionally, it could derive from the existence of diﬀerential returns to
socio-economic resources possessed by natives and immigrants. From a theoretical point
of view, we should expect to find lower educational returns to socio-economic status
(SES ) for immigrants than for natives. Indeed, children of immigrants are likely to
benefit less of their family background since in their case, parental education and social
status do not necessarily imply the possession of cultural and social capital specific of
the destination-country (Heath and Cheung, 2007). Moreover, educational qualifications
acquired in the origin country may not have (or may be perceived not to have) the
same value as those acquired in the destination country (Chiswick and Miller, 2009).
Thus immigrant parents can have a higher human capital than native parents with the
same occupational status. Human capital and high aspirations can compensate for the
social downgrading, hence the eﬀect of socio-economic status for migrant children could
be underestimated. Several works have tested the existence of a significant interaction
eﬀect between resources and migratory status in aﬀecting educational attainment. Many
of these analyses support the hypothesis of lower returns to parental SES for immigrants.
However, the evidence is not fully established. Wolbers and Driessen (1996), Fekjær
and Birkelund (2007), Kristen and Granato (2007), and Leopold and Shavit (2013) find
partial evidence in favor of a negative interaction eﬀect between SES and migratory status
(i.e., these resources are less less important for migrants than for natives in influencing
educational attainment). On the contrary, Phalet et al. (2007), Rothon (2007), Brinbaum
and Cebolla-Boado (2007), Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen (2007) and Azzolini and
Barone (2013) fail to detect any significant interaction eﬀect between the two. As noted
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by Heath et al. (2008), this lack of consistency can be attributed to methodological
diﬀerences in the way the relevant variables have been operationalized or to a lack of
statistical power to detect interactions. However, they could also reflect actual diﬀerences
among receiving societies in the way the processes of integration unravel.
Educational achievement
Just like parallel research on educational attainment, analyses of migrant/native achieve-
ment gaps indicate that children of migrants suﬀer from an educational disadvantage,
and that this disadvantage is somehow more serious for first-generation than for second-
generation immigrants (Hvistendahl and Roe, 2004; Van DeWerfhorst and Van Tubergen,
2007; Rothon, 2007; Besozzi, 2011). They also show that it is partially, though not fully
explained by diﬀerent endowments in socio-economic resources (Van De Werfhorst and
Van Tubergen, 2007; Rothon, 2007).
Additionally, many works from the economics of education address the question of
whether the age children experience migration aﬀects their academic performance. Gen-
erally, the younger is a child when he arrives in the destination country, the better is
his academic performance (Ohinata and van Ours, 2012). Possible explanations of the
negative eﬀect of age at arrival include the intricacy of the integration process hindered
by the trauma of the migrating experience (Schofield, 2006) as well as greater diﬃculties
in second-language acquisition. Indeed, cognitive sciences have shown that the ability
to learn a foreign language sharply decreases with age (Johnson and Newport, 1989;
Larsen-Freeman and Long, 1991) even if it is unclear whether learning diﬃculty is lin-
early aﬀected by age at arrival or if it is subject to a critical period (Hakuta et al., 2003;
Birdsong, 2006; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). Böhlmark (2008) use Swedish register data
on siblings to estimate the eﬀect of age at arrival on grades in the last year of compulsory
school. Their results point to the existence of a threshold eﬀect: children who migrated
before the age of nine are significantly and strongly more likely to get higher marks than
their siblings who migrated at older age. The critical importance of age nine is confirmed
by later studies on migrant educational attainment in Canada (Corak, 2011). However,
van Ours and Veenman (2006) find that critical ages at arrival vary according to gender
and country of origin.
In the previous subsection, I have mentioned some studies looking for possible in-
teraction eﬀects between socio-economic and migratory status in aﬀecting educational
attainment and I have concluded that this remains an open question. Some works have
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addressed the same question with respect to educational achievement. Here again, there
is not a strong evidence in favor or against the hypothesis of diﬀerential returns for
children of migrants. In a comparative study with broader aims, Schneeweis (2011) in-
cidentally finds that in some countries returns are negative, while in others they are
not significant. Getting back to single-country studies, Ammermüller (2007) investigates
whether children of immigrants in Germany perform poorly in the PISA tests because
of their limited socio-economic resources, or rather because of their low returns to these
resources. He finds no significant diﬀerences in the way natives and immigrants benefit
of family background. Botezat (2011) also considers the issue of diﬀerential returns to
achievement in PISA tests for immigrant students in Germany and finds partially con-
trasting results. By focusing on several dimensions of cultural capital, she finds that
while the impact of parental education is similar for natives and immigrants, educational
possessions are more important for the latter.
Educational choices
I now turn to discussing how research has investigated the processes and the outcomes
of choice between generalist and vocational tracks on the part of immigrant families.
Under this perspective, the structure of educational systems comes to light in setting
opportunities and constraints to individual students in pursuing their aspirations. Most
educational systems track students into vocational or generalist/academically-oriented
curricula. European tracking systems diﬀer in timing (targeting 10 to 16 years-old stu-
dents), decision criteria (binding vs. non-binding recommendations, based on teachers’
or external assessment) and rigidity (single or multiple decision points, bridging). Sev-
eral sociological and econometric studies investigate what are the consequences of such
institutional structures for the track placement of children of immigrants.
The literature consistently indicates that first- and second-generation immigrants are
more likely to choose the less prestigious vocational tracks. Evidence in this sense is
found for the early-tracking systems of Germany (Kristen et al., 2008), the Netherlands
(Tolsma et al., 2007; Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen, 2007), Switzerland (Laganà
et al., 2013) and Italy (Casacchia et al., 2008; Barban and White, 2011; Minello and
Barban, 2012). Also in systems where choice is postponed to upper-secondary schooling,
migrants appear to be under-represented in the most prestigious tracks, like the UK
(Jackson et al., 2012), France (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado, 2007; Cebolla Boado, 2011)
and Sweden (Jonsson and Rudolphi, 2011; Jackson et al., 2012).
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Why do children of immigrants tend to chose vocational over generalist tracks? A first
explanation resides in their lower socio-economic status. Indeed, it is a well established
fact that low-SES students are disproportionately represented in second-tier tracks, even
after controlling for prior ability (Jackson, 2013). However, as it was the case for the
disadvantage in educational attainment and achievement, the less ambitious educational
choices cannot be reduced to diﬀerentials in socio-economic resources (Tolsma et al.,
2007; Barban and White, 2011). A second explanation could be related to discriminatory
teachers’ attitudes in the choice-orientation process. However, as shown by Krause et al.
(2012) and Lüdemann and Schwerdt (2013), in Germany migrant students are just as
likely as their native peers with similar socio-economic background to receive teachers’
recommendations for any secondary school type.
On the contrary, diﬀerences in track placement seem to be at least partly ascribable
to diﬀerences in previous academic performance. As made clear in Chapter 2, Section 2.1,
Boudon (1974) introduced a key distinction in sociology of education between “primary”
and “secondary” eﬀects in school stratification. While the former concern the impact of
family background mediated by school performance, the latter pertain to its direct eﬀects.
A well established tradition of empirical works has developed methods to disentangle
primary and secondary eﬀects and applied them to inequalities related to social origin
(for an up-to-date comparative outlook, see Jackson, 2013). More recently, some scholars
have applied the same methods to explain choice inequalities related to migratory status.
Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen (2007) in the Netherlands, Cebolla Boado (2011)
in France, Kristen et al. (2008) in Germany and Jackson et al. (2012) in England and
Sweden found evidence of negative primary (performance) eﬀects but positive secondary
(choice) eﬀects for second-generation immigrants. In other words, students with an
immigrant background are found to make more ambitious track choices once previous
academic performance has been controlled for. This result is quite surprising considering
the fact that children of immigrants may lack relevant informational resources to navigate
the receiving country’s educational system. The reason why they disproportionately end
up in the least prestigious tracks is to be traced back to their lower grades in primary
and lower-secondary school, which in turn can be partly attributed to their migratory
status. In eﬀect, Frick and Wagner (2001) and Schnepf (2002) had already found that
migrants are not less likely to enroll in the Gymnasium than natives with similar previous
academic performance. However, the existence of a positive secondary eﬀect should not
be considered as a law-like regularity irrespective of the national context. For instance,
the work of Barban and White (2011) indicates that in Italy both primary and secondary
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eﬀects are negative for students of migrant origin.
Therefore, as suggested by theorists of segmented assimilation, children of immigrants
often have high educational aspirations, a finding that was hinted at by other empirical
studies with a more qualitative insight: Abbas (2007), with an in-depth study carried out
in Britain, found that working-class South Asian parents surprisingly displayed strong
middle-class attitudes towards selective education. This counterintuitive finding is some-
times called “immigrant paradox” (Poortinga et al., 2011). Although they have been
developed in a diﬀerent context, theoretical and empirical accounts of educational aspi-
rations of minority youth in the USA can shed light on aspirations expressed by children
of immigrants in Europe. According to Kao and Tienda (1998), two main lines of research
compete in explaining the high educational aspirations expressed by minority students
and their families: on the one hand, under the “status attainment framework” (Barr et al.,
1983), immigrants are assumed to be striving to meet the expectations of their co-ethnic
communities; on the other hand, under the “blocked opportunities framework”, (Sue and
Okazaki, 1990), they are assumed to invest in schooling to compensate the expected dis-
crimination on the labor market. The empirical analyses of Kao and colleagues, however,
indicate that neither framework is particularly helpful in understanding the high educa-
tional aspirations of Asians in the USA. Rather, they suggest that these aspirations are
driven by unrealistic wishes of upward social mobility on the part of immigrant families,
coupled with an insuﬃcient knowledge of the host country educational system, a pattern
which they define “immigrant optimism framework” (Kao, 1995; Kao and Tienda, 1995,
1998). Unfortunately, up to this moment, the relevance of such mechanisms has not been
systematically assessed in the European context. Two recent works go in this direction.
On the one hand, Salikutluk (2013)’s analyses on the aspirations to complete tertiary
education of Turkish youth, as opposed to native Germans, suggest that all the above-
mentioned mechanisms play a role in explaining the immigrant paradox, except for that
related to the lack of information. Indeed, students of Turkish origin have suﬃcient in-
formation about the requirements of the educational system. However, as she recognizes,
these are preliminary results which deserve deeper investigation. On the other hand,
Teney et al. (2013) tested and rejected the hypothesis of perceived ethnic discrimina-
tion in the labor market based on the educational aspirations declared by pupils of nine
minority groups in the city of Brussels. Rather, they suggest that the intergenerational
transmission of aspirations for upwards mobility plays a crucial role in determining the
higher educational aspirations of immigrant students.
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3.1.2 The role of teachers, classrooms, and schools
The studies reviewed so far focus on the micro-level determinants of migrant educational
disadvantage, notably on the characteristics of individual students and their families of
origin. Instead, in this section, I will discuss another cluster of works, which adopt a
meso-perspective by focusing on the role of teachers, classrooms, and schools in shaping
the educational opportunities of children of immigrants. While the general issue is al-
ways whether some students suﬀer from an educational disadvantage in reason of their
migratory origin, the research question is here shifted toward the role of educational
institutions in mediating the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
Clearly, teachers play a key role in determining how and what children learn. To
start with, psychological literature indicates that what teachers expect from their stu-
dents has a strong performative power on their actual learning behaviors and cognitive
development. In other words, teachers’ beliefs about the academic performance and the
overall intelligence of their students can turn into self-fulfilling prophecies, a phenomenon
that is known as “Pygmalion eﬀect” (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). In particular, it
has been shown that (i) teachers often have lower expectations for students from low
socio-economic status and/or immigrant or minority backgrounds and that (ii) the latter
are particularly vulnerable to the eﬀects of such expectations (Jussim and Harber, 2005).
Hence, teachers’ biases on the academic potential of children of immigrants can hinder
their actual cognitive development and contribute to their learning disadvantage relative
to their native peers.
Secondly, teachers are called to evaluate students in the form of grades, which are
the most visible indicator of school success and shape academic aspirations for the fu-
ture. Empirical works on teachers’ evaluations contribute to a greater understanding of
the mechanisms behind migrant educational disadvantage when they distinguish between
two diﬀerent dimensions of educational achievement: test scores, which reflect the per-
formance of students with respect to externally defined criteria, as opposed to grades or
marks assigned by teachers, a more subjective measure, which is likely to be influenced
by the overall evaluation of the student’s capacities, potential, eﬀort, and behavior and
could be potentially aﬀected by prejudices. With a study on children of migrants from
former Soviet Union to Israel, Leopold and Shavit (2013) show that, despite they perform
similarly on test scores, immigrants and natives of similar cultural capital are evaluated
diﬀerently by their teachers, with immigrants ending up with lower grades. Put dif-
ferently, migratory status mediates teachers’ biases in favor of students from culturally
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endowed homes. Therefore, teachers’ discriminatory attitudes could partially explain the
lower educational performance of children of immigrants. In Germany too, Lüdemann
and Schwerdt (2013) find that second-generation immigrants are more likely to have
lower grades than natives who attain similar performance scores in standardized tests.
The eﬀect is significant even after controlling for socio-economic resources, but only for
female students.
In the third place, the role of teachers is important because their recommendations on
school and track choice may impact the overall development of the educational careers of
their students. This is especially problematic for immigrants students and their parents,
who often lack the cultural capital specific to the host society and relevant to make
informed decisions at crucial educational transitions. Especially in educational systems
where tracking occurs at early age and teachers’ recommendations are mandatory for
track choice, the role of teachers is decisive. As we have just seen, teachers’ beliefs on
academic potential may be biased by students’ migratory status. However, lower teachers’
expectations do not necessarily translate into more discouraging recommendations for the
future. As shown by Kristen (2006), Krause et al. (2012) and Lüdemann and Schwerdt
(2013), in Germany migrant students are just as likely as their native peers with similar
ability to receive teachers’ recommendations for any secondary school type. In particular,
by using PIRLS 2001 data on 4th graders, Lüdemann and Schwerdt (2013) find that
second-generation immigrants are more likely to receive teachers’ recommendations for
the vocationally-oriented track of Hauptschule than for the academically-oriented track
of Gymnasium. However, the eﬀect is no longer significant after controlling for socio-
economic status and ability (measured by performance in standardized tests).
Beyond the role of teachers, another meso-level factor that is likely to influence edu-
cational inequalities by migratory status is the way students are allocated to classrooms
and schools. It is often the case that students with similar initial achievement levels,
socio-economic status (SES ) or migratory background end up being schooled together.
The extent to which classrooms and schools are segregated may have determinants that
are endogenous or exogenous to the school system. On the one hand, it partly reflects
residential segregation, i.e. the disproportionate concentration of individuals of similar
SES or ethnic origin in given neighborhoods (Karsten, 2010). On the other hand, school
and classroom segregation might derive from the fact that some educational systems are
explicitly aimed at fostering academic homogeneity, for instance through ability group-
ing or ability-based tracking (Schofield, 2006). Since the condition of low-achiever is
more common among students of disadvantaged background, these mechanisms lead to
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an over-representation of disadvantaged students in second-tier tracks, classrooms, and
groups. Moreover, segregation may depend on the degree of freedom in school choice
and on the possibility for schools to define admission rules and to engage in students’
profiling Karsten (2010).
In particular, many contributions have focused on the consequences of immigrant seg-
regation in schools. There appears to be solid empirical evidence of a negative correlation
between the concentration of students of immigrant origin in given schools and the aver-
age achievement in the same schools (Felouzis, 2003; Portes and Hao, 2004; Fekjær and
Birkelund, 2007; Szulkin and Jonsson, 2007). Whether this correlation reflects a causal
relation between immigrant segregation and achievement is a much more debated issue.
In particular, once accounting for socio-economic background and the non-randomness
of sorting into schools, the eﬀects of immigrant concentration become rather small or
non-significant.
In principle, three main mechanisms may explain the negative correlation between
segregation and achievement. They are respectively related to peer-, school-, and com-
positional eﬀects (Cebolla Boado and Garrido Medina, 2011). First, if students of im-
migrant origin are already less inclined towards schooling, finding themselves grouped
together with other students with similar attitudes may have a negative influence on
their school performance (Ogbu, 2003). Beyond the direct influence within the class-
room, immigrant segregation may also entail access to less developed social networks in
the community, and consequently to limited informational resources. This hypothesis
has been developed with respect to (involuntary) minorities in the United States, most
notably African-Americans. In this context, it has been supported by empirical evidence
(Portes and Zhou, 1993; Hoxby, 2000; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). However, as noticed
by Kroneberg (2008), such theoretical account is only partially helpful when dealing with
immigrants in Europe, some of whom exhibit strong aspirations for the upward mobility
of their children. Therefore, students of immigrant origin may be even more positively
oriented towards school than natives. A second possible explanation of the negative
correlation between immigrant segregation and average school achievement refers to the
existence of school eﬀects. On the one hand, students of immigrant origin tend to be
segregated into schools characterized by a poor learning environment, both with respect
to teaching and to material resources (Schindler Rangvid, 2007). Indeed, highly qualified
teachers have an incentive and means to leave troublesome schools (Wyckoﬀ and Boyd,
2005; Barbieri et al., 2010). At the same time, a higher turnover is associated with less
eﬀective teaching (Wyckoﬀ and Boyd, 2005). On the other hand, in schools or class-
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rooms populated by many immigrant students, in order to keep up with students who
lack some linguistic skills, teachers may slow down the pace and lower their assessment
standards. This adaptation process may result into a less demanding learning environ-
ment (Schofield, 2006; Cebolla Boado and Garrido Medina, 2011). The third and final
mechanism that can explain why higher levels of school segregation are associated with
lower achievement scores is not a causal one, but refers to mere compositional eﬀects.
To rephrase, since students of immigrant origin generally perform worse than native
students, schools where immigrant students are overrepresented will naturally tend to
display lower average scores. While this is always partially true, compositional eﬀects do
not rule out, in principle, the possibility that segregation has an additional impact on
achievement, because, even after accounting for individual characteristics, an association
between the two might still be in place.
In order to disentangle the three above-mentioned mechanisms and to assess the
relative importance of each one of them, several empirical works have investigated the ef-
fects of school or classroom concentration of immigrants on achievement more in depth.
Such works have found little evidence of a causal impact of migrant concentration on
educational outcomes (Fekjær and Birkelund, 2007; Szulkin and Jonsson, 2007; Ce-
bolla Boado, 2007; Cebolla Boado and Garrido Medina, 2011; Contini, 2013). Rather,
compositional eﬀects seem to drive the correlation. In particular, Schindler Rangvid
(2007), Cebolla Boado (2007), Cebolla Boado and Garrido Medina (2011), Ohinata and
van Ours (2011, 2013), Contini (2013) and Schneeweis (2013) found no or negligible peer
eﬀects in Denmark, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria respectively. In
other words, the presence of immigrants students does not have a negative influence per
se on general performance. Rather, where concentration of immigrants is associated to
lower test scores or grades, composition eﬀects are in place: prior sorting of individuals
across schools brings about more or less favorable school compositions: schools where
students are more favorably selected generally perform better because their more advan-
taged students do so. Some of these studies also indicate that, when in place, negative
peer eﬀects associated to migrant school concentration are generally more detrimental
for immigrant students themselves than for native students (Szulkin and Jonsson, 2007;
Contini, 2013; Schneeweis, 2013), and especially so for linguistically-intensive subjects
(Ohinata and van Ours, 2011).
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3.1.3 Cross-country diﬀerences
The empirical literature reviewed so far in this chapter reveals that in most Western Eu-
ropean countries, children of immigrants suﬀer from a double educational disadvantage:
one related to their socio-economic background, and one specific to their migratory sta-
tus. In several of these countries, this migrant-specific disadvantage is serious. However,
the review has also suggested that cross-country diﬀerences exist in the severeness of
this disadvantage. Some educational systems seem to foster learning opportunities for
students of immigrant origin.
In particular, we have seen that country studies performed in France and Britain
show that, in these systems, immigrants perform nearly as well as native students with
similar socio-economic background. For instance, in Britain, Dustmann et al. (2010) find
that, despite the fact that minority children experience achievement gaps before starting
school, these gaps are substantially reduced during compulsory schooling, and turn into
substantial advantages for some ethnic groups at the end of compulsory schooling. They
also show that second generation immigrants tend to attain higher qualifications than
their parents and—with the exception of Black Caribbeans—than their native peers.
The intergenerational improvement is far larger for ethnic minorities than for natives,
delineating a process of integration into the British educational system. Beyond these
more apparent cases, it is diﬃcult to compare results of single-country studies and to
assess where children of immigrants perform substantially worse than their native peers
and where, on the contrary, they fare nearly as well.
Some works adopt a comparative perspective in the sense that, despite being carried
out at a national scale, they share the same analytical framework and address the same
research questions. The main findings of such studies have been reported in the previous
sections. From a methodological viewpoint, it is worth mentioning the special issue
of Ethnicities investigating, separately for several Western European countries and the
USA, whether traditional measures of social background can explain the observed ethnic
inequalities in educational attainment (see the guest editorial by Heath and Brinbaum,
2007). While focusing on diﬀerent aspects of educational outcomes, relying on diﬀerent
kinds of datasets and adopting diﬀerent operationalizations of the key variables, these
papers take a step forward in revealing similar processes behind Ethnic Educational
Inequality (EEI) across national contexts. A similar comparative eﬀort has been made by
Heath and Cheung (2007), who analyze EEI as a component of the more general picture
of the socio-economic integration of second-generation immigrants in several Western
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European countries, Israel, North America and Australia. Despite providing fascinating
insights on the mechanisms underlying the ethnic stratification patterns in schools and
the intergenerational transmission of inequality within immigrant families, juxtaposed
single-country studies are not truly comparative. Hence, for those who are interested
in understanding whether and why children of immigrants perform diﬀerently in various
countries, they are limited because they do not allow direct comparison neither between
the outcomes of interest, nor between their determinants.
In order to perform meaningful comparisons, one has to make sure that the analyti-
cal units, the concepts at stake and the variables used to operationalize them are similar
enough. To start with, a suﬃcient degree of homogeneity must be reached among desti-
nation countries to be compared. This issue is extensively discussed in Chapter 2, Section
2.4, where I motivate my scope conditions and case selection, and in Chapter 4, Section
4.1.3 where I review comparative studies that investigate the way institutional aspects
shape opportunities and constraints of students with an immigrant background. Sec-
ondly, comparative researchers must ensure that the concepts of “children of immigrants”
and “educational outcomes” have the same meaning in the selected countries. Citizenship
and ethnic self-identification have strong political and historical connotations in Euro-
pean countries and beyond. Hence, in order to identify immigrants, most comparative
studies rely on the birthplace of students and their parents. As for educational outcomes,
dimensions of attainment and choice are much more diverse across countries than that
of cognitive achievement. Therefore, the privileged dimension in comparative studies is
often that of achievement, even if several studies from the sociology of education focus
on school completion and track choices instead. International comparisons also have to
set a reference point in order to define educational success. Since the goal of most studies
is to assess the degree to which children of immigrants are integrated in the host society
school system, the reference point is generally set as the mean performance of native
students. Hence, inequalities stemming from migratory status are conceived as relative
disadvantages with respect to the majority group. The third challenge to be met by com-
parativists is to find common measurement frameworks in order to operationalize the key
concepts of the analysis. Data derived from national statistical oﬃces pose a hurdle to
comparative research because they employ diﬀerent definitions (regarding educational
outcomes, migratory status as well as other measures of family background). There-
fore, genuinely comparative studies usually rely on self-collected data or internationally
standardized data.
Studies based on self-collected data are rare because they are necessarily part of large-
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scale and extensive surveys. A prominent research project of this kind is represented by
TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation), a seven-year collaboration
on the educational and occupational attainment of children of immigrants in eight Eu-
ropean countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
and Switzerland). The general idea behind its research design is that, in order to study
the experiences of immigrants, three meaningful comparisons can be made: the “linear”
strategy consists in contrasting the origin- and destination-country of each immigrant
group, the “convergent” one in contrasting diﬀerent origin groups within one destination-
country, and the “divergent” one in contrasting the same origin group across diﬀerent
destination countries (Green, 2005, p.13-16). The TIES project is indeed based on the
divergent strategy, since the survey focuses on one immigrant group at a time across
destination countries: the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia,
and Morocco. Several publications streamed from this project, like Crul and Schneider
(2009), which develops the case of Turkish students in Germany and the Netherlands,
and Crul et al. (2012a), a more comprehensive account of the project. The chapter on
educational attainment of Alba and Waters (2011) also reports part of the results from
the TIES survey. Generally, students of Turkish origin are more likely to dropout from
upper-secondary schooling than natives. However, in the Netherlands, Belgium, Ger-
many, and Austria, more than 25% of Turkish second-generation immigrants are early
school leavers, while in Switzerland, France, and Sweden this percentage goes down to
about 10%. The authors mention that while in the first cluster of countries dropout rates
are also very high for natives, this is not true for the second cluster of countries. In par-
ticular, in Sweden the percentage of early school leavers among natives is extremely low,
so that immigrants still face a serious relative disadvantage. Unfortunately, the authors
do not report the figures for natives, so that it is not possible to compare the degrees of
relative disadvantage across countries. The empirical findings of the TIES project point
to the importance of educational systems in explaining why students with the same immi-
grant background have diﬀerent academic performances in Western European countries.
In particular, they find partial evidence that tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula is detri-
mental for integration: indeed, in France and the Netherlands, two moderately stratified
systems, children of immigrants generally attain higher qualifications than in Germany,
Austria and Belgium; however, in the extremely comprehensive Swedish system they
perform quite badly. The authors also mention preschool development as a potential in-
stitutional factor to explain cross-country diﬀerences. In Belgium and France, preschool
attendance is almost universal, while in the Netherlands, Sweden, and especially in Ger-
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many and Austria, attendance rates are much lower. Moreover, in the latter countries,
fewer second-generation immigrants than natives tend to go to preschool.
When gathering their own primary data is not feasible, comparativists have to re-
sort to secondary data collected across countries. Recently, a step forward towards the
comparability of educational achievement has been taken by international standardized
surveys on student performance, such as the Programme for International Student As-
sessment (PISA), conducted by the OECD, the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), both con-
ducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
(IEA). These surveys also provide extensive information on background characteristics,
directly comparable across countries. The potential of these studies has been exploited
mainly by economists. Still, in recent years several sociologists have also relied on in-
ternationally standardized assessments to investigate migrant educational disadvantage
from a comparative perspective. In what follows, I will review the empirical results of
these studies concerning the cross-country diﬀerences in the educational disadvantage of
children of immigrants. The focus of these studies, however, is not so much a descriptive
comparison, but rather the explanation of such cross-country diﬀerences by institutional
variables. I will discuss the latter findings in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.
Econometric studies comparing migrant educational disadvantage across countries
are chiefly based on the above-mentioned standardized assessments of students’ per-
formance. Schnepf (2006, 2007, 2008) outlines a rich descriptive account of migrant
achievement gaps in ten OECD countries with a high population of immigrant pupils.
She checks the robustness of her findings by performing separate analyses on data
from PISA—which surveys 15-year-old students on the domains of reading, mathe-
matics and science—PIRLS and TIMSS—which survey 4th graders on reading, and
maths and science respectively. By running separate regression models for each country,
she finds that—relatively consistently across surveys—holding constant pupils’ socio-
economic background, migratory status negatively aﬀects achievement in France, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. On the contrary, in English-speaking countries
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain and USA) there is no evidence of a
specific migrant disadvantage (Schnepf, 2006). Moreover, in the English-speaking coun-
tries, language skills seem to explain immigrants disadvantage, while socio-economic
background is a more important determinant of immigrants’ gap in continental Europe
(Schnepf, 2007). However, this result is not surprising. Indeed, it should be noted that,
with the exception of Great Britain, English-speaking countries constitute a special kind
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of receiving societies. On the one hand, they are countries of traditional immigration,
where integration practices and policies are more developed than in prevalently post-war
migration Europe. On the other hand, in the last decades, such countries have adopted
selective immigration policies, bringing to an extremely favorable composition of immi-
grants in terms of skills. Accordingly, in another study based on previous waves of the
TIMSS survey, Buchmann and Parrado (2006) had found that migrant/native achieve-
ment gaps are larger in Nordic and Continental Europe than in traditional immigrations
countries, and they remain larger net of socio-economic status (SES ) and language us-
age. The position of Spain, Portugal, and Greece is intermediate, since they display large
gaps but, after controlling for SES and language spoken at home, they are not significant
anymore. However, it should be noted that in the period analyzed by this study (mid
1990s), the sample sizes of first- and especially second-generation immigrants were very
low in these Southern European countries.
Schnepf also finds that in all countries, language spoken at home, generational status,
and age at arrival in the country are crucial in diﬀerentiating the relative performances
of immigrant students (Schnepf, 2006). Yet, immigrants are an extremely heterogeneous
category: for almost all countries analyzed by Schnepf (2008), the dispersion of scores
is considerably higher among immigrants than among natives. By means of quantile
regression, Schnepf shows that dispersion mainly derives from low achieving immigrants
and that at lower percentiles language skills impact more on educational achievement
than at the top of the achievement distribution.
Jaap Dronkers and collegues conducted several cross-country studies on educational
achievement of first- and second-generation immigrants. Pooling countries together, they
used non-hierarchical multilevel models to explain reading performance of children of
migrants assessed by PISA in terms of individual-, school-, track-, origin-country- and
destination-country-characteristics (Levels et al., 2008; Dronkers et al., 2012b; Dronkers
and Kornder, 2013). Their main contribution is to account for the diversity of immigrant
populations and to introduce explanatory variables connected to the country of origin.
They find that some minority groups find it particularly hard to reach the school perfor-
mance of their native peers with similar family background. In particular, South Asians
in Denmark, Southern Europeans in Switzerland, and Western Europeans in Belgium
emerge as problematic groups. The authors contrast such countries with Australia, New
Zealand and Scotland, where the integration of immigrants in the school system appears
smoother, irrespective of the origin group considered. Germany, Greece, and Latvia are
found in intermediate positions. In a more recent study, Dronkers et al. (2012b) find
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that prevailing religion has an eﬀect on educational achievement, with students originat-
ing from predominantly Hindu or Buddhist countries performing best and students from
predominantly Islamic countries performing worse (Dronkers et al., 2012b). However,
further research showed that the low educational performance of Islam female migrants’
pupils can be traced back to the low level of gender equality in such countries (Dronkers
and Kornder, 2013).
In one of the rare studies in this field conducted from the perspective of political
science, Fossati (2011) performed a similar investigation pooling destination countries
together to estimate the institutional determinants of migrant underachievement in PISA
tests with multilevel models. Her focus is not only represented by the features of educa-
tional systems, but also by welfare-state regimes and immigration policies. Her results
show that immigrant students perform particularly well in Canada and Great Britain,
while they dramatically lag behind their native peers in Scandinavian countries and in
countries of continental Europe. She finds a positive eﬀect of social-democratic welfare
regimes, reduced school selectivity and immigration-friendly integration regimes on the
educational achievement of natives. However, she fails to find any eﬀect on the achieve-
ment of migrants. Rather, the achievement of immigrant students is positively related to
income inequality (measured by the Gini index), while it is negatively related to gender
equality (measured by the share of women in parliament) and to social-democratic ori-
entation (measured by left incumbency). She suggests that there might be a tradeoﬀ be-
tween equality of opportunity for socio-economically disadvantaged students background
on the one hand, and equality of opportunity for immigrant students on the other hand.
By relating her findings to the positive discrimination literature (Gomolla and Radtke,
2002), Fossati argues that well-intentioned policy measures may have counterproductive
results.
A more descriptive comparative analysis on immigrants’ achievement gaps is repre-
sented by Dustmann et al. (2012a). In a first step of the analyses, these authors contrast
immigrant students across destination countries, irrespective of their country of origin.
Consistently with previous studies, they find that in traditional immigration societies
(Australia, Canada, and the USA) the performance of second-generation immigrants is
not significantly diﬀerent from that of natives with similar socio-economic background.
Conversely, in Finland, Austria, and Belgium their situation is critical, since on aver-
age they score 50 to 100 PISA points less than comparable natives. Immigrant/native
achievement gaps are also substantial—though not as extreme—in Continental Europe,
Nordic countries, Portugal, and Spain. On the contrary, in the UK, France, Greece, and
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Italy the gaps are rather moderate, though still significantly diﬀerent from zero. However,
it should be noted that in the latter two countries the sample sizes are relatively small.
In a second step, Dustmann and collegues adopt an analytical strategy that, following
Green (2005), could be seen as a combination of the “linear” and the “divergent” approach.
On the one hand, they compare mathematics achievement of children of Turkish immi-
grants in several destination countries, and on the other hand they compare the same
scores to those of Turkish children in Turkey whose parents have not emigrated. Their
results indicate that in most host countries, the achievement of the children of Turkish
immigrants is lower than that of their native peers, but higher than that of children of
their cohort in the home country. This result holds when conditioning on parental back-
ground characteristics. With additional analyses, they show that the diﬀerence between
performances in Turkey and in immigration countries can be explained to a great extent
in terms of higher school- and peer- quality relative to that in the home country.
Finally, a recent study by Schneeweis (2011) explicitly addressed the issue of how
features of the educational systems aﬀect migrant/native achievement gaps, exploiting
the existing cross-country institutional variability. In her study, Schneeweis adopts a
two-step analytical strategy. First, with individual level analyses on migrant under-
achievement—which she runs separately for each country—she estimates what she calls
a measure of integration, i.e. net of socio-economic diﬀerentials. Second, she ranks
countries according to this measure. This becomes her dependent variable in a country-
level regression where her main independent variables are characteristics of educational
systems. The second-step of her analysis will be documented with greater precision in
Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3. Instead, given the focus of the present section, here it is worth
mentioning her descriptive findings. Once again, children with migration background are
found to perform quite well in English-speaking countries—and especially so in Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the USA. On the other hand, her measure of integration is
quite low in German-speaking countries, Benelux countries, France, and Scandinavian
countries. Countries also diﬀer in the extent to which socio-economic resources explain
immigrant/native gaps. While in Continental Europe and Nordic countries these re-
sources account for more than half of the achievement gap, in Southern Europe the
explained portion is lower. Conversely, in Eastern Europe, the explained part of the
gap is even negative, meaning that immigrant students are more favorably endowed with
socio-economic resources than native ones.
The studies reviewed in this section indicate that cross-country diﬀerences in the
degree of migrant educational disadvantage exist. In particular, empirical research con-
52
sistently shows that in traditional immigration societies, the integration of students of
immigrant origin is not an issue. The specificity of such countries, which I discussed
already in Chapter 2, Section 2.4, is here confirmed in terms of educational outcomes.
In other words, traditional immigration societies form a qualitatively diﬀerent cluster of
countries. Furthermore, when the reviewed studies analyze the performance of immi-
grant students in Eastern European countries, they often fail to find clear results. This
is generally acknowledged by the authors themselves, who trace the inconclusiveness of
these findings back to the limited sample sizes and the peculiar characteristics of migra-
tions flows in post-communist Europe. These empirical findings sustain my decision of
restricting the scope conditions to Western European countries.
Overall, in the last two decades scholars from diﬀerent disciplines have made a huge
step forward in the comparative analysis of migrant educational disadvantage. Single-
country studies provide a reliable descriptive picture of how children of migrants fare with
respect to natives in diﬀerent receiving societies. Moreover, some of these authors have
rightfully called for the need to account for ethnic or national belonging of migrants,
be it in terms of individual resources and access to networks, or in terms of macro
features of the origin country. Nevertheless, as noticed earlier, unfortunately such single-
country studies are not directly comparable. International research projects based on
self-collected data provide a reasoned framework for comparison and rich insights on the
micro-, meso-, and macro-factors that are specifically relevant for children of immigrants.
However, they require massive eﬀorts and financial investments. As a consequence, they
typically involve a limited number of destination countries, like in the case of the TIES
project. The most important contributions to the comparative study of migrant educa-
tional disadvantage come from studies that rely on internationally standardized assess-
ments of students’ performance. The search for standardized measures across countries
makes educational outcomes and their individual determinants truly comparative. This
endeavor improves our understanding of integration processes and outcomes within the
educational sphere. Still, such studies are aimed at explaining cross-country diﬀerences
in migrant learning disadvantage by country-level institutional factors. Hence, in order
to increase their sample sizes, they are typically based on quite heterogeneous samples
of countries. Moreover, given their focus on explanatory research questions, most of
the time such works do not adequately discuss the descriptive findings hidden in their
analyses. All things considered, the state of the art in the comparative analysis of mi-
grant educational disadvantage calls for a more systematic and in-depth assessment of
the performance of second-generation immigrants in Western European countries.
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3.2 Empirical statistical analyses: migrant achievement penal-
ties
The second part of this chapter is devoted to present original empirical analyses on
the educational achievement of children of immigrants in Western Europe, and more
specifically on the relative disadvantage specifically associated to migratory status1. More
precisely, in Section 3.2.1 I introduce my research questions and motivate the focus on (i)
relative disadvantage with respect to natives, (ii) educational achievement, (iii) second-
generation immigrants and (iv) assessment near the end of compulsory schooling, in the
framework of Equality of Educational Opportunity as defined by Coleman (1968). I also
explain in greater detail what I mean by migrant achievement penalty and how it is
related to the eﬀect of socio-economic status (SES ). Subsequently, in 3.2.2 I delineate
my analytical strategy by introducing a novel measure of migrant achievement penalty
and by specifying the way it has been parametrically estimated. Section 3.2.3 describes
the dataset used, by highlighting its potentials and limitations in addressing my research
questions. It also shows how the variables of interest were operationalized. In Section
3.2.4 I present the main empirical findings and discuss their implications for the diﬀerent
dimensions of equality of educational opportunity in Western Europe. Finally, in Section
3.2.5, I further detail the motivations of my model construction and present the results
of some sensitivity tests performed in order to check the robustness of my results against
alternative model specifications.
3.2.1 Research questions and hypotheses
Object of the analyses presented in this section is the educational achievement of second-
generation immigrants relative to their native peers, comparatively assessed on 15-year-
old students in 17 Western European countries. My analytical focus is based on Cole-
man’s conception of Equality of Educational Opportunity (EEO) as equality of educa-
tional outcomes between categories of students who have diﬀerent endowments of eco-
nomic, social and cultural resources but have developed their educational careers within
the same school system (Coleman, 1968, 20-22). In order to capture the overall im-
portance of the school systems in shaping EEO, my analyses are based on educational
outcomes of 15-year-old students, i.e., near the age limit which is set as the end of com-
pulsory schooling in all European countries. Furthermore, I concentrate my attention on
1Part of the analyses presented in this chapter can also be found in Borgna and Contini (2013).
54
the relative disadvantage of migrant students as opposed to absolute performance levels:
since my aim is to compare the educational opportunities for migrant students in several
countries, I am interested in the diﬀerential impact of educational systems on the pro-
cess of knowledge and skills acquisition of migrants vs. natives. Accordingly, I focus on
second-generation immigrants who were born in the destination country. Therefore, just
like their native peers, they have been fully exposed to the school and preschool system
of the receiving society. On the contrary, first-generation students have usually been par-
tially exposed first to the educational system of the origin-country and then to that of
the destination country. More generally—as explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.3—when
interested in the assimilation patterns of first-generation immigrants, it is essential to dif-
ferentiate according to age at migration. Ideally, an analysis of the relative educational
disadvantage of first-generation immigrants should be limited to those who have been
fully exposed to destination country’s educational system, hence to those who arrived be-
fore the age of 3 (age at which preschool facilities typically become available in European
countries). However, as will be made clear in Section 3.2.3, due to data restriction it is
not possible to single out this age group. As a consequence, the only immigrant group
that can be meaningfully compared to native students is that of second-generation im-
migrants. My empirical analyses are based on educational achievement in standardized
tests on mathematics, reading and science literacy. As a matter of fact, educational out-
comes involve two distinct dimensions: attainment (i.e. the formal progression through
the school system) and achievement (i.e. the skills and knowledge actually acquired). I
decided to focus on the outcomes of the learning process (achievement)—as opposed to
qualifications attained—because, thanks to international assessments on students’ per-
formance, they are directly comparable across countries. On the contrary, attainment
is less comparable in reason of the diﬀerent designs of educational systems, in terms of
length, transitions and tracks.
In my investigation, I move from previous works on migrant learning disadvantage
reviewed in Section 3.1 and extend their scope by addressing questions on the individual
and institutional sources of migrant penalties in a comparative perspective. At the same
time, for the above-mentioned reasons my focus is narrower than that of those studies
because I concentrate on the relative underachievement of second-generation immigrants.
The general aim of the analyses presented in this chapter is to assess whether second-
generation immigrants perform worse than their native peers and, if this is the case,
whether this implies a migrant specific disadvantage in educational achievement net
of students’ socio-economic status (SES ). In my analyses, I identify a component of
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underachievement which can be explained by diﬀerent SES endowments of natives and
migrants, and a residual component which remains unexplained. The latter, in turn, can
be made by returns to some migrant specific resources and/or by diﬀerential returns to
SES resources. The identification of the sign and the relative magnitude of these eﬀects
in the various countries under investigation constitutes the main purpose of the analyses.
My case selection, which I discussed in Chapter 2, reflects the need to obtain a rather
homogeneous sample of countries in terms of immigration history and institutional struc-
ture2. Even so, migrant populations across Western Europe are diverse. Therefore, the
cross-country variability of migrant underachievement and/or migrant specific penalties
could be attributed to diﬀerent origin compositions of migrant populations. In order
to account for these possible composition eﬀects, I partially adopt the “divergent strat-
egy” consisting in comparing a given immigrant group across destination countries. This
strategy was originally proposed by Green (2005) and it was applied by several empir-
ical studies reviewed in Section 3.1 (Crul and Schneider, 2009; Alba and Waters, 2011;
Crul et al., 2012a; Dustmann et al., 2012a). Unfortunately, due to data restrictions,
the divergent strategy cannot be applied to all the countries of interest, because many
do not provide information on the country of birth. Hence, first I analyze educational
achievement of second-generation immigrants to the whole set of my country selection
and second, by narrowing the focus to those countries that provide the relevant informa-
tion, I check the robustness of my findings by contrasting same-origin immigrants across
receiving societies.
Summing up, the research questions addressed in this empirical section are: do
second-generation immigrants (G2 ) perform worse than their native peers by the end
of compulsory schooling? Can the diﬀerent educational performance of natives and G2
be fully explained by diﬀerent endowments in socio-economic status (SES ) resources or
rather is there a specific “migrant achievement penalty”? If such migrant penalty exits,
to what extent can it be traced back to diﬀerential returns to SES and to what extent
instead it reflects migrant-specific (lack of) resources? Do Western European countries
display diﬀerent degrees of migrant underachievement and migrant achievement penal-
ties? If such cross-country diﬀerences exist, can they be accounted for by diﬀerent origin
compositions of immigrant populations?
2As mentioned, the specific countries analyzed are: Austria, Belgium (split into Belgium-Flanders and
Belgium-Wallonia, in reason of their diﬀerent educational systems), Switzerland, Germany, Denmark,
Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and
England and Wales.
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Drawing on the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in the first part of this
chapter, I make five research hypotheses :
1. G2 generally underachieve their native peers despite having been exposed to the
same educational system;
2. G2 generally perform worse even after accounting for SES diﬀerentials: migrant-
specific penalties exist;
3. SES and migratory origin negatively interact in aﬀecting educational achievement;
4. The degrees of general underachievement and migrant-specific penalties vary across
countries;
5. These cross-country diﬀerences are robust to possible composition eﬀects related
to the origin country.
3.2.2 Analytical strategy
A common measure of migrant underachievement is based on the average gap of migrants
with respect to natives. This is often used as a proxy for inequality of educational
opportunity by migrant status (Dronkers et al., 2012b) or for immigrant integration
(OECD, 2006; Schneeweis, 2011; Cobb-Clark et al., 2012; Crul et al., 2012a). I propose
an alternative measure (also discussed in Borgna and Contini, 2013), based on migrants’
z -scores, standardized with respect to the national distribution of natives. Such measure
has a number of advantages compared to average achievement gaps: first, it is based on
a well-known metrics. Second, it is more informative since it accounts for the variability
existing in a given receiving society. This makes it more consistent with the concept of
integration, which does not necessarily imply a close proximity of the individual to some
abstract midpoint, but rather avoiding relegation into marginalized sectors of society
(Ruedin, 2011, 14). The third advantage stems from a combination of the previous two:
taking this measure as a proxy of integration within the national educational system,
we could envisage parallel measures of integration with respect to other sectors of the
receiving society, and easily compare them. I will now detail two declinations of this
measure: the first one operationalizes the concept of general migrant underachievement,
the second one that of migrant specific penalty.
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Measuring migrant educational underachievement
Imagine to compare two extreme cases: in the first society the dispersion of scores for
native students is very high (e.g., with a standard deviation of 100), in the second they
are much more concentrated around the median value (e.g., with a standard deviation of
50). Even if the distance between the average migrant and the average native is the same
in the two societies (for instance, -50 PISA points), one can argue that in the second
society the lack of integration of migrants is more pronounced, since they are very distant
not only from the midpoint of the natives’ distribution, but also from its lowest bounds.
The measure of underachievement I adopt accounts for the fact that natives may have
larger or narrower variances. It is based on migrants’ z -scores, standardized with respect
to the national distribution of natives (N ):
zi;M =
Yi;M   YN
^N
(3.1)
where Yi;M is the score of the individual migrantM, YN is the average score for all natives
N and ^N is the standard deviation of natives’ scores.
My index of general underachievement is the average of these “raw” z -scores over the
population of migrant students:
zM =
1
n
X
i
zi;M =
X
i
Yi;M   YN
^N
=
YM   YN
^N
(3.2)
The interpretation of zM is straightforward: it reveals the distance between the aver-
age raw scores of migrants and natives expressed in terms of standard deviations of the
distribution of natives. For instance, a z -score of -0.8 implies that if we place the average
migrant into the distribution of natives, he or she would score 0.8 standard deviations
below the average. Assuming normality, this positions second-generation immigrants in
the 21st percentile rank of the distribution of natives.
Measuring migrant educational penalty
Previous literature highlighted that migrant educational underachievement can be ex-
plained to a significant extent by diﬀerentials in economic, social and cultural endow-
ments (cf. Section 3.1). In order to control for this compositional eﬀect and to isolate
migrant specific penalties in educational achievement, I use a modified version of the
above mentioned formulas. The “controlled” z -score of a student of migrant status and
58
a vector of individual characteristics x is:
zi;M jx =
Yi;M;x   YN jx
^N jx
(3.3)
The average controlled z-score given x is:
zM jx =
YM jx   YN jx
^N jx
while the average over all migrant students is:
zxM =
X
x
zM jxpM jx (3.4)
where pM jx is the proportion of migrants with X=x.
Instead of evaluating zxM completely non-parametrically, I refer to a simple country-level
model for performance score Y :
Yi = N + NXi + (M   N )Mi + (M   N )XiMi + i (3.5)
where M is a dummy indexing migrant background, M and N the intercepts for
migrants and natives respectively, and M and N the corresponding eﬀects of socio-
economic status. In this case:
zxM =
1
^
X
x
h
^M + ^Mx

 

^N + ^Nx
i
pM jx
=
1
^
X
x
h
(^M   ^N ) +

^M   ^N

XM
i
(3.6)
Incidentally, this measure is related to a decomposition of the migrant-native performance
gap performed using the method proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973):
YM   YN = (^M   ^N ) +

^M   ^N

XM + ^
 
XM   XN

Here, the last term of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition represents the portion of the gap
ascribable to compositional eﬀects due to diﬀerent endowments in X. Instead, the first
two terms constitute the unexplained component which coincides with the numerator of
my controlled z -score (Equation 3.6). If X is expressed in terms of deviation from the
mean, the diﬀerence between the intercepts is the migrant-native gap for the average X,
while the second term accounts for diﬀerent returns to socio-economic status between
migrants and natives3.
3Schneeweis (2011, 1283) uses the unexplained component of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as
dependent variable in her analyses. Note that, diﬀerently from her, I do not put much emphasis on
diﬀerential returns to interpret controlled z -scores, as my empirical results show that in all countries the
largest part of the unexplained component is captured by the diﬀerence in the intercepts.
59
3.2.3 Data, operationalization, and models
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)
Analyses are based on representative data from the Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) collected in the years 2006 and 20094. PISA assesses 15-year-old stu-
dents’ competences in three domains: reading, mathematics, and science. Test scores are
standardized on a common scale (OECD countries mean is 500 with a standard devia-
tion of 100), which allows direct comparisons of student achievement across countries.
Moreover, individual, family, and school background information is collected through
questionnaires administered to students and school oﬃcials. PISA samples are derived
from a two-stage stratified sampling procedure with schools selected in the first stage
and individual students selected in the second one. In order to account for this complex
sampling structure and to provide design-based measures of uncertainty, PISA recom-
mends using the final sampling weights together with the 80 replicate sampling weights
provided. Moreover, to obtain unbiased estimates of the standard errors for the mean
scores, it is recommended to use the five plausible values for students proficiency. I do
so by following the suggested procedure of “unbiased shortcut” (OECD, 2009, 129).
Since mathematics literacy is less influenced by lack of linguistic skills than reading
and science, I use the former as the educational outcome of main interest. This choice has
the advantage of limiting compositional eﬀects due to the origin country. Nonetheless,
to gain leverage, I replicate analyses on the two other literacy domains. In the PISA
framework, mathematical literacy is defined as the ability of students to analyze, reason,
and communicate ideas eﬀectively as to pose, formulate, solve, and interpret solutions
to mathematical problems in a variety of situations (e.g., personal, educational, occupa-
tional, public, and scientific). Descriptive statistics on math scores can be found in Table
A.2 in the Appendix.
The high comparability of its measurement framework, the rich information collected
on students’ background, the focus on the end of compulsory schooling, and the number of
countries involved makes this survey a unique source of data for my research questions.
However, a limitation of PISA is given by the lamentable fact that—just like other
international surveys on cognitive abilities—it does not collect consistent information
4Analyses were first performed separately for the two waves 2006 and 2009. Since results proved
consistent, in order to ensure greater sample sizes for immigrant students, I rerun the analyses on the
pooled waves.
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on the exact country of birth, the nationality, or the mother tongue of students5. A
more specific limitation of the PISA survey is that some questions asking information on
students’ early years display a high number of missing values: in particular the question
on age at arrival in the destination-country has too few valid answers to allow a proper
diﬀerentiation of first-generation immigrants according to the length of their staying in
the country and their exposure to its educational system.
Variable construction
The sample units for the analysis are 15-year-old students over 17 Western European
countries. I define migrant categories according to information on place of birth provided
by PISA: G2 are second-generation migrants (native-born students with both foreign-
born parents). Natives (students with at least one native-born parent) is the residual
category, while first-generation migrants (foreign-born students with both foreign-born
parents) are excluded from the sample6. To operationalize the various dimensions of fam-
ily background potentially aﬀecting educational achievement, I used a synthetic measure
provided by PISA: the index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS ). This is
derived from three indices: highest score of parents on the Ganzeboom’s scale of occupa-
tional status (Ganzeboom et al., 1992); highest parental education on the ISCED scale7;
and home possessions (HOMEPOS ) which in turn comprises items on the family wealth
(WEALTH ), cultural possessions (CULTPOS ) and educational resources (HEDRES )
scales, as well as the number of books at home.
5In PISA, the questions regarding the place of birth are specific to national questionnaires and in
many European countries only limited options are oﬀered to answer them. The question on language
usually spoken at home has the same limitations, while no question concerns nationality. Contextual
questionnaires from IEA surveys (PIRLS and TIMSS) only provide information on whether the student
and her parents are foreign born or not, and on whether the language spoken at home is the oﬃcial
idiom of the destination country or not.
6Data from Germany also exclude students whose mother was born in former Soviet Union, since
some indications (extremely high test scores, German as language spoken at home) suggest they are
ethnic German return migrants.
7ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education, a framework developed by the
UNESCO in 1997 “to facilitate comparisons of education statistics and indicators across countries on
the basis of uniform and internationally agreed definitions” (http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/
Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx)
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Models
In order to compute the controlled z -score as a measure of migrant educational penalty,
I run country-specific individual-level regressions on mathematics score over a dummy
variable for gender (F ), a dummy variable for migrant status (M ), a continuous variable
for socio-economic resources (X ) and an interaction between the last two terms:
Yi = N + NXi + (M   N )Mi + (M   N )XiMi + Fi + i (3.7)
For the countries where the interaction term proved non significant at the 5% level, I run
a more parsimonious model without interaction:
Yi = N + Xi + (M   N )Mi + Fi + i (3.8)
Both these models are extremely flexible because they allow each parameter to vary
across countries. Descriptive information on the sample sizes and summary statistics on
the dependent variable and controls for natives and second-generation migrants can be
found in Tables A.1-A.3 in the Appendix A.
3.2.4 Results and discussion
Results of the estimation of performance scores for each country are shown in Table 3.1.
(M   N ) is the mean diﬀerence in the scores of migrants and natives at ESCS = 0
(the OECD average), while N is the eﬀect of one additional point in the ESCS scale
for natives. Where the interaction coeﬃcient (M   N ) is not significant, (M   N ) is
the mean diﬀerence at all values of ESCS.
As expected, in all countries immigrants perform substantially worse than their native
peers, even after controlling for socio-economic resources, thus supporting Hp 1 and Hp
2. Yet, diﬀerentials vary greatly across countries, from 10 PISA points in England and
Wales to 56 in Belgium-Flanders (supporting Hp 4 ). The socio-economic background
also has large eﬀects on educational achievement, for both native and migrant students.
Hp 3 is only partially supported. As expected, in countries where the interaction term
is significant, it is generally negative, meaning that migrants benefit less than natives
from a high endowment of socio-economic resources. However, in Denmark, England
and Wales, Spain, Greece, Italy, and Sweden the interaction is not in place. As discussed
in 3.1, previous studies reached no consensus on the existence of diﬀerential returns to
parental socio-economic resources. According to Heath et al. (2008), these inconsisten-
cies might reflect actual cross-country diﬀerences. In other words, in some countries
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country (M   N ) N (M   N )
Austria -38.11** (5.44) 40.37** (2.13)
Bel. Flanders -56.43** (9.73) 44.63** (1.59) -23.79** (6.07)
Bel. Wallonia -30.21** (6.61) 51.80** (2.28) -21.00** (5.19)
Switzerland -39.51** (3.12) 34.25** (1.36)
Germany -41.15** (4.84) 45.33** (1.80) -15.35** (4.00)
Denmark -40.26** (4.82) 32.52** (1.32) -9.39* (3.90)
England+Wales -10.86** (4.00) 40.8** (1.58)
Spain -25.80** (6.59) 28.45** (0.97)
Finland -54.27** (12.04) 28.58** (1.17)
France -33.31** (6.73) 52.17** (1.81) -19.28** (4.14)
Greece -10.43 (6.96) 33.88** (1.56)
Italy -35.77** (8.38) 23.24** (1.41)
Luxembourg -21.07** (2.66) 29.66** (1.01)
Netherlands -35.71** (6.00) 38.47** (1.64) -16.94** (3.78)
Norway -25.41** (7.08) 34.43** (1.53)
Portugal -40.02** (8.34) 31.57** (1.31) 10.10* (5.14)
Sweden -34.32** (4.60) 37.56** (1.60)
Table 3.1: Source: PISA 2006-2009. Country-specific regressions of math scores estimated using replicate weights
and plausible values. ** Sig. at 1% level * Sig. at 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Model: refer to
Equations 3.7 and 3.8. Controls: female, ESCS, ESCS*G2.
the diﬀerential returns may be in place, while in others they may be not. However,
he also argues that they might simply reflect diﬀerent methodological and analytical
choices made by diﬀerent scholars, as well as—for countries where interactions are not
significant—small sample sizes. In my analyses, I adopt a consistent measure of educa-
tional achievement across countries and run the very same statistical models. Moreover,
countries where ESCS*G2 interactions are not significant are not necessarily those with
the smallest sample sizes (cf. Table A.1 in Appendix A). Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that in some countries second-generation immigrants actually have diﬀerential
returns to SES while in others they do not. There seem to be no special relation between
the significance of the interaction terms and the size of the SES coeﬃcient for natives.
In other words, countries where second-generation immigrants suﬀer from negative dif-
ferential returns to socio-economic and cultural resources are not necessarily those where
such resources influence to a greater extent educational achievement, nor those where
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they influence it to a smaller extent. Then what diﬀerentiates countries with significant
interaction terms with countries with non-significant ones? My tentative explanation
is that in Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands country-specific
cultural capital is particularly important to navigate the educational system. Therefore,
the cultural capital of immigrant parents is more acutely devalued in those five countries
than in the remaining countries.
Nevertheless, even when significant, interaction terms are rather small with respect
to the coeﬃcients associated to the migrant dummy, indicating that underachievement
of second-generation immigrants is not so much driven by diﬀerential returns to socio-
economic resources, but rather by the lack of other migrant-specific resources.
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Figure 3.1: Overall underachievement and migrant achievement penalty. Source: PISA 2006-2009 Maths (PV).
Raw and controlled z -scores for G2
How do these results translate in terms of my measures of migrant disadvantage? As
shown in Figure 3.1, raw z -scores provide a clear-cut picture of how severe is the issue of
migrant underachievement in Western Europe. In most countries, second-generation mi-
grants lie below the 30th percentile of the distribution of natives, despite being born in the
receiving society and having been fully exposed to its educational system. In Belgium-
Flanders the situation is particularly critical, since the average second-generation mi-
grant scores about 0.8 standard deviations less than the average native, lying around the
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20th percentile of the distribution of natives. Generally speaking, migrant achievement
penalties (controlled z -scores) are huge both in absolute and relative terms: the aver-
age second-generation migrant child lies below the 35th percentile of the distribution of
natives with the same socio-economic resources in Finland, Portugal, Belgium-Flanders,
Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Sweden and Germany. The least unequal countries
for migrant achievement penalties are Greece, England-Wales, France, Luxembourg, and
Belgium-Wallonia.
Moreover, SES diﬀerentials partly explain underachievement, but not fully, and not in
all countries. In Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, underachievement
is at least halved when accounting for such diﬀerences, while in Finland, Portugal, Italy
and Spain more than three quarters remain unexplained. It is interesting to point out
that in the former countries mass immigration already developed in the post-war period
as an eﬀect of guest-worker programs or flows from former colonies, while in the latter
countries it is a more recent phenomenon. Second-generation immigrants still experience
serious educational disadvantages in both groups. However, in new-immigration coun-
tries, migrant-specific lack of resources is more important than lack of traditional sources
of inequalities in explaining such disadvantages. Finally, Western European countries
display sharp diﬀerences in both general underachievement levels (which range between
around the 20th percentile of Flanders and Denmark to the 40th percentile of Greece and
England and Wales) and migrant specific penalties (going from the 22nd percentile of
Finland to the 44th of Greece and England and Wales again).
Are the countries with the largest migrant-specific penalties also unequal with respect
to socio-economic background? Figure 2-left displays how Western European countries
perform with respect to these two dimensions of educational inequality8. As shown
by Figure 3.2, not only migrant-specific penalties do not coincide with socio-economic
penalties, but they are negatively correlated in this sample of countries. This find-
ing could be interpreted as signaling a policy tradeoﬀ. To rephrase, countries that are
able to mitigate traditional forms of inequalities may perform less well when migrant-
specific disadvantages are at stake. This explanation was invoked by Fossati (2011), to
account for her finding that where income dispersion is low—and especially in Scandi-
navian countries—immigrant children perform poorly. However, the correlation between
migrant-specific and socio-economic penalties might also spurious.
8The “socio-economic penalty” was obtained by dividing the coeﬃcient of ESCS for natives by the
root-mean-square error. This indicator measures by how many standard deviations a native individual
with ESCS=x-1 lags behind the native individual with ESCS = x.
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Figure 3.2: Migrant penalty vs. Socio-economic penalty in educational achievement. Source: PISA 2006-2009
Maths (PV). Raw and controlled z -scores for G2
To my scope, this finding is especially interesting in so far it allows to envisage a
typology of educational systems based on the level of Inequality of Educational Op-
portunity (IEO) they produce on these two main dimensions: socio-economic penalties
and migrant-specific penalties. As illustrated by Figure 3.3, indeed, we can first detect
some strongly socially inegalitarian systems that fail to integrate migrant students as
well (Belgium Flanders and, to a minor extent, Sweden, Austria, and Germany). On the
contrary, other systems (Greece and Luxembourg, but also Norway and Spain) appear
to be able to limit the impact that socio-economic status and migratory status on educa-
tional performances. Perhaps even more interesting, however, are the oﬀ-diagonal cases.
On the one hand, in some educational systems that are not egalitarian with respect to
socio-economic background migrants perform like natives with similar socio-economic
resources (England-Wales, France, Belgium Wallonia, followed by the Netherlands). On
the other hand, other systems are relatively egalitarian to disadvantaged natives but very
detrimental for migrants, given socio-economic status (Italy and Finland and, to a minor
extent, Switzerland, Denmark, and Portugal). The placement of the latter two clusters of
countries—driving the negative correlation between migrant penalties and socio-economic
penalties—suggests that migrant-specific penalties and socio-economic penalties are two
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distinct aspects of educational inequality and should not be confounded. On the contrary,
previous work (Levels et al., 2008; Schneeweis, 2011; Cobb-Clark et al., 2012; Dronkers
et al., 2012b; Dronkers and Kornder, 2013) implicitly assumed that the two eﬀects go
in the same direction, when including institutional variables related to socio-economic
background in their explanatory models. This evidence suggests that a deeper reflection
is needed on the features of educational systems that may be specifically beneficial or
detrimental to immigrant-background students of migrant origin.
 
Severe migrant penalty 
Severe SES penalty 
Mild migrant penalty 
Mild SES penalty 
Finland , Portugal,  
Switzerland, Denmark, Italy 
Belgium Flanders, Germany, 
Sweden, Austria 
Spain, Norway, 
Luxembourg and Greece 
England and Wales, 
France, Belgium Walonia 
and the Netherlands 
Figure 3.3: Typology of educational systems by Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEO) driven by SES and
migratory status
Yet, the typology just presented—and more generally the cross-country variability
of migrant penalties—cannot be considered sound before having verified that the cross-
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country variability of migrant penalties cannot be reduced to compositional issues. To
rephrase, educational systems displaying mild migrant penalties might not be the most
egalitarian, but rather those having the most favorable origin-country composition of im-
migrant population. This is why I perform additional analyses based on the “divergent
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Figure 3.4: Migrant penalty vs. socio-economic penalty, for Turkish students only. Source: PISA 2006-2009
Maths (PV). Raw and controlled z -scores for G2
strategy” proposed by Green (2005), that is, contrasting same-origin migrants across
destination-countries. Unfortunately, due to the data restrictions outlined in 3.2.3, it
is only possible to do such robustness checks on a limited number of countries. More
precisely, I contrast students with Turkish immigrant mothers across seven destination
countries, for which the information on country of birth of parents is available: Belgium
Wallonia and Belgium Flanders, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and
Austria. The focus on second generation migrants of Turkish origin is justified by their
considerable presence in many Western European countries and their high degree of com-
parability. Indeed, as documented in Table A.3 in the Appendix, they are very much
alike in so far socio-economic and cultural resources are concerned. Moreover, from the
linguistic point of view, Turkish is very distant to all of the oﬃcial idioms spoken in
Western Europe. Finally, as argued by Schneider and Crul (2009, 7), Turkish immi-
grants are also comparable across destination countries in reason of their motivation to
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migrate (labor and family reunification) and in reason of their prevalent rural origin.
As shown in Figure 3.4, the ranking of most countries is left unchanged. The inverse
relation with socio-economic penalties holds true, and appears to be even stronger: there-
fore, even if compositional eﬀects are in place, they are not responsible for the negative
correlation. The results of the divergent strategy, despite not generalizable to the whole
set of Western European countries, on the one hand substantiate the empirical findings
presented above—and in particular the counterintuitive relation between migrant penal-
ties and socio-economic penalties; on the other hand, they provide further information
on the countries considered, contributing to a more sensible interpretation of their po-
sitioning in the typology proposed above. All things considered, by ruling out possible
confounding eﬀects—even if for a subset of countries—the robustness checks presented
here help drawing more aware conclusions on the more or less egalitarian character of
national educational systems. Hence, the hypothesis that cross-country diﬀerences are
robust to possible compositional eﬀects (Hp 5 ) is at least partially confirmed.
To summarize, the empirical statistical analyses presented in this section reveal a
critical picture of the educational underachievement of second-generation immigrants
in Western Europe. Students of migrant origin generally perform substantially worse
than their native peers: in most countries, the average G2 is situated below the 30th
percentile of the achievement distribution of natives. Through a novel measure of migrant
achievement penalty, I have shown that migrant underachievement is not fully explained
by SES diﬀerentials: hence, a migrant-specific disadvantage in educational achievement
exists. The hypothesis of a diﬀerential impact of SES resources on natives and migrants
was only partially confirmed: while in some countries G2 benefit less of these resources, in
other countries the interaction term proved not significant. I have also provided evidence
that cross-country diﬀerences in migrant achievement penalties are in place and cannot
be reduced to compositional issues related to the origin-country. Therefore, I argue that
there is room for an institutional explanation of this variability. Finally, from the analyses
presented in this section, migrant penalties and socio-economic penalties emerged as two
distinct dimensions of educational inequalities. I interpret this finding as a call for an
in-depth reflection on dimensions of educational systems liable to specifically aﬀect the
underachievement of second-generation migrants.
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3.2.5 Notes on model specification and robustness checks
The statistical models presented in the previous section include only few explanatory
variables. This is a deliberate choice since the goal of the first step of research is not to
attain a high predictive power, but rather to identify the “migrant specific penalty” in
educational achievement. In other words, I do not aim at disentangling the micro-level
mechanisms that explain why students of immigrant origin lag behind their native peers,
but rather at quantifying the size of this disadvantage, insofar it is specifically associated
to their migratory status. Given that the migrant-specific penalty is the explanandum
of the second step of my research (focused on the structure of educational systems), in
the individual-level model construction, I carefully selected those variables that are not
endogenous to characteristics of the destination-country’s educational systems. In this
section, I motivate the choice of the control variables and briefly describe sensitivity
tests performed in order to check the robustness of the results against alternative model
specifications.
First of all, the fact that I operationalized parental socio-economic background with
the synthetic indicator of ESCS provided by PISA is debatable. Family resources that
are not specific to migratory status can be grouped under three main dimensions: (i)
economic capital; (ii) social capital; (iii) cultural capital, in its components that are not
country-specific. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, ESCS is a composite index based on
the aggregation parental occupational status, parental education, and home possessions.
These items operationalize the dimensions of economic, social, and cultural capital in
multiple ways. For instance, cultural home possessions are a proxy of economic capital,
but also of cultural capital. Parental education is a proxy of cultural capital, but also of
social capital. Occupational status is a proxy of social capital, but also of economic cap-
ital. . . Therefore, with the use of ESCS I gain in parsimony, while capturing several rele-
vant dimensions. The choice of ESCS as a single control variable also makes it easier to
compare migrant-specific penalties and socio-economic penalties. However, I performed
some robustness checks in order to test whether using considering each dimension sep-
arately produces substantially diﬀerent results compared to using ESCS as a synthetic
index. In the first alternative specification, parental education, parental occupation and
home resources are introduced as distinct control variables. In particular, beyond the
female dummy, I controlled for HISEI (highest parental score on the Ganzeboom’s scale
of occupational status), HISCED (highest parental education on the ISCED scale) and
HOMEPOS (index of wealth possessions, cultural possessions, educational possessions).
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Figure 3.5: Consistency of results with alternative model specification. Baseline model (M0) controls for female
and ESCS. Alternative model (M1) controls for female, HISEI, HISCED, HOMEPOS.
Figures 3.5-left and -right compare the results from my baseline model (controlling for
ESCS ) with those from the alternative model. In particular, I compare the estimates of
the coeﬃcient associated to the G2 dummy, on which my measure of migrant achieve-
ment penalty is based. The estimates of the two models are highly consistent, both
in terms of correlation between the two measures ( = 0.954) and in terms of country
rankings.
In the second model, I controlled for the female dummy and the HISEI index only.
Therefore, only the dimension of occupational status is considered here as a possible
confounder of the relationship between migratory status and educational achievement.
Indeed, as indicated by Engzell and Jonsson (2013), child and parental reports on parents’
educational qualifications often diﬀerent substantially: parental reports are much more
accurate and the consequence is that SES eﬀects can be severely underestimated with
children’s reports9. On the contrary, there is a much higher degree of accordance for
parental occupation. From this perspective, it would be better to use parental occupation
as an indicator of SES, rather than parental education (Engzell and Jonsson, 2013). At
the same time, the authors also show that the estimates of the immigrant origin eﬀect on
test scores are not heavily aﬀected by measurement error, neither in parental occupation,
nor in education. Hence, this source of error has no serious consequences on the estimates
of the immigrant-origin eﬀect given social origin. Nevertheless, I performed a sensitivity
check controlling for parental occupation only. Figure 3.6-left and -right display the
consistency of the results from the baseline model with those from the alternative model
9However, when available, parental reports are usually aﬀected by large non-random non-response
rates, which also heavily bias the estimates.
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Figure 3.6: Consistency of results with alternative model specification. Baseline model (M0) controls for female
and ESCS. Alternative model (M2) controls for female, HISEI.
controlling for HISEI only. As expected, the achievement gap is generally higher when
controlling for parental occupation as a unique indicator of socio-economic background.
However, the country ranking is not substantially altered. Moreover, the two estimates
are highly correlated across countries ( = 0.920).
A third potential issue that might arise from the use of ESCS as a control variable
is that parental occupation is partially endogenous, because the labor market opportu-
nities available to immigrants—especially of extra-EU origin—are not the same as those
available to citizens with comparable education. Indeed, system-level features as labor
market structure, immigration selection policies and integration policies for adults aﬀect
the mismatch of immigrants’ skills and their job positions. The same reasoning could
apply to indicators of wealth, such as home possessions. However, parental occupa-
tion is exogenous to children’s achievement, and thus is not aﬀected by features of the
destination-countries’ educational systems. As a consequence, controlling for parental
occupation and wealth indicators would be problematic if one is interested in the overall
picture of immigrants’ integration in the host society and its indirect consequences on
the educational achievement of immigrant children. On the other hand, this dissertation
is focused on the role of educational systems. Hence, there is no endogeneity problem
related to parental occupation. Moreover, I argue that it is not only possible, but nec-
essary to control for parental occupation and home resources, if one wants to contrast
immigrant and native children with comparable cultural, but also economic and social
resources. To be more specific, by controlling for parental education only, one would miss
an important part of the influence of socio-economic background on educational achieve-
ment. This is particularly relevant for students of immigrant origin, since educational
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Figure 3.7: Consistency of results with alternative model specification. Baseline model (M0) controls for female
and ESCS. Alternative model (M3) controls for female, HISCED.
qualifications acquired in the origin country may not have (or may be perceived not to
have) the same value as those acquired in the destination country. Let us compare two
individuals. The first one is a second-generation immigrant. He has highly educated par-
ents, who are nevertheless employed in a low-status, poorly paid job in the destination
country. The second one is a native student of native parents, who are highly educated
and have high-status and well-paid positions. The first student cannot benefit from a
number of additional monetary resources (e.g. access to expensive study materials) as
well as non-monetary resources (e.g. access to specific social networks). By controlling
for parental education only, one would erroneously interpret the eﬀects of this lack of
resources as an eﬀect of the migratory status. Yet, as a third robustness check, I re-
peated the analyses by controlling for the gender dummy and the HISCED index only.
Therefore, the occupational status and the home resources are left out as control vari-
ables. As shown by Figure 3.7-left and -right, the estimates are highly correlated with
the original ones ( = 0.900), and the ranking is similar. Hence, the choice of one model
over the other should not substantially aﬀect the construction of my measure of migrant
achievement penalty. At the same time, Figure 3.7-right also shows that the G2 coeﬃ-
cient of model 3 is even larger than the one of model 2. This confirms that leaving aside
the dimensions of parental occupation and home resources bias upwards our estimates of
migrant achievement penalties.
PISA provides information on whether students speak the destination-country lan-
guage at home. Since previous studies found that language spoken at home is a significant
predictor of educational achievement, one could argue that in my model specification I
should include this control. One could also argue that I should control for language spo-
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ken at home as a proxy for parental linguistic skills and/or acculturation. Yet, I believe
that controlling for this variable is not appropriate. A first order of reasons concerns the
unclear meaning of this variable. Whether or not children speak the destination-country
language (L2 ) at home depends on a variety of factors, certainly including children’s and
parents’ linguistic skills in L2. In turn, children’s linguistic skills can be influenced by
language spoken at home. However, the direction of this relation is not obvious from a
theoretical perspective. While Esser (2006) argues that factors that promote L1 reten-
tion hinder immigrants’ skills in L2, many educational scientists support the concurring
hypothesis of “linguistic interdependence” (Cummins, 1979). As lamented by Kristen
et al. (2011), no empirical rigorous study has tested the validity of one over the other.
What is more, the relation between language use and parental linguistic skills in L2 is
far from clear-cut. It might well be the case that immigrant parents, while mastering
L2, prefer to speak to their children in their mother tongue in order to preserve their
cultural ties with the origin country. On the contrary, it is possible that immigrant
parents, despite having a very poor knowledge of the host-country language, make an
eﬀort to use it to communicate with their children. In addition, pupils may speak the
host language with their siblings and switch to the origin-country language with their
parents. Unfortunately, the phrasing of the question in the PISA questionnaire is quite
vague (“What language do you speak at home most of the time?”), so that is not possible
to disentangle the two.
A second order of reasons I believe that controlling for language spoken is not ap-
propriate relates to the endogeneity of this variable with respect to the achievement of
second-generation immigrant children. In fact—as argued before—language use is to
some extent influenced by children’s and parents’ linguistic skills in L2. The level of lin-
guistic skills of immigrant children is highly endogenous to achievement in all the literacy
domains assessed by PISA. Clearly, the educational system aﬀects the degree to which
immigrant students master L2. Parental skills are also endogenous, because—through
their children’s schooling—parents can improve their linguistic competences. For exam-
ple, if immigrant children generally attend preschool from early age, they will have more
opportunities to improve their linguistic skills and therefore, be more inclined to speak
L2 also at home, with siblings and parents. Therefore, controlling for the individual-level
variable of language spoken at home would hinder the identification of the systemic eﬀect
of preschool, by capturing part of the desired eﬀect.
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3.3 Empirical fuzzy-set analyses: coinciding factors of mi-
grant disadvantage
In Section 3.2 I have called attention to the existence of a migrant achievement penalty.
More precisely, I have emphasized the fact that at the end of compulsory schooling,
in all Western European countries second-generation immigrants lag behind their na-
tive peers in educational achievement even after accounting for socio-economic status
(SES ). However, statistical analyses have also shown that a substantial part of migrant
underachievement is indeed explained by SES resources. Hence, even if the focus of
this dissertation are migrant-specific penalties, the importance of SES should not be
disregarded. For these reasons, in the present section I am going to develop further
the way migrant educational disadvantage is related to social stratification of migrants
and natives in Western Europe. More specifically, I explore the accumulation of factors
of advantage and disadvantage among natives and immigrants and relate them to their
achievement gaps. In order to do so, I take advantage of the mixed-methods approach
of this dissertation and use fuzzy-set analysis as an alternative analytical strategy to
statistical methods, especially able to detect asymmetrical patterns. I first present my
research questions, which refer to the extent to which native and second-generation stu-
dents in Western Europe compound factors of advantage and disadvantage related to
various dimensions of socio-economic status (SES ). Next, I describe my analytical strat-
egy, framing it into the more general ensemble of comparative configurational methods
and motivate the use of fuzzy-set coincidence analysis as opposed to mainstream sta-
tistical methods. Finally, I present my empirical findings by highlighting an interesting
pattern that is invisible to correlation analysis.
3.3.1 Research questions
Social stratification of individuals typically occurs along a number of diﬀerent dimen-
sions, as profusely recognized by sociologists since Max Weber. When these dimensions
coincide to a great extent, social structures are said to be “crystallized” (Freedman et al.,
1951). From a set-theoretical perspective, one can think of individuals as simultaneously
belonging to multiple sets, according to the dimension considered: social class (élite,
bourgeoisie, proletariat), cultural or social status (high, low), education level (primary,
secondary, tertiary). Up to now, I have relied on a unidimensional conception of SES.
More precisely, I have assumed that the various dimensions of SES have an additive eﬀect
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on educational achievement. However, one could argue that the same dimensions have
a stronger eﬀect when they combine. Moreover, factors of advantage and disadvantage
related to various dimensions of SES do not necessarily operate in a symmetrical way in
aﬀecting educational performance. Since the present work has a comparative outlook, I
am going to consider this issue from a country level perspective. By focusing on Western
European countries—for the reasons outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 —I will address
the following questions:
1. Do second-generation immigrants (G2 ) compound factors of advantage and/or dis-
advantage related to SES more than their native peers?
2. Do Western European countries diﬀer in the way G2 and natives compound factors
of advantage and/or disadvantage?
3. If such cross-country diﬀerences exist, are they related to migrant educational dis-
advantage?
Given the exploratory character of the present empirical section, I do not have strong
theoretical hypotheses on these research questions. However, I expect that—if cross-
country diﬀerences are in place—countries where migrant underachievement is higher
also display a stronger unbalance in the way natives and G2 compound factors of disad-
vantage. Indeed, the compounding of factors of disadvantage (crystallization “from the
bottom”) could point to a situation of social exclusion where only highly resilient stu-
dents can escape educational failure. On the contrary, no empirical evidences suggests
that simultaneously enjoying several assets (crystallization “from the top”) is decisive to
be among top-performers.
3.3.2 Analytical strategy
In order to assess the crystallization of social structures, sociologists have relied on cor-
relation measures (Lenski, 1954; Landecker, 1981). However, I argue that set-theoretic
methods—and in particular the technique of fuzzy-set coincidence analysis proposed in
Borgna (2013)—is more apt to assess the degree of crystallization. Hence, I will show
that set coincidence is fundamentally diﬀerent from correlation, first of all because its fo-
cus is on the joint subsistence of attributes rather than on a common probabilistic trend.
This is particular important when studying stratification systems, which—as Landecker
himself maintains—are “constellations of rank systems” (Landecker, 1981, 40), that is,
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constellations of “qualitatively diﬀerent status hierarchies” (ivi, 19). Secondly, the useful-
ness of fuzzy-set coincidence analysis in this field derives from its capability to account
for asymmetrical patterns. Indeed, a social structure can be crystallized either because
some individuals are able to accrue their position by cumulating several assets, or be-
cause some other individuals are trapped in the lowest strata by multiple deprivations,
or, still, because both these processes are in place. Correlational analysis is not able to
disentangle these processes and could fail to detect patterns of crystallization if only one
of the two is in place. On the contrary, fuzzy-set coincidence analysis requires careful
calibration of set membership for factors of advantage and factors of disadvantage sepa-
rately, and the two do not need to be symmetrical: in this way, crystallization processes
“from the top” and “from the bottom” can be distinguished.
Set theoretic research and social science
The application of fuzzy-sets to social sciences developed from crisp-set Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis (csQCA) which was intended for Boolean sets, where cases could either
assume value 1 (if they belonged to the given set) or 0 (if they belonged to its negation)
(Ragin, 1987). However, to account for the fact that most social and political phenomena
exist in degrees, the framework of QCA was later extended to fuzzy logic, under which
the degree of membership to a given set may vary, assuming any value from 0 to 1 (Ragin,
2000, 2008). Fuzzy sets do not equate with continuous variables, because their construc-
tion relies on a procedure called “calibration” which anchors set membership scores to
qualitative thresholds and truncates irrelevant variation. When calibrating raw data,
researchers rely on external substantive or theoretical criteria or on meaningful breaks
in the internal distribution to determine qualitative thresholds for full membership (1),
full non-membership (0) and maximum ambiguity (0.5). Intermediate values are typi-
cally assigned using a linear or log-linear function. As Ragin puts it: “Fuzzy sets are
simultaneously qualitative and quantitative. They address the varying degree to which
diﬀerent cases belong to a set (including the two qualitative states, full membership and
full non membership), not how they diﬀer from one another along quantifiable dimensions
of open-ended variation”(Ragin, 2000, 154).
The specificity of fuzzy-set coincidence
Set-coincidence can be defined as the degree to which two or more sets overlap, or, in
other words, the extent to which they constitute one and the same set. In a crisp-set
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framework, coincidence scores can be calculated as the number of cases in the intersection
of two or more sets over the number of cases in the union of the same set. Given that in
fuzzy logic the union of two sets corresponds to taking the maximum membership score
and their intersection corresponds to taking their minimum, fuzzy-set coincidence score
can be calculated as:P
min (xi; yi)P
max (xi; yi)
(3.9)
where xi and yi are individual membership scores in the sets X and Y (Ragin, 2008, 59).
Both indexes vary from 0 (absence of set coincidence) to 1 (perfect set coincidence). The
symmetrical nature of set coincidence might induce more than one reader to wonder if
there is any diﬀerence with correlation. However, set coincidence diﬀers from correlation
in at least two respects. The first one pertains to its underlying logic, while the second
one derives from more pragmatic considerations regarding the “hidden” asymmetrical na-
ture of set coincidence. To start with, a correlation coeﬃcient is an estimate of a common
probabilistic trend of two variables among our observations. It concerns the functional
form of the relation between two variables, be it linear in the case of strictly defined corre-
lation coeﬃcients—such as Pearson’s R—or more complex in the case of other measures
of association—such as odds-ratios. Instead, a set coincidence score close to 1 indicates
that most of our cases share exactly the same degree of membership in two sets. It is
about the joint subsistence of attributes in given cases. In Ragin’s words: (fuzzy-set
coincidence) “is a special case of correlation. In a plot of two fuzzy sets, any straight line
that is neither vertical nor horizontal yields a perfect correlation coeﬃcient. However,
perfect set coincidence occurs only when all the cases plot exactly on the main diagonal
of the fuzzy plot” (Ragin, 2008, 59). A second aspect which diﬀerentiates coincidence
from correlation is that, despite appearances, fuzzy-set coincidence is not completely
symmetrical in nature. Indeed, as I have mentioned, any fuzzy-set analysis relies on
calibration, which anchors set membership scores to qualitative thresholds and truncates
irrelevant variation. Calibration can be asymmetrical (or “dual”) rather than symmetri-
cal (or “unipolar”). For instance, if a researcher moves from an interval scale variable to
define two diﬀerent sets, referring to the two extremes of this source variable, when im-
puting membership scores he may decide to leave space for a “gray” area, where cases do
not hold membership in one set, but neither do they in the other set. Put diﬀerently, one
set is not the negation of the other. More specifically, in this section I assess the degree
to which individuals cumulate socio-economic advantages and disadvantages. The fact
that an indicator of economic wealth is strongly correlated with one of cultural status
78
implies that, in the given sample, the two simultaneously increase or decrease. However,
from simple correlational measures it is impossible to understand whether this is true
because some individuals are able to accrue their position by cumulating richness with a
high cultural status, or rather if some other individuals are trapped in the lowest strata
by their poorness and their low cultural status. On the contrary, coincidence analysis is
able to uncover these diﬀerent patterns, because it requires the researcher to carefully
calibrate the two indexes into precise sets defining e.g. “richness” and “poorness”.
3.3.3 Operationalization: fuzzy-set calibration
The fuzzy-set analyses presented in this section are based on the 2006 and 2009 waves of
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey described in Section
3.2.3.
To operationalize socio-economic status (SES ), I draw on the Bourdieuian concept of
class which emphasizes the dimensions of status, cultural capital and wealth. My fuzzy-
set calibrations are based on four indexes provided by the PISA dataset: HISEI refers to
the dimension of status and it is the highest occupational level of parents according to
Ganzeboom socio-economic index (range 1-100); HISCED is a proxy for institutionalized
cultural capital and it is a categorical variable measuring the highest educational level
among parents according to ISCED 1997 scale (ranging from none: 0 to academic degree:
6); CULTPOS is instead a proxy for objectified cultural capital and it is a linear index
standardized over all OECD countries built on possession of classical literature, books of
poetry and pieces of art (ranging from -2.00 to +2.00 circa); finally, WEALTH clearly
operationalizes the wealth dimension and it is a linear index standardized over all OECD
countries built on possession of a room of their own, a link to the Internet, a dishwasher,
a DVD player and three other country-specific items and the number of cellular phones,
televisions, computers, cars and the rooms with a bath or a shower (ranging from -6.00
to +4.00 circa) . Descriptive statistics on control variables can be found in Table A.6 in
the Appendix A.
For each of these variables, I calibrate two fuzzy sets: one as a factor of advantage
(e.g. “high occupational status”) and one as a factor of disadvantage (e.g. “low occu-
pational status”) . Dual unipolar calibrations are performed, so that one set is not the
negation of the other. As a consequence, some individuals may fail to display the factor
of advantage and the factor of disadvantage and they will have membership score lower
than 0.5 in both sets. In order to define the critical thresholds for the institutionalized
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cultural capital (parental education), I relied on substantial knowledge on the perceived
value of educational qualifications. On the contrary, for status (parental occupation),
objectified cultural capital (cultural possessions), and wealth (home possessions), I relied
on the internal distribution, since these three are composite indexes. Table A.7 in the
Appendix A details the calibration thresholds and their motivation. Finally, I calculate
fuzzy-set coincidence scores (see Equation 3.9) separately by country and by migratory
status (natives and second-generation migrants) assessing the degree to which factors of
advantage and disadvantage coincide.
3.3.4 Results and discussion
Table 3.2 shows that fuzzy-set coincidence scores are definitely closer to zero than to
one10. In other words, in Western Europe there is no substantial crystallization of factors
of advantage or disadvantage, neither among natives nor among children of immigrants.
However, factors of advantage systematically coincide more for natives than for second
generation migrants, while the opposite is true for factors of disadvantage. In other
words, it is more likely for households which are privileged under one aspect to enjoy
other assets if parents are native-born than if parents are foreign-born. On the contrary,
unprivileged households are more likely to suﬀer from a multiplicity of deprivations if
parents are foreign-born than if they are native-born.
It is worthwhile to point out that we could not have unveiled these patterns by
performing mainstream correlational analysis, as can be clearly seen in Figure 3.8. The
average correlation of uncalibrated assets is not systematically higher for either of the
two student categories defined by migratory status. In eﬀect, it is exactly the asymmetry
of coincidence patterns for factors of advantage and disadvantage that makes it invisible
to a symmetrical technique like correlation: the higher coincidence of disadvantages for
second generation migrants compensates the higher coincidence of advantages for natives.
What might seem a “zero pattern” from a correlational point of view is actually a double
pattern of inequality, as revealed by fuzzy-set coincidence analysis.
Even if fuzzy-set coincidence analyses reveal a common pattern in Western Eu-
rope—in the sense that natives systematically compound more factors of advantage than
G2 do, and the opposite is true for factors of disadvantage—cross-country diﬀerences
exist in the extent of such migrant/native diﬀerentials. How are these diﬀerentials re-
lated to the educational underachievement of G2 in various Western European countries?
10Part of the findings presented in this section can also be found in Borgna (2013).
80
country Advantages Disadvantages
G2 Natives Diﬀerence G2 Natives Diﬀerence
Austria 0.035 0.139 -0.104 0.154 0.059 0.095
Belgium Flanders 0.045 0.143 -0.098 0.148 0.027 0.122
Belgium Wallonia 0.075 0.158 -0.083 0.082 0.033 0.050
Switzerland 0.070 0.112 -0.042 0.138 0.066 0.072
Germany 0.043 0.151 -0.109 0.160 0.061 0.098
Denkmark 0.031 0.166 -0.135 0.188 0.044 0.145
England+Wales 0.116 0.138 -0.022 0.069 0.058 0.011
Spain 0.086 0.134 -0.048 0.150 0.100 0.050
Finland 0.142 0.125 0.017 0.070 0.023 0.047
France 0.092 0.158 -0.066 0.139 0.087 0.052
Greece 0.066 0.158 -0.092 0.033 0.074 -0.042
Italy 0.009 0.016 -0.007 0.162 0.096 0.066
Luxembourg 0.075 0.158 -0.082 0.192 0.037 0.156
Netherlands 0.037 0.152 -0.115 0.141 0.018 0.123
Norway 0.059 0.119 -0.060 0.047 0.010 0.037
Portugal 0.226 0.197 0.029 0.145 0.161 -0.016
Sweden 0.052 0.135 -0.084 0.068 0.033 0.035
Table 3.2: Advantage and disadvantage coincidence scores. Source: PISA 2006-2009. Fuzzy-set coincidence of
factors of advantage and disadvantage, by country and migratory status
Figure 3.9 shows that the disproportionate coincidence of both advantages and disad-
vantages are associated to migrant educational disadvantage in the expected way. In
countries where G2 suﬀer markedly more than natives of a compounding of factors of
disadvantage, they also experience particularly severe achievement gaps. The same hap-
pens, though to a lower extent, in countries where natives are particularly more able
than G2 to compound factors of advantage.
Summing up, in this section I have used the novel procedure of fuzzy-set coincidence
analysis to assess the degree to which factors of advantage and disadvantage related
to socio-economic status (SES ) coincide diﬀerently for native students and students of
immigrant origin in Western Europe. We have seen that neither advantages nor disad-
vantages coincide substantially in any of the categories considered. However, fuzzy-set
coincidence analysis revealed an interesting pattern that was invisible to correlational
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Figure 3.8: Set coincidence vs. correlation. Source: PISA 2006-2009. Average correlations of assets are computed
as the simple average of the components of the correlation matrix between HISEI, HISCED, CULTPOSS and
WEALTH. Fuzzy-set coincidence scores are instead computed as multiple coincidence scores.
analysis. In almost all the countries considered, second-generation immigrants are more
likely than natives to compound factors of disadvantage, while natives are more likely to
compound factors of advantage. Finally, by relating coincidence diﬀerentials to average
achievement gaps I have shown that countries where second-generation immigrants suﬀer
from a higher educational underachievement also display a stronger unbalance in the way
natives and second-generation immigrants compound factors of disadvantage and—to a
lesser extent—advantage.
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Figure 3.9: Diﬀerential coincidence of assets and achievement gaps. Source: PISA 2006-2009. Native/G2 diﬀer-
entials in fuzzy-set coincidence of advantages and disadvantages vs. average achievement gaps in mathematics
83
84
Chapter 4
The role of educational systems for
migrant learning disadvantage
In Chapter 3 I have shown that Western European countries diﬀer in the extent to
which second-generation immigrants suﬀer from a migrant-specific penalties in educa-
tional achievement. Empirical analyses have also made clear that such diﬀerences cannot
be reduced to diﬀerent compositions in the immigrant populations, leaving room for
an institutional explanation. In this chapter, I explore the role of educational systems
in explaining such cross-country variability in migrant achievement penalties. In order
to identify potential explanantes, I move from the theoretical framework developed in
Chapter 2, and focus on four main institutional dimensions: (i) the duration of school-
ing, i.e. the amount of time pupils spend in the educational system; (ii) its degree of
stratification, i.e. the structural diﬀerentiation of students within given grades; (iii) the
allocation of human and financial resources; (iv) the degree of standardization in the
quality of education provided nationwide. I also consider contextual elements of West-
ern European countries, in particular those connected to the history of immigration and
to the linguistic composition of immigrants. In what follows, I review previous studies
that, albeit following diﬀerent approachs, have put forward country-level explanations
of migrant learning disadvantage. Most often, these studies are not based on explicit
theoretical frameworks. However, summarizing their approaches and findings is useful
to better frame my contribution. My empirical investigation of which institutional con-
figurations, embedded in which contexts, produce more or less severe degrees of migrant
achievement penalties is carried out with both variable-oriented and diversity-oriented
methods.
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4.1 Previous studies
4.1.1 Educational institutions and class-driven inequalities
Education is often seen as a double-edged sword in the stratification process (Shavit et al.,
2007). On the one hand, it is designed to provide learning opportunities to all individuals
irrespective of their family background and it is therefore the key instrument of social
mobility, as opposed to inherited privileges. On the other hand, education mediates
the intergenerational transmission of inequality, since children with a favorable family
background are more likely to gain access to high educational levels to and successfully
complete them. Whether a function prevails over the other depends, among other factors,
on the way the educational system itself is organized.
There is a rich literature aimed at identifying the role of features of the school sys-
tem in shaping educational inequalities associated to socio-economic background. Such
works are typically based on internationally standardized assessments of students’ per-
formances, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the
Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Progress in International
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS). By exploiting cross-country institutional variability,
these scholars trace diﬀerences in the educational achievement of the most and least
socio-economically endowed students to features of the school system. In particular,
most empirical contributions come from the economics of education (for a comprehen-
sive review, see Hanushek and Wössmann, 2011). However, in this field we can also
find studies from the sociology of education (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010), as well
as from political science (Schlicht et al., 2010). This literature has singled out some
dimensions of educational systems as particularly detrimental for the equality of edu-
cational opportunity. Early tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula has been consistently
found to increase educational inequalities driven by family background (Brunello and
Checchi, 2007; Schütz et al., 2008; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). Still, Korthals
(2012) finds that, when further diﬀerentiating early tracking systems, the evidence is
more nuanced. In particular, systems with many tracks, and where tracking takes into
account prior performance, are associated to greater equality of educational opportunity.
Another institutional aspect on which empirical studies agree is the egalitarian role of
early childhood and care facilities. Preschool attendance is positively associated to the
cognitive development of socio-economically disadvantaged children, even after selection
issues have been solved (Currie, 2001; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Magnuson et al.,
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2006; Schütz et al., 2008; Felfe and Hsin, 2012). Other features of the school system
are more disputed. In particular, research has come to ambivalent conclusions on the
eﬀects of instruction time (Schlicht et al., 2010; Hanushek and Wössmann, 2011) and of
the market structure of schools (Ball, 1993; Ammermüller, 2005) on educational achieve-
ment and equality of opportunity. The same can be said for school autonomy (West
et al., 2010), though, generally, school autonomy is found to be beneficial in systems
with external exit exams (Fuchs and Wössmann, 2007; Wössmann, 2007).
4.1.2 Educational institutions and migrant-learning disadvantage
The role of the school system for the educational opportunities associated to migratory
status is far less studied. Essentially, three kinds of studies can be distinguished. First,
fundamentally descriptive contributions which analyze how immigrant students perform
in diﬀerent destination countries and suggest some implications in terms of educational
policies. Second, empirical studies that target a specific characteristic of the school
system and attempt to estimate its impact on the educational outcomes of children of
immigrants. Third, more comprehensive studies whose aim is to explain—from a statis-
tical viewpoint—as much as possible of the cross-country variability of migrant/native
achievement gaps, and whose main explanatory variables are the institutional features of
educational systems.
In the first group of studies, we find publications of the kind of those stemming
from the TIES project (Crul and Schneider, 2009; Alba and Waters, 2011; Crul et al.,
2012a). These authors provide a throughout descriptive picture of the situation of second-
generation immigrants in the educational systems and in the labor markets of Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. When discussing
the diﬀerent country performances in promoting the educational success of immigrants,
they suggest that some features of the school system may play a role. For instance, Crul
et al. (2012b) point out that in Germany, Austria, and Belgium, where tracking into
diﬀerentiated curricula is quite rigid and takes place at early age, the vast majority of
second-generation immigrants is not able to attain high-level educational qualifications.
However—as the authors themselves recognize—among more comprehensive systems, the
situation is ambiguous: while in France students of immigrant origin display relatively
low dropout rates and high educational attainment, in Sweden they do not achieve re-
sults in any way comparable to their native counterparts. The authors also underline
the fact that the educational disadvantage of immigrants is milder in countries where
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preschool facilities are very common, such as Belgium and France, as opposed to the
Netherlands, Sweden, and especially in Germany and Austria. In this second group
of countries, preschool attendance rates are much lower and, most importantly, fewer
second-generation immigrants than natives tend to go to preschool. The contribution
of these scholars is an important one, because they go beyond the debate on “integra-
tion models”, preponderant in the field of migration studies in Europe. Instead, they
stress the role of institutions in shaping the opportunity structure where children of im-
migrants develop their educational and occupational careers. However, mainly because
of the limited number of countries available, their explanation does not go beyond the
simple juxtaposition of countries. For these reasons, I do not discuss here any further
study of this kind, but rather move towards more systematic assessments of the role of
school systems in exacerbating or mitigating the educational opportunities of children of
immigrants.
In the second group of studies—more focused on single features of the educational
system—a common research question is whether preschool attendance has a positive ef-
fect on later educational outcomes. For instance, Biedinger et al. (2008) studied the
eﬀects of preschool attendance on performance scores in standardized tests that students
take at the beginning of compulsory schooling in Germany. Quite surprisingly, they
found that attending preschool is not beneficial per se for any group of students. How-
ever, attending a preschool with a favorable social composition has a positive impact on
later performances, and especially so for students of migrant origin. While interested in
similar substantive issues, Dustmann et al. (2012b) employ a diﬀerent analytical strat-
egy. They exploit a reform in the German federal preschool system—taken as a natural
experiment—to study the eﬀects of universal childcare on students of diﬀerent family
backgrounds. Their findings indicate that preschool attendance improves overall school
readiness for first- and second-generation immigrants, while it has no significant eﬀect on
natives, thus helping to narrow immigrant/native achievement gaps. Spiess et al. (2003)
had reached similar results with respect to another outcome, i.e. track placement. They
followed the educational careers of native and immigrant students up to the 7th grade,
when the first tracking occurs. In order to account for potential selectivity issues, they
control for individual variables that are likely to influence the probability to attend the
Kindergarten. According to their results, for natives Kindergarten attendance does not
have a significant influence on later school placement. On the contrary, for immigrants,
the likelihood of being placed in the prestigious track is significantly higher for children
who have attended preschool.
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Beyond preschool, in this second group of studies we find another specific focus, i.e.
the extent to which, at a national level, the school system is characterized by immigrant
segregation in certain schools or tracks. Such studies are diﬀerent from those reviewed
in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, because the latter consider the impact of school segregation
at the school level. On the contrary, Schnepf (2008) is interested in explaining country-
level migrant/native gaps. In particular, she introduces an aggregate measure of school
migrant segregation as a potential explanatory variable of cross-country diﬀerences in
achievement gaps. She finds it to have a negative—though not always significant—eﬀect
on the performance of both migrants and natives. However, Schnepf herself raises some
doubts on the heuristic potential of international surveys to assess migrant segregation:
given the relative small number of pupils sampled by these surveys, the estimates could
be biased upwards. In a similar stream of research, Brunello and Rocco (2011) investigate
whether the presence of immigrants has an influence on natives’ learning performance.
They consider country-level indexes of both immigrant shares and immigrant segregation
across schools. They find that immigrant concentration is negatively and statistically
significantly associated with the achievement performance of natives in the PISA tests.
However, the eﬀect is small in size, since doubling the share of immigrant pupils in
secondary schools would reduce the test score of natives by one percentage point. They
also show that—conditional on the average share of immigrant pupils—reducing the
dispersion of this share between schools has small positive eﬀects on natives’ scores.
4.1.3 Cross-country explanatory studies
The third groups of studies reviewed in this chapter lies between the descriptive accounts
on the one hand, and the analyses aimed at isolating the causal eﬀects of specific educa-
tional policies on the other hand. Aim of these studies is to explain—from a statistical
point of view—the variation in the educational achievement of immigrants who have been
schooled in diﬀerent destination countries. These authors estimate multi-level regression
models or two-step cross-country regressions based on data collected in diﬀerent desti-
nation countries by international surveys on students’ performance—in particular PISA
(targeting 15-year-old students), but also TIMSS and PIRLS (targeting fourth-graders).
In most cases, the dependent variable is the migrant/native achievement gap. For a small
number of studies, the dependent variable is instead defined as the simple performance
level of immigrant students. The diﬀerence is slight but relevant: while the previous
focus on the capability of educational systems to mitigate the relative disadvantage of
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immigrants, the latter focus on their capability to raise the absolute migrant achieve-
ment. The independent variables are characteristics at the micro- (the individual and his
family), macro- (the educational system and the host society), and sometimes meso-level
(the classroom, the school, and the track). In order to increase the sample size, they typ-
ically include a number of heterogeneous countries, to the detriment of comparability1.
As opposed to the first two groups, I will discuss studies from this third group in greater
detail, because they are the closest reference point for my dissertation.
Dronkers and colleagues focus on immigrant students’ absolute levels of performance
(Levels et al., 2008; Dronkers et al., 2012a,b). More specifically, they perform pooled-
country multilevel regressions on students’ mathematics and science performance in the
PISA tests. In order to estimate the eﬀects of system-level features, in their models they
interact them with individual-level variables. Their main contribution is to consider not
only destination-country, but also origin-country institutional features. Yet, in order
to do that, they are forced to select destination countries in reason of the availability
of information on the origin of migrants. This choice results in a reduced sample size
(N=16), which weakens the generalizability aim maintained in the article. At the same
time, results are undermined by the heterogeneity of the sample, which includes Aus-
tralia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, and New Zealand, as well as Western European countries.
In what concerns the eﬀects of the origin-country institutional features, they distinguish
between second- and first-generation immigrants and, among the latter, between 1.75,
1.5 and 1.25 generations defined according to their age at immigration. However, when
looking at the destination-country institutional features, they consider immigrants as a
homogeneous category and do not allow for diﬀerential eﬀects. Dronkers et al. (2012b) in-
troduce a meso-level of analysis. In particular, by including characteristics of the school
(i.e. the school composition) as explanatory variables, together with the system-level
degree of stratification, the authors attempt to disentangle the eﬀect of tracking from
“genuine” school eﬀects. Indeed, attending a school with a large share of immigrants,
socio-economically disadvantaged children, or low-ability children may be detrimental
even if the system-level character of the schooling system is comprehensive. However,
if one is interested in system-level features, this approach is not particularly fruitful,
because it ascribes the eﬀects of segregation to the school-level. These authors find that
the level of economic development of an emigration country is positively associated with
school achievement (Levels et al., 2008). However—after controlling for characteristics of
1Indeed, even if analyses are based on a large number of individual observations, the relevant sample
size to identify institutional eﬀects is the number of countries.
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the educational systems (in particular, long term compulsory schooling)—it is not signif-
icant anymore (Dronkers et al., 2012a). Concerning destination countries, they find that
teacher shortage has a negative eﬀect on immigrants’ performance. Diﬀerently from what
expected, the role of tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula is ambiguous: comprehensive
systems do benefit immigrant students, but only if they have a favorable socio-economic
background (Dronkers et al., 2012a).
A similar study was performed by Fossati (2011), who modeled the general test per-
formance in PISA (averaging up literacy in mathematics, reading, and science). Like
Dronkers and collegues, she is interested in the absolute level of performance of immi-
grant students, but she also models the achievement of natives in order to have a term
of comparison. Her sample comprises 22 Western and Eastern European countries, with
the addition of Canada. In an attempt to gain greater model parsimony, she makes
rather strong assumptions. For instance, she fixes the eﬀects of individual level variables
across countries, irrespective of the well established evidence showing that the eﬀect of
socio-economic background varies considerably between early and late tracking countries
(Hanushek and Wössmann, 2006; Schütz et al., 2008). Moreover, like Dronkers and col-
legues, she assumes that destination-country institutional features have the same eﬀect
on first- and second-generation immigrants. Since the key interest of her analysis is on
welfare state regimes, rather than on educational systems, I already discussed part of
her findings in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3. Her results on the role of educational systems
to explain cross-country variation in students’ achievement are ambivalent: the duration
of compulsory schooling is positively related to natives’, but not to immigrants’ achieve-
ment. The same is true for the duration of comprehensive schooling, i.e. before tracking
into diﬀerentiated curricula.
The analytical strategy proposed by Schneeweis (2011) is more flexible than those
presented so far. Indeed, she relies on a two-step regression analysis. First, with country-
specific individual-level regressions, she derives a measure of “integration” for immigrant
students. This is based based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the migrant/native
achievement gap into a part explained by socio-economic status and one unexplained,
attributed to diﬀerential returns to socio-economic resources. Hence, the eﬀects of socio-
economic background are left free to vary and across countries. In the second step, this
unexplained component becomes her dependent variable of a pooled country regression
and a country-fixed eﬀects model, where features of educational systems are her main
explanatory variables. While in the first step estimates for first- and second-generation
immigrants are derived separately, in the second step she assumes that institutional ef-
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fects are constant across the two categories. Schneeweis uses a rich dataset obtained by
pooling several waves of PISA, TIMSS IV, and TIMSS VIII and including all the available
countries in either of the assessments. This translates into rather big sample sizes sup-
porting the statistical power of her country-level estimates. However, by pooling several
waves together she equates cross-country variation and over-time variation in migrant
integration. Moreover, by pooling diﬀerent surveys together, she assumes that the same
institutional mechanisms explain the integration of fourth-graders, eight-graders and 15-
year-old students. A third shortcoming of this inclusive strategy is that the sample of
countries to be analyzed is extremely heterogeneous, going from Western and Eastern
European countries to traditional immigration countries like New Zealand and Australia,
to Latin American countries up to Middle-East, Far-East and African countries. Clearly,
those countries have too many institutional and historical diﬀerences, including in the
kind of immigration they attract, to be genuinely comparable. Given the big sample
sizes, she is able to estimate the eﬀects of a number of institutional variables, including
school segregation by migratory status and social background, instruction hours, compul-
sory schooling start, preprimary enrollment rates, pupil/teacher ratio, external students’
assessments and remedial or enrichment courses. Moreover, in an attempt to deal with
country heterogeneity, she controls for the developmental level and income dispersion2.
Her findings indicate that extended instruction hours and high rates of preprimary en-
rollment mitigate—though not always significantly—migrant underachievement. On the
contrary, remedial courses and pupil-teacher ratios have ambiguous eﬀects, with positive
eﬀects in some model specifications and negative eﬀects in others. Indecisive is the role of
school segregation: while segregation by socio-economic background is negatively related
to migrant integration, segregation by migratory status seems to have a beneficial eﬀect
on the educational achievement of children of immigrants. In her discussion, Schneeweis
treats this latter finding as an internal inconsistency and states that no conclusion can
be drawn on the role of school segregation. However, these results are not necessarily
inconsistent. From a theoretical point of view, students in socially-segregated schools
have access to fewer material and relational resources. On the contrary, children of im-
migrants could benefit from attending schools with a high proportion of students with the
same background, especially if co-ethnics, as suggested by the literature on ethnic capi-
tal (Borjas, 1992; Hatton and Leigh, 2011) and by the segmented-assimilation framework
2In an additional model specification, she controls for the diﬀerent origin-compositions of immigrant
populations by including controls for emigration macro-regions. However, this is only possible for a small
number of country-years, while the others are recoded as missing dummies.
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(Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou, 1997). Nevertheless, another
possible explanation of these ambivalent findings has to do with variable construction.
Migrant segregation is computed with the dissimilarity index introduced by Duncan and
Duncan (1955). The latter is the proportion of migrant students who would have to be
reassigned to other schools in order to achieve the same proportion in each school as for
the whole area. Given that for Schneeweis the whole area is the country, and immigrants
are not not evenly spread over the national territory, her index of migrant segregation
confounds actual school segregation with the territorial distribution of migrants.
In the last study discussed in this section, Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) estimate an
individual-level pooled-country model for PISA scores, as a function of individual charac-
teristics—including migratory status—and country-level variables. Their country-fixed-
eﬀects models comprise interactions between each institutional feature and the dummy
variables for migratory status, so that each estimated parameter for these interaction
terms conveys the diﬀerential eﬀect of a given institution on test scores for a given cate-
gory of migrant students with respect to natives. The sample of countries analyzed is less
heterogeneous than the one used by Schneeweis (2011), but nevertheless includes West-
ern and Eastern European countries, as well as traditional immigration societies like the
USA, Australia, and New Zealand. This makes up a reasonable sample size but, given
the number of institutional features, the sample is still too small to assess them all at the
same time. Therefore, only three to four country-level variables at a time are included
in the regressions. Diﬀerently from the previous studies, they estimate the diﬀerential
eﬀects of educational institutions on diﬀerent categories of immigrant students. In par-
ticular, they separate second- vs. first- generation immigrants, and they diﬀerentiate
the latter according to age of arrival in the country. They also distinguish immigrants
who speak the test language at home from those who do not. In this sense, their model
specification is praiseworthy because of its flexibility. Yet, under another perspective the
models are considerably restrictive because the eﬀects of gender and socio-economic back-
ground are not allowed to vary between migrants and natives, nor across countries and
institutional features. Quite consistently over the three literacy domains, Cobb-Clark
and colleagues find that a high level of educational expenditure and of teachers’ salaries
increase G2/native achievement gaps, while external evaluations reduce them. On the
contrary, the starting age of compulsory schooling and the age when tracking occurs do
not show significant eﬀects, with the partial eﬀect of age at tracking reducing the science
achievement gaps of second-generation immigrants.
Taken altogether, the studies reviewed so far are praiseworthy because they have
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opened up a fertile field of inquiry, apt to provide a contribution also in terms of policy
implications. Indeed, cross-country comparisons of migrant underachievement take a
step forward in shedding light on how features of educational systems relate to migrant
learning disadvantage. However, they have a number of theoretical and methodological
limitations that I have already hinted at, and that I try to discuss in greater detail in
what follows.
First of all, they lack an explicit theoretical framework. As noted by Busemeyer and
Trampusch (2011, 432), the disproportion between data analysis and theory is a gen-
eral problem of comparative studies on educational outcomes. Often research questions
seem to be driven by data availability rather than theoretical considerations and—he
argues—this might explain the inconsistent findings on the role of institutions. However,
this problem is even more serious in the emerging subfield of comparative studies on
migrant educational underachievement. The authors reviewed earlier merely derive their
hypotheses from previous studies on the eﬀects of educational institutions on class-driven
educational inequalities (cf. Section 4.1.1). In other words, they include the typical insti-
tutional variables used in this literature in their regression models, but they do not moti-
vate their choice in terms of micro-level mechanisms that could explain migrant-specific
educational disadvantage. Yet, before building a regression model, one should reflect on
a number of theoretical questions. To what structural dimension of educational systems
do the chosen institutions refer? Which dimension of migrants’ educational opportunities
(achievement, underachievement, achievement penalty) are they likely to impact? What
micro level mechanisms do they imply? Are they likely to interact in aﬀecting migrants’
educational opportunities?
The last question opens up the field for the second critical point I want to make. In all
the studies reviewed so far, the authors assume that educational systems are simply a sum
of independent features, whose eﬀect on students’ achievement is nothing but additive.
This is a strong simplifying statement that should be tested empirically rather than
assumed a priori. Moreover, this is also a problematic assumption when authors include
in their models independent variables that actually measure very similar concepts, or that
could be though as substitutable conditions. For instance, Schneeweis (2011) includes
both preschool enrollment rates and starting age of compulsory schooling. As I will
argue below, both these characteristics refer to the dimension of duration of schooling,
and in particular to its starting age. Consequently, the substantive meaning of the eﬀect
of one given the other one is not clear. Clearly, given the small sample sizes available
when doing cross-country comparisons, and especially so in the subfield of immigrants’
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educational achievement, it is impossible to estimate models with an excessive number
of interaction terms. I argue that the way to come out of this deadlock is twofold.
First of all, scholars should develop a theoretical reflection that allows to reduce the
number of educational features specifically detrimental for second-generation immigrant
students. Secondly, they should unambiguously adopt a descriptive perspective and chose
appropriate analytical methods to address their research questions. In this dissertation,
I chose to focus on a limited number of potentially relevant educational features and to
rely on comparative configurational methods to detect the possible interactions between
such features in producing more or less severe migrant-specific penalties in educational
achievement.
In the third place, the studies reviewed above have methodological limitations. As
mentioned earlier, in order to increase the number of observations, they gather countries
which diﬀer greatly not only in their educational systems, but also in their societal struc-
ture, geographical position, and developmental level. This lack of comparability hinders
the explanatory potential of these studies. Moreover, the selected countries display very
heterogeneous origin-country compositions of the immigrant populations, resulting in
diﬀerent degrees of cultural and linguistic distance liable to aﬀect educational achieve-
ment of children of migrants. Unfortunately, international surveys on cognitive abilities
generally do not collect detailed data on the origin country. Failing to account for these
compositional eﬀects poses a second threat to the identification of institutional eﬀects.
While these studies control for socio-economic background and migratory status (first-
vs. second-generation immigrants), they do not always diﬀerentiate first-generation ac-
cording to their age at arrival in the country. More generally, first-generation immigrants
are less comparable than second-generation, because part of their educational career has
developed in their origin country. Finally, their model specification is sometimes impre-
cise. In order to limit the number of parameters, restrictive and sometimes not plausible
assumptions are posited in the regression specifications. For example, all the previous
studies with the exception of Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) assume constant eﬀects of insti-
tutions on the two migrant categories. On the other hand, the latter, just like Fossati
(2011), fix the gender- and SES eﬀect across countries. Furthermore, all the studies
include an individual-level control for host-country language spoken at home. As men-
tioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.5, this choice can be useful to increase the explained
variance, but is not necessarily helpful when one wants to quantify the achievement dis-
advantage of immigrants in a given educational system. Since most native parents have a
good command of the host-country language, the immigrant students’ performance—net
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of the language spoken at home—refers to the (however small) portion of children of
immigrants whose parents speak the destination-country language with them. On the
contrary, the authors that control for language spoken at home generalize their findings
on the whole population of immigrant students.
Such theoretical and methodological limitations are reflected in the lack of consistency
between the empirical results of these studies. Fossati (2011) and Cobb-Clark et al. (2012)
find no significant eﬀect of age at tracking, while according to Dronkers et al. (2012a),
comprehensive systems do benefit immigrant students with a favorable socio-economic
background. Schneeweis (2011) fails to find conclusive results on the role of school
segregation, since it appears that migrant segregation is good, but social segregation bad
for children of immigrants. With respect to starting age of compulsory schooling, Cobb-
Clark et al. (2012) find no significant influence on second-generation immigrants. On the
contrary, Schneeweis (2011) finds a positive eﬀect of preschool attendance, while remedial
courses and pupil-teacher ratio have ambiguous eﬀects. Ultimately, the above mentioned
studies do not provide any compelling evidence on the role of single educational features
of destination-countries in reducing or amplifying migrant disadvantage in educational
achievement. As a consequence, empirical evidence on the role of educational systems
in mediating the intergenerational transmission of inequality for migrants vs. natives
is still inconclusive, and further attention should be devoted to the assessment of how
single features of educational systems interact in producing more or less severe migrant
educational disadvantages.
4.2 Hypotheses formulation
4.2.1 Theoretically relevant dimensions of educational systems
In order to develop my explanatory hypotheses, I move from four institutional dimensions
identified in Chapter 2, Section 2.2: the duration of schooling, its degree of stratification,
the allocation of human and financial resources and the degree of standardization in
the quality of education provided nationwide. All these dimensions are to some degree
important in order to explain the educational disadvantage of immigrant students relative
to their native peers.
The duration of schooling is a relevant dimension because it is possible to argue that
systems where pupils are exposed to the contact with teachers and peers for a longer time
are more beneficial than others for children of immigrants. In particular, the moment
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children enter (pre)school is crucial: children’s lives, previously fully spent within fami-
lies and communities, are now exposed to the surrounding society. For many immigrant
children this may be the moment when the first interactions with natives occur. The
exposure to school, broadly defined, could benefit not only the absolute performance lev-
els of immigrants, but also their performance relative to natives. For instance, empirical
evidence has consistently shown that entering the system at early age through preschool
does not have uniform eﬀects on pupils. Socio-economically disadvantaged children gen-
erally benefit more than advantaged ones from preschool attendance, in terms of cognitive
(Magnuson et al., 2006; Schütz et al., 2008; Brilli et al., 2011) and non-cognitive abil-
ities (Currie, 2001; Esping-Andersen and Mestres, 2003; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003;
Votruba-Drzal et al., 2004; Felfe and Hsin, 2012). Preschool attendance has also been
found to have diﬀerential eﬀects on children of immigrants. Although empirical evidence
is still limited, some studies conducted in the US, Germany, and the Netherlands suggest
that preschool attendance has positive eﬀects on second-generation immigrants’ cogni-
tive development (van Tuijl and Leseman, 2007; Biedinger et al., 2008) as well as on
their subsequent track placement (Spiess et al., 2003). Given the universal nature of
compulsory schooling, it is not easy to assess its impact on future educational outcomes
of diﬀerent categories of students. When attempting to explain cross-country diﬀerences
in migrant learning disadvantage, however, the timing when compulsory education start
may matter. I argue that mechanisms similar to those associated with preschool atten-
dance may be triggered by an early entry in compulsory schooling. Indeed, curricular
and extracurricular activities provide an obvious context to learn the oﬃcial language
of the destination country (Christensen and Stanat, 2007). Moreover, early socialization
with native peers could reduce cultural distance and the lack of information experienced
by immigrant families (Schofield, 2006). Therefore, my first hypothesis is:
HP1: Low preschool attendance rates and/or late start of compulsory schooling contribute
to severe migrant penalties in educational achievement.
A high degree of structural stratification might also be relevant, because it is gener-
ally considered to be detrimental to the egalitarian character of school systems. There
is robust evidence that early tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula increases educational
inequalities driven by socio-economic background (Ammermüller, 2005; Marks, 2005;
Hanushek and Wössmann, 2006; Brunello and Checchi, 2007; Schütz et al., 2008; Van de
Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). Since educational choices depend on strategic information
and cultural capital (Müller and Karle, 1993; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), early tracking
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systems might be specifically detrimental to the children of migrants. Indeed, immigrant
families are likely to suﬀer from a lack of the culturally-relevant resources crucial to mak-
ing informed school choices. However, empirical evidence suggests that, when compared
with native peers with similar prior achievement, students with an immigrant background
tend to make more ambitious educational choices (Kristen et al., 2008; Cebolla Boado,
2011; Jackson et al., 2012). Therefore, the role of stratification per se for migrant un-
derachievement is not obvious. Yet, one could still argue that highly stratified systems
are detrimental for immigrant students when they yield to immigrant students being
disproportionately concentrated in low-quality tracks.
In other words, stratification might become an issue when it is coupled with a low
degree of national standardization and/or an uneven distribution of human and financial
resources across schools. In this case, students attending vocational tracks are likely to
be penalized compared to those attending academic tracks, because they are exposed
to low-quality teaching and low-performance targets. At the same time, the dimensions
of standardization and resources might be relevant even in absence of a high degree
of stratification. Even in comprehensive educational systems, residential segregation in
poor districts and/or discriminatory school enrollment policies can bring to the uneven
concentration of immigrant students in certain schools. This form of school segregation
may exacerbate inequalities if no compensatory policies are enacted to foster the provision
of high-quality teachers and additional resources to schools with disadvantaged children.
There is some evidence that schools with disadvantaged students have lower quality
teachers in Norway (Bonesrønning et al., 2005), Denmark (Schindler Rangvid, 2007), and
Italy (Barbieri et al., 2010). In eﬀect, highly qualified teachers have incentives and means
to leave troublesome schools (Wyckoﬀ and Boyd, 2005). Moreover, a higher turnover is
associated with less eﬀective teaching (ivi). A disproportionate concentration of students
of immigrant origin may entail additional problems, since teachers’ adaptation to children
with diﬀerent cultural and linguistic background is likely to slow down the learning
pace (Fekjær and Birkelund, 2007). Besides the exposure to lower-quality teaching,
the relegation of immigrant students into marginal sectors of the schools system may
be problematic because students may negatively influence each others’ performance via
“peer eﬀects” (Hoxby, 2000). Empirical studies on migrant segregation have focused on its
eﬀects on the achievement of native students and found that the presence of immigrants
students does not have a negative influence per se on general performance (Fekjær and
Birkelund, 2007; Szulkin and Jonsson, 2007; Cebolla Boado, 2007; Cebolla Boado and
Garrido Medina, 2011; Contini, 2013). Nevertheless, when in place, negative peer eﬀects
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associated to migrant school concentration are generally more detrimental for immigrant
students themselves than for native students (Szulkin and Jonsson, 2007; Contini, 2013).
Ultimately, I argue that in order to understand cross-country variation in migrant-
achievement penalties, it is useful to look at the outcome of the complex processes out-
lined so far, involving the degree of diﬀerentiation, children’s sorting, prior achievement,
peer eﬀects, teachers’ quality and resources. I define such outcome as marginalization
of second-generation immigrants in low-quality schools. From the arguments discussed
above I derive my second hypothesis:
HP2: Early tracking brings forth severe migrant penalties in educational achievement only
when combined with a high degree of marginalization of second-generation immigrants in
low-quality schools.
4.2.2 Contextual factors
In addition, one must acknowledge that educational systems are embedded in national
contexts that potentially aﬀect their role in the process of creation of a relative achieve-
ment disadvantage of second-generation immigrants. To start with, since many of their
learning diﬃculties stem from a lack of linguistic skills (Esser, 2006), the origin com-
position of immigrants is an important factor in a country’s capacity to integrate their
children in the school system. Moreover, some of the above-mentioned features of edu-
cational systems may be particularly beneficial to children of immigrants who speak a
language that is very distant from that of the destination country. In particular, early
entry in the (pre)school system might be decisive for such children, since cognitive sci-
ences have shown that the ability to learn a foreign language decreases sharply with age
(Birdsong, 2006). Hence, I hypothesize that:
HP3: A high proportion of immigrants speaking a language that is distant from that of
the host society brings about severe migrant penalties in educational achievement.
Finally, even if Western European countries are quite homogeneous in comparison to
traditional settlement societies (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and USA) and Eastern
and Central European countries, still they diﬀer in terms of their immigration history.
Freeman (1995) first distinguished states with post-war labor recruitment (continental
Europe and the UK) from new immigration countries, which have turned from emigra-
tion into immigration societies in the 1980s (Italy, Spain) or even late 1990s (Greece,
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Ireland, Portugal). In the 1960s, Sweden also had implemented some guestworkers pro-
grams, which nevertheless involved relatively moderate inflows from other Scandinavian
countries. More generally, Nordic countries saw a sharp increase of immigration with
the rise of asylum seekers in the 1980s and 1990s (Castles and Miller, 2003). On the
one hand, host societies that received a great deal of immigrants from former colonies
and/or via guestworkers programs in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s may be more equipped
to deal with the inclusion of children of immigrants in the school systems, since they may
have developed eﬀective teaching practices to target their specific learning diﬃculties, in
contrast to newer immigration countries such as Scandinavian and Southern European
countries. On the other hand, the various “modes of integration” adopted by post-war
labor immigration countries have been widely criticized for promoting shortsighted poli-
cies. The diﬀerential exclusionist model was based on the assumption that immigrants
would act as guestworkers instead of settling down in the host society. Multiculturalism is
blamed for producing a persistent separatism, while assimilationist policies often had the
unintended outcomes of social exclusion and conflict (Castles and Miller, 2003, 258-260).
In such countries, even children of immigrants who arrived in more recent waves could
be trapped in conditions of social exclusion and stigma, which hinder the development of
their educational careers. Therefore, it is not evident that schooling systems of post-war
immigration countries have a easier job than those of newer immigration countries in
tackling migrant learning disadvantage. Still, I argue that the immigration history of a
destination country is an important contextual factor to account for. Consequently, my
fourth and last hypothesis is that:
HP4: In post-war immigration countries, second-generation immigrants experience dif-
ferent penalties in educational achievement from countries where mass immigration began
later on.
4.3 Analytical strategy
The overarching research question that I am trying to answer can be summarized as: in
which kinds of educational systems children of immigrants experience the largest achieve-
ment penalties in Western Europe, and in which they do not? In order to address this
question from diﬀerent angles, I adopt an analytical strategy that is based on method-
ological triangulation. The first part of the empirical analyses presented in this chapter
is aimed at assessing association patterns between institutional variables and migrant
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achievement penalties across countries. Accordingly, they rely on variable-oriented meth-
ods, i.e. statistical techniques. More specifically, I assess bivariate correlations between
the independent and the dependent variables. Next, I move to a multivariate framework
with Ordinarily Least Squares (OLS) regressions and regression-tree analysis. The latter
is an exploratory technique particularly suitable when complex patterns of interactions
between independent variables are in place.
In the second part of my investigation, I shift my focus from variables to cases,
hence acknowledging that educational systems are complex entities of interconnected
elements, which is very diﬃcult—and not necessarily meaningful—to separate. Moreover,
educational systems are embedded in national contexts, which may influence their ability
or inability to reduce migrant penalties. To deal with this complexity, I adopt a diversity-
oriented research strategy, and more specifically I use fuzzy-set theory and configurational
comparative methods. The latter are a useful framework for detecting complex causal
patterns by systematically assessing subset relations between combinations of conditions
and an outcome. Given the limited diﬀusion of these methods in the scientific community,
as opposed to statistical analysis, in the following paragraph I provide a brief introduction
to their logic and their operation.
4.3.1 Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs-QCA)
Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) developed Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an ex-
tension of Mill’s canons, by arguing that statements of necessity and suﬃciency—much
more common in social theory than apparent—imply subset relations, which mainstream
statistical techniques are unable to identify. Scholars from diﬀerent disciplines have re-
sorted to these methods especially for their capacity to deal with complex causality, also
known as multiple conjunctural (Ragin, 1987) or INUS 3 causation (Mackie, 1965), where
neither the uniformity nor the additivity of causal eﬀects are assumed. To rephrase, (i)
causal conditions may operate in combination with each other, just as suggested by Mill’s
notion of chemical causation (Mill, 1868) and (ii) multiple paths can lead to the same
outcome (Braummoeller, 2003). QCA moves from the assumption of maximum causal
complexity acknowledging all possible configurations (combinations of conditions) as po-
tentially leading to the outcome. A matrix with all possible configurations—the truth
table—is created, to which cases are allocated according to the configuration they belong
3A INUS condition as an Insuﬃcient but N ecessary part of a condition that is itself Unnecessary
but Suﬃcient for the result.
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to. Subsequently, by iterative paired comparison of configurations, irrelevant conditions
are eliminated until a logically minimal expression is reached. This expression—the so-
lution—is composed by one or more “prime implicants”—the causal paths. The latter
are alternatively suﬃcient configurations for the occurrence of the outcome. Yet, it is
extremely rare that all logically possible combinations of conditions display empirical
instances. In other words, the universe of relevant cases may be too small to cover
the property space entailed by the interplay of potential explanatory factors (Lazarsfeld,
1937), bringing about the problem of limited diversity, an inherent but overlooked issue in
comparative social science (Ragin, 2000). When using mainstream statistical techniques,
researchers more or less consciously make simplifying assumptions (such as additivity
or linearity) in order to extrapolate their inferences beyond the available data. Often
these assumptions are untenable and rely on “extreme counterfactuals” (King and Zeng,
2006). A distinctive feature of QCA is that it forces the researcher to make explicit use
of counterfactual thinking in order to deal with limited diversity, by choosing a parsimo-
nious, conservative or theory-based approach4. Fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) stems from the
application of fuzzy algebra (Zadeh, 1965) to the original crisp-set QCA, which is based
instead on Boolean algebra. In the latter framework, cases can either assume value 1 (if
they belong to the given set) or 0 (if they belong to its negation) (Ragin, 1987). On the
contrary, fsQCA acknowledges that most social and political phenomena are not easily
dichotomizable: hence, the degree of membership to a given set may vary, assuming any
value from 0 to 1 (Ragin, 2000, 2008). Fuzzy sets do not equate with continuous variables,
because their construction relies on a calibration procedure informed by case-based and
4In order to perform the minimization of configurations, the researcher has to choose how to treat
the configurations that lack empirical instances (logical remainders). If no simplifying assumption is
made, logical remainders are excluded from the minimization process (conservative approach, usually
producing a rather complex solution). If all needed assumptions are made, any logical remainder useful
for the minimization can be used (parsimonious strategy). Ragin and Sonnett (2004) recommend a
theory-based approach to limited diversity, i.e. the identification of “easy counterfactuals” as logical
remainders on which researchers can make plausible and theoretically justifiable assumptions. Only
“easy counterfactuals” are used in the minimization procedure, leading to an intermediate solution whose
complexity lies between the conservative and the parsimonious one. Schneider and Wagemann (2006) put
forward a complementary theory-based approach to deal with limited diversity, based on the distinction
between remote and proximate factors. Their suggested procedure divides the analytical moment in two
steps: the first one is aimed at identifying the remote, structural contexts where the outcome is present.
The second one is aimed at specifying the proximate conditions which lead to the outcome within those
contexts. This decomposition dramatically reduces the number of logically possible combinations of
conditions and hence attenuates the problem of limited diversity.
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substantive knowledge, which anchors set membership scores to qualitative thresholds
and truncates irrelevant variation.
Within this framework, I investigate the asymmetrical relations between institutional
conditions and my outcome of interest, i.e. severe migrant penalties. I test the suﬃciency
and necessity of single conditions in bringing about the outcome and in avoiding it. Next,
by means of a Venn diagram, I show all logically possible combinations of institutional
conditions and describe Western European educational systems according to the config-
uration they belong to. Finally, I systematically assess which combinations of conditions
are suﬃcient to produce severe penalties (or to avoid them). To do so, I perform fs-QCA
and apply several strategies to deal with limited diversity.
4.4 Operationalization
4.4.1 Variable construction
The operationalization of the explanandum—“Migrant achievement penalties”—has been
fully detailed in Chapter 3. In order to operationalize the structural and contextual
explanantes described in Section 4.2, I construct five country-level variables. As moti-
vated in the same section, the age at tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula pertains to
the dimension of school stratification, while the entry age in the system pertains to the
dimension of duration of schooling. The degree to which second-generation immigrants
are marginalized in the worst-performing schools simultaneously pertains to the dimen-
sions of school stratification, standardization and resources allocation. Besides these
institutional variables, I also construct two contextual variables: one referred to a coun-
try’s history of immigration—and more precisely to the period when mass immigration
started—and another one to the linguistic composition of immigrants—in particular, the
proportion of immigrants living in a country whose mother tongue is very distant from
the one of that country. More precisely, the five explanatory variables are:
1. Age at tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula. The information refers to year
2007/2008 and was taken from the review of educational systems performed by
Eurydice, a network of 38 country units coordinated by the European Commission’s
agency for education and culture (Eurydice, 2009, 2-7);
2. Marginalization of second-generation immigrants in low performing schools.
I computed the index based on individual information provided by PISA 2006-
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2009. The index represents the relative risk for G2 (vs. natives) of attending the
worst-performing group of schools (situated in the 10th percentile of the achieve-
ment distribution according to PISA average scores on all literacy domains). The
index is then equal to Pr(badschools)G2Pr(badschools)NAT , where Pr(badschools)G2 is the probabil-
ity of being the worst-performing schools for second-generation immigrants, and
Pr(badschools)NAT the same probability for natives;
3. Average entry age of second-generation immigrants in the (pre)school
system. I computed the index combining individual information on preschool at-
tendance provided by PISA 2006-2009 and country-level information on the oﬃcial
starting age of compulsory schooling relevant for the birth cohort of interest (Eu-
rydice, 2000, 65-66). I subtracted the individual years of preschool attendance
retrospectively assessed by PISA from the oﬃcial starting age, and computed the
country average for second-generation immigrants. The index is then equal to
COMP:AGE  (1  f1+2  f2), where COMP:AGE is the starting age of compul-
sory schooling, f1 the proportion of G2 children with one year of preschool, and f2
that with two years;
4. Starting decade of mass immigration. The information is derived from previ-
ous literature discussed in Chapter 2 (Freeman, 1995; Bauer et al., 2000);
5. Proportion of second-generation immigrants with high linguistic dis-
tance. This index is computed in three steps. First, I computed shares of national
origins in the population of second-generation immigrant students moving from (i)
mother’s birth country of second-generation immigrants, (ii) data on inflows in the
period 1975-1993 provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Aﬀairs (UN-DESA) and (iii) information on foreign residents in the 2000s
collected by national statistical oﬃces5. Second, I assessed linguistic distance from
5 For countries where information on mother’s birth country was available in the national ques-
tionnaires, PISA 2006-09 data were used to identify the origin of second-generation immigrants with
diﬀerent degrees of linguistic distance (Austria, Belgium-Flanders, Belgium-Walonia, Switzerland, Ger-
many, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden). For countries where
the information was not available from PISA, I used UN-DESA data on immigration flows in the period
1975-1993 to proxy origins of parents of second-generation immigrants born in 1994 (England and Wales,
Sweden). Where no international information on country of origin was available, I relied on national
statistics: Spain (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración - Ministerio del Interior: data on foreign
residents aged 16-64 in 2003); France (INED: data on foreign residents aged 25-54 in 2009); Italy (ISTAT:
data on foreign residents in 2003).
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the oﬃcial language of the host society for every single origin group. Distance is
assessed according to the Encyclopedia of Languages (Lewis, 2009) as follows: if
the two languages coincide to a great extent (ex. U.S. and British English), the
distance is set at zero; if they share the same linguistic sub-family (ex. Spanish and
French as Romance languages), the distance is considered mild; if they only share
the same family (ex. Polish and French as Indo-European languages), distance
is high; if they belong to diﬀerent families (ex. Turkish as Altaic and German as
Indo-European), distance is very high6. Third, I computed the share of immigrants
with high or very high linguistic distance.
The distribution of countries on these variables can be found in Table B.1 in the Ap-
pendix.
4.4.2 Fuzzy-set calibration
As mentioned earlier, in order to perform fsQCA, researchers have to calibrate the sets
corresponding to the outcome (explanandum) and the causal conditions (explanantes).
In other words, one needs to identify some transparent and legitimate criteria to assess
the degree of membership of each case to each set. I follow the “direct method” of
calibration (Ragin, 2008, 186-190), which consists of moving from a “source” variable
and setting three qualitative thresholds: full membership (1), full non-membership (0)
and maximum ambiguity or crossover (0.5). Table 4.1 reports the critical thresholds
chosen.
The source variable for my explanandum—“Severe penalty”—is the index of mi-
grant achievement penalty presented in chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. In order to set the
critical thresholds, I relied on meaningful breaks in the internal distribution of the index,
identified by case inspection and cluster analysis7. The calibration resulted in the follow-
ing partition: countries where G2 score below the 30th percentile of comparable natives
fully belong to the outcome (“Severe penalty”); countries where they score above the 40th
6I assess the distance between the oﬃcial language in the country of destination and the oﬃcial
language in the country of origin. However, when another language is widely spoken in the country of
origin, I also assess the distance between the latter and the oﬃcial language in the country of destination,
and subsequently increase the distance by one level. Ex. Algerian immigrants in France: mild distance
because: (i) oﬃcial language in Algeria: Arabic; but (ii) French widely spoken in Algeria, and French to
French: zero distance.
7The breaks proved robust to diﬀerent clustering specifications of methods (average, complete link)
and distances (euclidean, manhattan).
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fully belong to the negated outcome (“Not severe penalty”); countries where they score
between the 30th and the 35th percentile are more in than out of the outcome; countries
where they score between the 35th and the 40th percentile are more out than in.
As for the explanantes, moving from the five structural and contextual variables listed
in the previous section, I calibrated seven conditions:
1. Tracked system. An educational system where students are tracked into diﬀer-
entiated curricula before being assessed by PISA;
2. Early-tracked system. An educational system that tracks students into diﬀer-
entiated curricula at early age;
3. Marginalizing system. An educational system where second-generation immi-
grants are relegated to a great extent in low-quality schools or tracks;
4. Early-entry system. An educational system where children generally begin
school or preschool before the age of 4;
5. Late-entry system. An educational system where children generally begin school
or preschool after the age of 5;
6. Linguistically distant country. A country where a great proportion of immi-
grants speaks a language that is very distant from the oﬃcial one;
7. New immigration country. A country where mass immigration began substan-
tially after the post-war period.
While the first one is a crisp (dichotomized) set, the remaining conditions are all
fuzzy-sets, hence case membership varies in degree. Since the distribution of G2 average
entry age has few extreme values, “Early-entry” and “Late-entry” are calibrated in a
“dual” (asymmetrical) rather than “unipolar” (symmetrical) way. Hence, some cases do
not belong neither to the set of “Early-entry” nor to that of “Late-entry”.
The calibration of “Tracked”, “Early-tracked” and “New immigration”, was based on
substantive and theoretical knowledge. I consider as tracked a system where students
have already been diﬀerentiated into generalist and vocational tracks by the age they
take the PISA test, i.e. 15. Hence the qualitative crossover for the crisp set “Tracked” is
set at 14.5. In order to set the three critical thresholds (full membership, crossover, full
non-membership) for the fuzzy-set “Early tracked” I relied on the literature on tracking
(Hanushek andWössmann, 2006; Brunello and Checchi, 2007; Van deWerfhorst and Mijs,
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2010). These scholars contrast on the one hand Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands (which track their students at 12 or beforehand) and on the other
hand the UK, France, Spain, and Nordic countries (which track their students at 15 or
later on). Italy and Switzerland are generally considered as intermediate cases, since they
track their students at age 14 . Since I am interested in the performance of 15-year-old
students, the second group clearly does not belong to the set of early tracked countries,
while the first one does. Hence, 12 and 15.5 were chosen as thresholds for full membership
and full non-membership, respectively. The third group belongs to the set of early-
tracked systems, but with lower membership scores than the first one: 14.5 was chosen
as crossover. As for the calibration of “New immigration country”, I considered countries
characterized by post-war guestworkers programs, where mass immigration began in the
1950s, as completely not belonging to the set (full non-membership: 1950s). Instead,
Southern European countries, where mass immigration began in the 1980s or even 1990s,
completely belong to the set (full membership: 1990s). Nordic countries, which hosted a
great number of refugees since the 1970s, are considered new immigration countries but
“less new” than Southern European countries (crossover: 1960s).
The calibration of “Early-entry”, “Late-entry”, “Marginalizing”, and “Linguistically
distant” was based on meaningful breaks in the internal distribution, identified by case
inspection and cluster analysis8. Figure 4.1 plots fuzzy-set membership scores in the out-
come against “source” variables and graphically illustrates the meaning of the qualitative
thresholds chosen for cross-over, full membership and full not-membership.
8Like for the outcome, the identification of these breaks proved robust to diﬀerent specifications of
methods (average, complete link) and distances (euclidean, manhattan).
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Source variable Fuzzy set Critical thresholds
G2 achievement penalty Severe penalty Fully in <= -0.524,
Cross-over: -0.385,
Fully out >= -0.253
Age at tracking
Tracked Cross-over: 14.5
Early-tracked Fully in: 12,
Cross-over: 14.5,
Fully out: 15.5
Relative risk of marginalization Marginalizing Fully in: 4.677,
Cross-over: 2.768,
Fully out: 1.708
(Pre)school entry
Early-entry Fully in <= 3.5,
Cross-over: 4,
Fully out >= 5
Late-entry Fully in >=5,
Cross-over: 4.66,
Fully out: <= 3.5
G2 with high lang distance Linguistically distant Fully in >= 90.49,
Cross-over: 64.18,
Fully out <= 21.39
Mass immigration start New immigration Fully in >= 1990s,
Cross-over: 1960s,
Fully out <= 1950s
Table 4.1: Source variables, sets and critical thresholds for calibration. Method: direct (unipolar for Early-entry
and Late-Entry, dual for the remaining sets). Full membership: 0.99. Full non-membership: 0.01. Function for
intermediate values: logistic (R package QCA).
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Figure 4.1: Calibration of outcome and conditions. Source variables against fuzzy-sets. Solid lines indicate
critical thresholds for cross-over (0.5). Dotted lines indicate critical thresholds for full membership (0.99) and full
non-membership (0.01).
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4.5 Results from variable-oriented approach
After having identified theoretically relevant institutional dimensions of educational sys-
tems and having operationalized them with synthetic indicators, I investigate how they
are related to the relative disadvantage experienced by children of immigrants in ed-
ucational achievement. In this section, I present the results of analyses based on a
variable-oriented approach, i.e. one focused on the associations between the independent
and the dependent variables across countries. First, I look at bivariate correlations be-
tween institutional variables and the index of migrant achievement penalty I developed
in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. In assessing the existence of linear symmetrical relations
between each of the institutional variables and migrant penalties, I draw attention on
possible outliers and discuss their leverage. Second, I perform exploratory cross-country
regressions in order to address spuriousness issues and I estimate the net eﬀects of in-
stitutional variables on migrant penalties. Third, I present results from regression-tree
analysis, looking for complex interaction patterns between the institutional features and
migrant achievement penalties.
4.5.1 Bivariate correlations
Table 4.2 displays the correlation matrix among all institutional variables and migrant
achievement penalties. I expected “Age at tracking” to be positively associated with
migrant achievement penalty9, while “G2 average (pre)school entry age”, “Marginaliza-
tion in low-performing schools” and “Proportion of G2 with high linguistic distance” to
be negatively associated with it. I held no expectation on the direction of the relation
between the outcome and “Starting decade for mass immigration”.
Quite surprisingly, age at tracking displays a zero linear relation with migrant achieve-
ment penalties. However, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, the correlation index masks a
great variability among late-tracking countries. Some countries that track students at
15 or 16 display mild migrant penalties, like Greece or England and Wales, while others
display quite severe penalties, like Portugal and Finland. This may indicate that a sys-
tem cannot avoid severe penalties by simply delaying its tracking age. More generally,
the graph suggests some kind of complex relation between age at tracking and migrant
penalties, either because of an asymmetrical pattern (e.g. countries that track their stu-
9Remember that the measurement unit of the migrant achievement penalty index is standard devia-
tions and that negative values indicate larger penalties, while zero indicates no penalty.
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Penalty Tracking Entry Marginalization Imm decade Lang dist
Penalty 1 -0.010 -0.558 -0.228 -0.148 -0.216
Tracking 1.000 0.361 -0.306 0.590 -0.314
Entry 1.000 0.195 0.493 0.239
Marginalization 1.000 -0.305 0.274
Imm decade 1.000 -0.157
Lang dist 1.000
Table 4.2: Pearson’s correlation matrix of “Migrant achievement penalty”, “Age at tracking”, “G2 average
(pre)school entry age”, “Marginalization in low-performing schools”, “Starting decade for mass immigration”, “Pro-
portion of G2 with high linguistic distance”.
dents at early age are generally characterized by severe penalties, but the reverse is not
true), or because of some combination of eﬀects (e.g. late-tracking can reduce migrant
penalties, but only when combined with some other factors).
Both the average entry age of second-generation immigrants in (pre)school and their
relative risk of marginalization in low-quality schools display quite strong and negative
correlations. Indeed, a later entry in school or preschool is quite strongly associated
with a worsening of migrant penalties ( = -0.558), as is, even if to a lesser extent,
the relative proportion of immigrants compared to natives in bad schools ( = -0.228).
The observation of Figure 4.2 further reveals that the linear relation between degree of
marginalization and penalties is particularly strong if immigrants are up to four times
overrepresented in bad schools as opposed to natives. Austria and Denmark, where im-
migrants are five to seven times more likely to be found in bad schools, display severe
penalties, but not more severe than the other marginalizing countries. Therefore, if we
excluded these countries, the relation would be even stronger. On the contrary, outliers
seem to drive the strong correlation existing between entry age and migrant penalty. In-
deed, late-entry systems like Sweden, Denmark, and in particular Finland, display severe
migrant penalties, while early-entry systems, like England and Wales and the Nether-
lands, display quite mild penalties. Among countries where entry age is neither very early
nor very late, there is much more variability in the degree of migrant penalties. This
finding suggests that, even if entry age may matter for migrant learning disadvantage,
when its values are not extreme, we have to resort to other institutional factors in order
to explain cross-country variability10.
10Note that the fuzzy-set calibrations performed in section 4.4 take into account these findings. Indeed,
the calibration of “Marginalizing system” truncates the irrelevant variation after the value of 5, while the
calibration of “Late entry” and “Early entry” was performed in a dual way to emphasize the explanatory
power of the extreme values of the source variable.
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Figure 4.2: Linear correlation plots between “Age at tracking”, “G2 average (pre)school entry age”, “Marginal-
ization in low-performing schools”, “Proportion of G2 with high linguistic distance” and “Migrant achievement
penalty”. Peculiar cases identified by country labels.
Contextual factors are weakly related to migrant achievement penalties. With re-
spect to linguistic distance, the relationship is negative as expected: an increase in the
proportion of immigrants with a high linguistic distance corresponds to a worsening of
migrant penalties ( = -0.216). As shown by Figure 4.2, some outliers exist, but do not
aﬀect the strength of the relation because they are pretty evenly distributed within the
graph. An old history of immigration, on which I had no precise expectation, is also
negatively related to migrant penalties, though only to a weak extent ( = -0.148).
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Finally, the correlation matrix reveals that such theoretically relevant institutional
features are not independent from each other. In particular, it is worth to point out that
the average entry age in the (pre)school system is positively related to age at tracking.
Hence, in highly comprehensive systems the inclusion of children of immigrants takes
place at a relatively late age. Since a delayed entry age is associated with larger penalties,
the zero correlation between age at tracking and migrant penalties could be driven by
the confounding eﬀect of entry age, associated with both variables. More generally,
bivariate associations identified with correlation measures can be spurious rather than
causal. Hence, I now move to a multivariate framework and in order to isolate the eﬀects
of institutional variables net of each others.
4.5.2 OLS cross-country regressions
Table 4.3 displays the results of two exploratory linear regressions on the institutional
determinants of migrant achievement penalties. In the first model, I include only the three
variables referring to characteristics of the educational system (“Age at tracking”, “G2
average (pre)school entry age”, and “Marginalization in low-performing schools’), while in
the second one I additionally introduce the contextual variables (“Immigration decade”
and “Proportion of G2 with high linguistic distance”). In both cases, the dependent
variable is “Migrant achievement penalty”.
All the eﬀects go in the expected direction, including age at tracking, whose coeﬃ-
cient—net of that of entry age, to which it is positively correlated—changes sign with
respect to the correlation coeﬃcient. The fact that all the coeﬃcients except for that of
entry age fail to display acceptable significance levels is not surprising since the sample
size is very small. As expected, standard errors are larger in Model 2, where degrees
of freedom are reduced, but the size of the coeﬃcients does not change substantially.
Instead, I want to point out that the net eﬀects of the theoretically relevant features of
educational systems are quite weak. Indeed, entering school or preschool one year later
is associated with a worsening of migrant penalties by about one sixth of a standard
deviation (-0.16 or -0.17, depending on model specification). Increases in the age when
pupils are tracked or in the relative proportion of immigrants compared to natives in bad
schools bring about trivial changes in the size of migrant penalties.
The results of this exploratory regressions suggest that if we are interested in the
role played by educational systems in aﬀecting migrant learning disadvantage in Western
Europe, the search for additive eﬀects of single institutional variables may be an un-
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Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.126 (0.301) -0.928 (6.565)
Age at tracking 0.014 (0.018) 0.013 (0.023)
G2 (pre)school entry age -0.160** (0.066) -0.168* (0.086)
RR of marginalization -0.005 (0.025) -0.003 (0.029)
Immigration decade 0.001 (0.003)
G2 with high lang dist 0.000 (0.002)
Observations 17 17
F-statistic 2.39 1.222
Adjusted R-squared 0.207 0.065
Table 4.3: Coeﬃcients and fit values of OLS regression of “Migrant achievement penalty” on ‘Age at tracking”, “G2
average (pre)school entry age”, “Marginalization in low-performing schools”, “Immigration decade”,“Proportion of
G2 with high linguistic distance”. Standard errors in parentheses. ** Sig. at 0.05, * Sign at 0.1.
productive strategy. From a variable-oriented perspective, this acknowledgement could
induce researchers to include several interaction coeﬃcients in the regression models.
However, their interpretation would become extremely cumbersome. Instead, in the next
section I present results from an exploratory data technique, regression-tree analysis,
which allows to detect and to easily interpret complex patterns of interaction.
4.5.3 Regression-tree analysis
Bivariate and multivariate analyses on the eﬀects of theoretically relevant institutional
characteristics on migrant achievement penalties have suggested that complex patterns of
causation are in place in Western Europe. As mentioned in Section 4.3, I use regression
tree analysis in order to explore possible interactions, for which I have no strong a priori
assumptions. In fact, this multivariate data technique is exploratory and completely data-
driven. It recursively partitions the data space into smaller regions, according to the one
binary question which minimizes the sum S of squared deviations from the subgroup
means in the response variable. Each parent node is further divided into child nodes,
and the procedure is repeated until the largest decrease in S is below a given complexity
threshold. A decrease in the complexity threshold corresponds to an increase in the
overall R-squared in linear regression models. Figure 4.3 depicts results of the regression
tree analysis. As a guidance to the interpretation of the tree, note that variables with
the best predictive power are those generating splits at the higher level nodes and that
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show up again in subsequent divides, while those appearing for the first time in the lower
level nodes are less important.
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Figure 4.3: Results of regression tree analysis of “Migrant achievement penalty” on ‘Age at tracking”, “G2 average
(pre)school entry age”, “Marginalization in low-performing schools”, “Proportion of G2 with high linguistic dis-
tance”. Analyses performed with the R package rpart. Method: “anova”, complexity parameter 0.01. To improve
the readability of the graph, migrant achievement penalties are reported as absolute values
In the first step, countries are split according to the average entry age in the (pre)school
system. In the right branch we find late-entry countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Por-
tugal), all exhibiting severe migrant penalties (0.44 to 0.75). In the left branch, where
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age at entry is low to medium, the picture is more complex. This group is further divided
according to the degree of migrants’ marginalization. On the one hand, highly marginal-
izing systems (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium-Flanders) all display severe
migrant penalties (0.41 to 0.50). On the other hand, in Greece, where marginalization is
very low, migrant penalties are close to zero (0.14). Moderately marginalizing systems
display greater internal heterogeneity. England and Wales and France, where the propor-
tion of immigrants speaking a very distant language is quite low, migrant penalties are
also low (0.15 and 0.26). On the contrary, Italy is set apart in reason of its rather delayed
entry age and displays a severe penalty (0.45). The remaining countries (Luxembourg,
Belgium-Wallonia, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway) all display fairly mild penalties
(0.27 to 0.33).
A first discussion of these results concerns their degree of coherence with my theoret-
ical expectations on the role of single institutional features. Generally, results support
these predictions. Entry age in the (pre)school system stems as the most relevant vari-
able in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in migrant penalties: it drives the first split
and it emerges as a discriminating factor in further divides. As expected, earlier en-
try is associated to milder migrant penalties, with the exception of Portugal. Second
order splits are driven by marginalization in low-performing schools, which is generally
associated with more severe penalties. However, for a single observation (Finland), the
split goes in the unexpected direction. The importance of contextual variables is only
partially supported. Starting decade of mass immigration does not emerge as a vari-
able of split, while linguistic distance does, but only in lower level nodes11. Possibly,
this reflects a qualitative diﬀerence between new and old immigration countries that
variable-oriented techniques like regression tree analysis are not able to handle. In the
second place, one should acknowledge that these results confirm the existence of complex
causality patterns in the production of migrant penalties. More specifically, equifinality
is made visible by two clusters of countries above all: on the one hand, Nordic countries
and Portugal emerge as late-entry systems producing high levels of migrant penalties.
On the other hand, the same outcome is present in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and
Belgium-Flanders. These countries are not characterized by late-entry but, instead, by
a high degree of marginalization. Hence, two alternative paths towards large penalties
11As expected, linguistic distance is more relevant to diﬀerentiate countries according to migrant penal-
ties in the other domains of literacy assessed by PISA, as appears from additional analyses performed
on reading and science. Results of regression trees on these domains are reported in Figures B.1 and B.2
in the Appendix B.
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seem to be in place. Finally, these results can be read with an eye on the interactions
between institutional features that emerge from the regression tree. In order to produce
large migrant penalties, interactions do not seem very relevant because the two variables
just mentioned appear crucial by themselves: a late entry age and sustained marginal-
ization. However, in order to display mild penalties, systems have to combine several
variables: England and Wales and France combine a low marginalization with a low
linguistic distance, while Luxembourg, Belgium-Wallonia, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Norway combine the same low marginalization with a relatively early entry age. Italy,
where marginalization is also low but linguistic distance is high and entry age is not very
early, is left to face severe penalties.
Overall, the regression-tree analysis presented in this section shows that, even when
adopting a variable-oriented approach, complex patterns of interactions emerge between
the institutional and contextual characteristics of educational systems. Multiple alter-
native combinations of characteristics are associated with high or low levels of migrant
achievement penalties. Nevertheless, regression-tree analysis has some limitations. First
of all, like all mainstream statistical analyses, it is based on correlations and it is therefore
unable to detect asymmetrical relations. However, as I have shown in the previous sec-
tion, explorative analyses suggest that some characteristics of the educational systems
may be linked to migrant achievement penalties in an asymmetrical fashion. Second,
like any variable-oriented technique, it is concerned with the overall variance of the de-
pendent variable and the independent variables, irrespective of its substantive meaning.
This implies that its major aim is to explain the greatest amount of variance, rather than
explaining the value of the dependent variable in single cases or groupings of cases. A sec-
ond implication of the variable-oriented approach is that it consider all variation—both in
the dependent or independent variables—as relevant, irrespective of the substative mean-
ing of specific values. As I have already shown, fuzzy-set calibration is able to address
this issue, by accounting for fine-grained diﬀerences but at the same time setting some
qualitative thresholds. More generally, I argue that Qualitative Comparative Analysis
provides a more powerful framework to systematically assess all the issues just raised,
namely: (i) asymmetrical relations; (ii) patterns of complex causation; (iii) substantive
and theoretical relevance of single cases or groupings of cases, seen as configurations of
attributes. The next section is devoted to present results from Qualitative Comparative
Analysis.
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4.6 Results from diversity-oriented approach
In this section, I question the symmetrical nature of the relation between features of
educational systems and migrant penalties and hence I resort to set-theory, by assessing
whether any characteristic is individually necessary or suﬃcient to produce severe mi-
grant achievement penalties, or to avoid them. Next, I consider how such characteristics
actually combine in Western European educational systems and whether we can iden-
tify any recurrent institutional configuration. Finally, I present results from Qualitative
Comparative Analysis, as a systematic assessment of the configurations that are suﬃcient
to produce severe migrant penalties, and of those that are suﬃcient to avoid them.
4.6.1 Assessing individual necessity and suﬃciency
After having explored the correlations between institutional variables with migrant achieve-
ment penalties, I now resort to set-theory in order to assess asymmetrical relations of
suﬃciency and necessity between the same variables—though now calibrated into fuzzy-
sets—and the presence (or the absence) of severe migrant penalties.
A first question that can be addressed is whether any condition is formally necessary
for the occurrence of the outcome. In set-theory, this is equivalent to assessing whether
the condition is a superset of the outcome, or in other words whether all instances of the
outcome display the condition of interest. Comparative configurational methods follow
a somehow less deterministic logic and allow for small deviations from an exact superset
relation. The extent of these deviations and the explanatory power of the relation can
be evaluated by looking at the parameters of fuzzy-set consistency and coverage12. Table
4.4 presents the results of an analysis of necessity of single institutional conditions (and
their negation) for the presence of severe migrant penalties (and their absence)13.
The consistency scores indicate that, formally, two conditions are almost necessary to
12Consistency for necessity assesses the extent to which a superset relation is accurate. Formally,
it measures the degree to which cases sharing the outcome Y agree in showing a given condition (or
configuration of conditions) X. It is computed as:
P
min(xi;yi)P
(yi)
where where xi and yi are individual
membership scores in the sets X and Y . Coverage expresses the empirical importance of the necessity
relation. Formally, it measures the degree to which instances of the causal condition (or configuration
of conditions) X agree in displaying the outcome Y . It is computed as:
P
min(xi;yi)P
(xi)
.
13As noted by Bol and Luppi (2013), the traditional analysis of necessity fails to identify potentially
necessary combinations of conditions. Following the stepwise procedure suggested by these authors, I
systematically assess the degree of necessity of all possible configurations for the presence and the absence
of the outcome. Results are reported in Table B.2 in the Appendix.
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SEVERE PENALTIES severe penalties
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
TRACKED 0.649 0.397
tracked 0.351 0.603
EARLY TRACKED 0.598 0.501
early tracked 0.441 0.542
MARGINALIZING 0.625 0.286
marginalizing 0.463 0.812
LATE ENTRY 0.443 0.134
late entry 0.617 0.933 0.602
EARLY ENTRY 0.180 0.465
early entry 0.894 0.649 0.617
LANG DIST 0.885 0.657 0.569
lang dist 0.166 0.488
NEW IMM 0.529 0.372
new imm 0.522 0.684
Table 4.4: Results of analysis of necessity for the presence and the absence of the outcome. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency scores for each condition
and its negation. Coverage scores are shown only for conditions close to necessity.
bring about severe penalties. The first one is a not-early entry in the (pre)school system,
which displays a consistency value close to 0.9. Its coverage value is not low (0.649)
suggesting that this relation is not trivial. Equally, being a linguistically distant country
is found as a pretty consistent and not trivial superset of the outcome. By turning now
to institutional characteristics that are needed to avoid severe penalties, Table 4.4 also
shows that a not-late entry system is necessary for the absence of the outcome and that
its explanatory power is quite large.
These results can be more easily interpreted if they are translated back to the more
familiar language of Boolean algebra. First of all, in almost all Western European coun-
tries displaying severe penalties, a great proportion of immigrants speaks a very distant
language from the oﬃcial one14. This result suggests that—although second-generation
immigrants were born in the host society—most of their learning disadvantages derive
14The relation is of quasi-necessity rather than necessity, first of all because consistency is not re-
markably high, and secondly because one country—Portugal—substantially contradicts the relation, by
displaying severe migrant penalties in the absence of high linguistic diﬀerence.
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from a lack of linguistic skills. Hence, countries where languages of immigrants are very
distant from their own face the greatest diﬃculties in tackling migrant penalties in ed-
ucational achievement, and only some of them succeed in avoiding severe penalties. In
order to see what diﬀerentiates successful countries from unsuccessful ones, we must in-
vestigate which configurations of conditions are suﬃcient to avoid severe penalties. On
the contrary, in countries where linguistic distance is low, generally no severe migrant
penalties emerge.
To better understand the role of entry age, we shall remember that the calibration
of Early-entry and Late-entry was performed asymmetrically, therefore one set is not
the negation of the other one, but rather a subset of the negation of the other one.
This asymmetrical calibration led to a skewed distribution of the membership scores in
the two sets: the large majority of cases holds low membership in Late-entry and in
Early-entry too, as can be observed in the Figure 4.1 presented earlier. As noted by
Schneider and Wagemann (2012), if membership in a given condition is skewed, and
membership is the outcome is skewed too, the empirical relevance of that condition can
be overestimated by the coverage formula. In this case, membership in the outcome is
not particularly skewed (cf. again Figure 4.1). Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the
potential triviality of these quasi-necessary conditions is given by the XY plots depicted
in Figure 4.4, where membership scores in “Not-early entry” and “Not-late entry” are
plotted against memberships in the outcome and the negated outcome, respectively.
While most countries have membership higher than 0.5 in both conditions, in neither
plot cases are massively concentrated in the upper-right corner. On the contrary, several
cases can be found in the lower-right corner of the plot. In other words, while all the cases
displaying the condition also display the outcome, the outcome is not so common to cover
all the instances of the condition: the two sets do not coincide. Rather, the condition
is a superset —albeit imperfect—of the outcome. In eﬀect, in this case, the formula
of relevance for necessary conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 236)15 produces
rather similar results to those produced by the formula of coverage. In particular, the
relevance of “Not-early entry” for the presence of the outcome is 0.521, and the relevance
of “Not-late entry” for the absence of the outcome is 0.475. Hence, the conditions seem
to be not trivial.
More generally, both graphs in Figure 4.4 reveal that fuzzy-set membership in the
15These authors propose to assess the relevance of necessary conditions as:
P
(1 xi)P
[1 min(xi;yi)] where xi
and yi are membership scores in the condition and the outcome, respectively. Values close to one indicate
high relevance, while values close to 0 indicate triviality.
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Figure 4.4: Fuzzy-set plots of necessary institutional conditions for the presence (left) and the absence (right) of
the outcome. Inconsistent cases are identified by country labels.
condition is generally higher than fuzzy-set membership in the outcome, meaning that
when the outcome is present, the condition is present too. Some inconsistent cases
exist, but none of them is found in the upper-left corner of the plot, therefore they
are inconsistent in degree or irrelevant, rather than inconsistent in kind (Schneider and
Wagemann, 2012, 306-310). Plainly speaking, in all Western European countries that
display severe penalties, children of immigrants enter the educational system after age
4. On the other hand, in all countries that avoid severe penalties, they enter the system
before age 5.
After investigating individual necessity, we may be interested in seeing whether there
is any institutional characteristic that is suﬃcient by itself in producing severe penalties,
or in avoiding them. As shown by Table 4.5, only one condition satisfies the minimal
requirements for the subset relation16: a late-entry system is a suﬃcient condition for
severe migrant penalties (consistency: 0.88). In other words, the simple fact that chil-
dren of immigrants enter an educational system after age 5 produces severe migrant
achievement penalties in some countries. However, the proportion of outcome explained
16Just like for necessity, in order to evaluate a suﬃciency relation, researchers have to rely on param-
eters of consistency and coverage. Since suﬃciency implies a subset relation, consistency for suﬃciency
measures the degree to which cases sharing a given condition (or configuration of conditions) X agree
in displaying the outcome Y . It is computed as:
P
min(xi;yi)P
(xi)
where where xi and yi are individual
membership scores in the sets X and Y . Coverage expresses the degree of the outcome Y explained by
the causal condition (or configuration of conditions) X. It is computed as:
P
min(xi;yi)P
(yi)
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SEVERE PENALTIES severe penalties
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
TRACKED 0.644 0.356
tracked 0.392 0.608
EARLY TRACKED 0.591 0.447
early tracked 0.494 0.549
MARGINALIZING 0.786 0.325
marginalizing 0.418 0.662
LATE ENTRY 0.880 0.443 0.240
late entry 0.441 0.602
EARLY ENTRY 0.341 0.799
early entry 0.649 0.405
LANG DIST 0.657 0.381
lang dist 0.299 0.794
NEW IMM 0.649 0.413
new imm 0.479 0.567
Table 4.5: Results of analysis of suﬃciency for the presence and the absence of the outcome. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency scores for each condition
and its negation. Coverage scores are shown only for conditions close to suﬃciency.
by this condition is quite low (0.443). Moreover, looking at the X-Y plot displayed in
Figure 4.5, we realize that only three cases are substantially explained by this condition
alone: although cases in the the upper-left part of the graph are consistent with the
suﬃciency relation, they are not explained since they do not display the condition. On
the contrary, Sweden and Denmark (although not perfectly consistent) and Finland are
explained because they are more in than out of both sets (outcome and condition). But
what about other countries suﬀering from severe penalties? What institutional condi-
tions account for their inegalitarian educational outcomes? In order to address these
questions and to provide an explanation of greater empirical relevance, one must resort
to some combinations of conditions, rather than single conditions.
4.6.2 Institutional configurations
Before moving to a systematic assessment of the suﬃciency of combinations of conditions
in producing or avoiding severe migrant penalties, I explore which configurations are
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Figure 4.5: Fuzzy-set plot of LATE ENTRY as a suﬃcient condition for the presence of the outcome. Substantively
explained cases are identified by country labels.
actually embodied byWestern European countries. Figure 4.6 displays the property space
resulting from all the 64 logically possible combinations of five institutional conditions:
“Tracked”, “Early tracked”, “Late-entry”, “Not early entry”, and “Marginalizing”17. For
the sake of simplicity, I depict the conditions in a dichotomized form. Coherence with the
logic of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is preserved, because the crossover
of 0.5 marks a qualitative threshold between cases fundamentally in and out of the
set. The graphical representation of how the relevant dimensions of educational systems
combine in Western European countries shows no simple explanation of severe migrant
penalties. Only two clear-cut clusters of countries emerge: on the one hand, not-tracking
and not-marginalizing systems characterized by not-late entry (France, Spain, Greece
and Norway), or even early entry (England and Wales). Such systems are all able to
avoid severe migrant penalties. On the other hand, early-tracking and marginalizing
systems characterized by not-early entry all display severe penalties (Austria, Flemish
17Since graphical representations of combinations of more than five conditions are extremely hard to
interpret, I include only the conditions referring to the educational systems and not those referring to
the context. “Early entry” is negated because the intersection of “Late-entry” and “Early entry” would
be a logical contradiction.
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Figure 4.6: Venn diagram depicting all logically possible combinations of TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED,
LATE-ENTRY, early-entry, MARGINALIZING. The sequence of 0 and 1 in each cell represents the absence
and presence of each factor in the aforementioned order. Cases depicted against a black background display
severe migrant penalties, cases depicted against a gray background do not.
Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany) with the exception of Walloon Belgium. However
the outcomes of countries displaying an institutional mix of theoretically egalitarian and
inegalitarian conditions are less easily explained. Among countries that suﬀer from severe
migrant penalties, Denmark and Sweden are not-tracking, but late-entry systems. The
same holds for Finland. However, while Denmark and Sweden marginalize children of
immigrants in low-quality schools, Finland does not. Italy and Portugal—which display
the outcome too—are both tracking systems where marginalization does not take place
and entry is neither late or early. However, Italy tracks students at early age, while
Portugal does not. Among countries that avoid severe penalties, Netherlands emerges as
a peculiar case, because it is very similar to Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany.
However, diﬀerently from them, it is characterized by an early entry age in the system.
In order to gain a better understanding of the configurations suﬃcient for the outcome
(or for its absence), it is then needed to perform a formal minimization of the truth table.
The Venn diagram also shows that if we consider only institutional dimensions related
to the school system, two configurations are contradictory with respect to the outcome.
Walloon Belgium, as stated earlier, fails to display the outcome, but it is grouped to-
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gether with systems where severe penalties are in place. However, a large proportion
of immigrants in Belgium come from countries where French is widely spoken, there-
fore—from a linguistic point of view—many children of immigrants have a comparative
advantage in the Walloon as opposed to the Flemish educational system. In the second
contradictory configuration, Luxembourg appears together with Italy (early tracking,
not-marginalizing, neither early entry nor late entry) but, diﬀerently from the latter, it
does not display severe penalties. However, the two countries have two very diﬀerent
immigration histories: while Italy is a new immigration country, in Luxembourg mass
immigration started in the post-war period. Therefore, including the contextual charac-
teristics related to linguistic distance and to the history of immigration may be helpful
in solving these contradictions.
Like the other exploratory analyses presented in this chapter, the Venn diagram
suggests that no easy institutional explanation can account for migrant achievement
penalties in Western Europe. Instead, it is worth to conduct a systematic comparative
assessment of institutional configurations in order to understand the role of educational
systems.
4.6.3 fs-QCA: model construction and robustness checks
Unlike variable-oriented research—where concept formation, case selection, measurement
and model specification should be distinct phases of inquiry—comparative configurational
methods entail a “dialogue of ideas and evidence” (Ragin, 1987, 164-71). Hence, fuzzy-set
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs-QCA) is an iterative process where it is not only
admitted, but expected that researchers adjust and refine their theoretical expectations
in the light of empirical analyses. Moreover, researchers should be open to change the
definition of critical thresholds for calibration and for truth table analysis, as well as
their assumptions on counterfactual arguments. They should also explicitly discuss how
these changes aﬀect their results. Ultimately, the goal of fs-QCA is not so much to test
theoretical hypotheses, but rather to explore complex causal patterns in given contexts.
In this perspective, this subsection documents the process of my systematic assessment
of institutional configurations leading to severe penalties in Western Europe.
Presence of the outcome
As I have shown earlier in this section, exploratory statistical and set-theoretical analyses
consistently show that some countries display equally severe penalties while embodying
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diﬀerent kinds of educational systems. Against this evidence, it would be simplistic
to conclude that educational systems are irrelevant in explaining migrant penalties in
Western Europe, because there may be diﬀerent combinations of institutional charac-
teristics bringing to the same outcome. In order to construct my explanatory model, I
moved from three institutional dimensions, calibrated into five fuzzy-sets (TRACKED,
EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY and LATE-ENTRY educa-
tional systems) as detailed in Section 4.4. As shown by Figure 4.6, the configurations
created by the combination of these institutional conditions display two contradictions
with respect to the outcome. Given the deterministic nature of set-theoretic methods,
it is essential to deal with contradictory rows before proceeding to the truth table anal-
ysis. There are several strategies to solve contradictions (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009;
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In this case, I chose to add to the model two contex-
tual conditions: NEW IMMIGRATION and LINGUISTICALLY DISTANT countries18.
The new conditions are able to diﬀerentiate among the countries belonging to the con-
tradictory configurations, respectively Italy vs. Luxembourg, and Walloon Belgium vs.
Austria, Flemish Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany. This resulted in truth tables for
the presence and the absence of the outcome free of substantive contradictions19, re-
ported in Tables B.3-B.9 in the Appendix. However, the drawback of this strategy is a
considerable intensification of limited diversity, given that, by increasing the number of
conditions, the number of logically possibly configurations is increased exponentially.
Table 4.6 presents the first results of the truth table minimization for the occurrence
of the outcome. The solution indicates the presence of a complex pattern of causation:
no single condition is suﬃcient in bringing about severe penalties, but some conditions
can produce the outcome if combined. Moreover, severe penalties can alternatively stem
from four diﬀerent combinations of conditions.
As expected, the solution is quite complex, because I adopted the most conservative
strategy to deal with limited diversity. In other words, in order to produce this solution,
no assumption was made on the logical remainders, i.e. configurations that lack empirical
instances. Theoretical knowledge is helpful in assessing whether the conservative solution
contains some conditions which—despite not formally redundant from a logical point of
18Again, for the definition and the calibration of these conditions refer to Section 4.4
19Substantive contradictions, or—as Schneider and Wagemann (2012) call them—True Logical Con-
tradictions (TLCs), are configurations that correspond to some cases displaying the outcome (i.e. having
a fuzzy-set membership score higher than 0.5) and to some other cases not displaying the outcome (i.e.
having a fuzzy-set membership score lower than 0.5).
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Path cons. cov. Cases
(late entry * early entry * lang dist) * NEW IMM 1.000 0.065 PRT
* (TRACKED * marg * early tracked)
(late entry * early entry * LANG DIST) * NEW IMM 1.000 0.103 ITA
(TRACKED*marg*EARLY TRACKED)
(LATE ENTRY*LANG DIST) * NEWIMM
* (tracked*MARGINAL)
0.999 0.173 DNK,SWE
(early entry*late entry*LANG DIST) * 0.956 0.328 AUT, BELF
(MARGINAL * EARLY TRACK) CHE, DEU
Whole solution 0.977 0.650
Table 4.6: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.9. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis performed with
the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
view—can be removed by making plausible assumptions. In order to better understand
this point, let us have a look at the third path of the solution. I find that in new immi-
gration countries, a late entry into the educational system by children of immigrants who
speak a very distant language from that of the host society is suﬃcient in bringing about
severe penalties, provided that it takes place in non-tracked systems which marginalize
students of immigrant origins in low-quality schools. Given the well-known inegalitarian
character of tracking, it is plausible that severe migrant penalties would be produced also
in similar systems which, nevertheless, do track students into diﬀerentiated curricula. In
order to formally assess this argument, we would need the counterfactual configuration
(LATE ENTRY*LANG DIST) * NEWIMM * (TRACKED*MARGINAL), which, unfor-
tunately, does not exist in Western Europe. However, this configuration can be treated
as an “easy counterfactual”, hence assuming that if it existed, it would lead to severe
migrant penalties (Ragin and Sonnett, 2004; Ragin, 2008). In other words, I can set a
directional expectation on the role of tracking for the outcome: if tracking plays any role
in producing migrant achievement penalties, it goes in the direction of worsening those
penalties rather than mitigating them. Similarly, based on the theoretical reasonings
developed in Section 4.2, one can set directional expectations on some other institutional
characteristics, chiefly entry age and linguistic distance. By doing so, it is possible to use
some of the logical remainders suitable to contribute to greater parsimony in the truth
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table minimization. The role of directional expectations is then to justify the definition
of such simplifying assumptions as “easy counterfactuals”. Table 4.7 presents the results
of a truth table analysis that incorporates such directional expectations. The solution is
denoted as “intermediate”, since it is a superset of the one obtained with the more conser-
vative strategy, but is a subset of the one we might have obtained if we allowed for the use
of any counterfactual configuration (including the “diﬃcult” ones) in the minimization
procedure20.
Path cons. cov. Cases
early entry * TRACKED * NEW IMM 0.999 0.220 PRT; ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) * NEWIMM
* MARGINAL
0.999 0.173 DNK,SWE
(early entry*LANG DIST) * 0.955 0.328 AUT,BELF,CHE,DEU
(MARGINAL * EARLY TRACK)
Whole solution 0.978 0.709
Table 4.7: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simpli-
fying assumptions: TRACKED, LATE-ENTRY, early-entry, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINAL, LANG DIST
contribute to the presence rather than the absence of the outcome. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.95. Frequency cutoﬀ:
1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
20As an alternative strategy to deal with limited diversity, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) put for-
ward what they label “Theory-Guided Enhanced Standard Analysis (TESA)”. This strategy addresses
several issues inherent in the derivation of the “intermediate solution”. First of all, as mentioned, the
intermediate solution is a subset of the parsimonious solution, which is obtained by using all logical
remainders suitable to gain parsimony in the truth table minimization. In order to get to the intermedi-
ate solution, researchers only use some of those remainders. More specifically, when setting directional
expectations, only those that are theoretically justifiable and suitable to gain parsimony are used in
the truth table minimization. However, as the authors argue: (i) remainders that are suitable to gain
parsimony can be implausible; (ii) the goal of fs-QCA is not necessarily to gain greater parsimony. The
TESA approach consists in inspecting all logical remainders and in setting configurational directional
expectations. Unfortunately, given the limited theoretical development in the study field of this disser-
tation, it is very hard to derive directional expectations that go beyond the role of single conditions.
Moreover, given the policy relevance of the research questions at stake, an important goal of my fs-QCA
is to attain a parsimonious account of which features of educational systems lead to severe penalties and
which do not, provided that the context is adequately taken into account. However, as I will display
later in this section, I deal with the problem of limited diversity in two other ways: first, by performing
a two-step analysis on remote and proximate factors (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006), and second, by
streamlining the explanatory model.
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The most evident finding concerns the relevance of entry age in (pre)school: late
or not-early entry emerge in all the components of the solution. This is not surprising
given the results of the analyses presented beforehand: entry age was the first variable of
split in the regression tree analysis and had a strong correlation with migrant penalties.
Most importantly, the analysis of necessity has shown that a not-early entry system is
a quasi-necessary condition for severe penalties (consistency: 0.894, coverage: 0.649).
Upon a closer inspection of the causal paths, we notice that tracking into diﬀerentiated
curricula by itself is not decisive in producing the outcome. However, in new immigration
countries, when not counterbalanced by an early entry age in the educational system,
it is suﬃcient to produce severe migrant penalties (path 1). The remaining two paths
are most interesting because they contrast two Scandinavian educational systems, known
for their high degree of comprehensiveness, to highly diﬀerentiated systems that track
students at young age. On the one hand, in Denmark and Sweden—new immigration
countries with a large proportion of linguistically-distant immigrants—severe penalties
are the product of a delayed entry in the (pre)school system together with a subsequent
marginalization of immigrants in low-quality schools. On the other hand, in Austria,
Flemish Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany, second-generation immigrants, a majority
of whom also speaks a very distant language from that of the host society, enter the
(preschool) system at a relatively young age. However, this cannot compensate for the
detrimental combination of early tracking and marginalization of immigrants in low-
quality schools. Possibly, in these countries marginalization is itself a product of tracking,
since by the end of compulsory schooling children of migrants who chose a vocational
track have already been exposed to a lower quality environment for three to five years.
It is easy to visualize the accurateness and the empirical relevance of the solution
presented above by looking at Figure 4.7. The bottom-right part of the graph is empty,
revealing that no inconsistencies in kind exist. In other words, all the cases belonging
to one of the configurations entailed by the three causal paths also belong to the set of
countries with severe migrant penalties. The case of Germany, lying below the diagonal
but still above the 0.5 threshold, is to be considered an inconsistency in degree rather
than in kind (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 306-310). The upper-left part of the plot
corresponds to the unexplained cases. Finland lies in this part of the graph. This is
particularly disturbing since Finland has a membership score of almost one in the set
of severe penalties. In other words, it is close to the idealtype of an educational system
where children of immigrants experience extreme penalties in educational achievement.
Hence, even if the whole solution has a quite high coverage value (0.709), it is not
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Figure 4.7: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the presence of the outcome. Solution:’ refer to Table 4.7
completely satisfying, because it fails to explain the role of educational systems in one of
the countries where children of immigrants are particularly worse oﬀ.
A closer inspection at the truth table (reported in Table B.3 in the Appendix B)
reveals that the case of Finland corresponds to a configuration that has a subset consis-
tency of 0.776 to the outcome. Therefore, by setting a row consistency threshold of 0.95 I
have categorized such configuration as a logical contradiction, not to be used in the min-
imization procedure. Nevertheless, Finland is not a substantive contradiction, because
it has a membership score higher than 0.5 in both the outcome and the configuration.
Therefore, I repeated the analyses by setting a less stringent row consistency threshold
(0.75) which allows the categorization of Finland’s configuration as a positive case, i.e.,
displaying the outcome21. The intermediate solution of such analysis is reported in Table
21According to Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 182-3), this is an acceptable threshold for row con-
sistency, provided that the configuration corresponds to cases which are not substantive contradictions
(or, as they call them, “true logical contradictions”). Finland has a membership of 0.822 in the configu-
ration and 0.999 in the outcome, hence the configuration can be considered a substantive subset of the
outcome. It should be noted that in computing the value for row consistency, one takes into account the
fuzzy-set memberships in the configuration and in the outcome of all cases, and not just of the cases
that substantively belong to the configuration. For this reason, the value of 0.776 for the configuration
corresponding to Finland is lower than 0.822 (=0.822/0.999).
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4.822.
Path cons. cov. Cases
early entry * TRACKED * NEW IMM 0.999 0.220 PRT; ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) * NEWIMM 0.884 0.312 FIN; DNK,SWE
(early entry*LANG DIST) * 0.955 0.328 AUT,BELF,CHE,DEU
(MARGINAL * EARLY TRACK)
Whole solution 0.936 0.824
Table 4.8: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simpli-
fying assumptions: TRACKED, LATE-ENTRY, early-entry, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINAL, LANG DIST
contribute to the presence rather than the absence of the outcome. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.75. Frequency cutoﬀ:
1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
Now, not only the case of Finland is explained, but it is grouped together with the
other two Scandinavian countries, which leads to a greater parsimony of the solution.
In other words, Finland’s configuration was similar in all respects but one (the pres-
ence/absence of a marginalizing system) to the configuration of Denmark and Sweden.
Since cases in both configurations display the outcome, it is possible to rule out the rel-
evance of marginalization in this causal recipe. The fit parameters reveal that lowering
the row consistency threshold did not cause an abrupt loss of accurateness of the whole
solution (consistency now: 0.936, before: 0.978), while its explanatory power has con-
siderably increased (coverage now: 0.824, before: 0.709). Most importantly, as can be
seen in Figure 4.8, all cases are now substantially explained and still no inconsistencies
in kind exist.
The results presented in Table 4.8 are rather satisfying in terms of parameters of fit,
as well as in substantive terms. Nevertheless, the complexity of the model is quite high.
Though QCA was developed as a method to address the problem of “many variables, few
observations”, common in comparative research, a reasonable proportion of conditions to
cases should be attained. First of all, an unbalance between conditions and cases is prob-
lematic because it corresponds to a large limited diversity in the data. As mentioned,
a linear increase in the number of conditions corresponds to an exponential increase in
the number of logically possible configurations. Hence, the universe of relevant cases is
far too small to cover the property space entailed by the interplay of potential explana-
22To be thorough, I also report the results of the conservative solution with a row consistency threshold
of 0.75 in Table B.4 in the Appendix B.
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Figure 4.8: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the presence of the outcome. Solution: refer to Table 4.8
tory factors. While counterfactual thinking can be used to deal with limited diversity,
researchers should avoid making too many assumptions. On the contrary, a balance
between complexity and parsimony should be the aim of QCA researchers (Ragin and
Sonnett, 2004). Secondly, as recently shown by Marx (2010) and Marx and Dusa (2011),
when the proportion of conditions to cases is too high, QCA does not produce robust
results23.
Hence, I proceeded to streamline the explanatory model. In particular, two con-
ditions—despite not being logically redundant—emerged as potential candidates to be
excluded. On the one hand, EARLY-TRACKED: the two paths where tracking appears
as a relevant factor to explain severe migrant penalties—path 1 and path 3 in Table
23More precisely, the authors perform simulations of cs-QCA on large numbers of random data and
conclude that “csQCA applications with more than 7 conditions (including the outcome) and applications
where the proportion of conditions on cases is higher than .33 are not able to distinguish real from random
data due to the problem of uniqueness.” (Marx, 2010, 155). Although further simulations should be
run in order to verify if the same thresholds hold when using fs-QCA, by using this criterion as an
approximate rule of thumb, I reckoned that my initial model was not robust enough. In my initial
model, I had seven conditions, plus the outcome, over 17 cases (proportion: 0.412). On the contrary, the
streamlined model presented in what follows is more reliable, because I reduced the number of conditions
to five, while the number of cases was held constant to 17 (proportion: 0.294).
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4.8—seem to indicate that the fact that tracking occurs at a particularly early age is not
crucial. Indeed, among old immigration countries where early tracking occurs, the latter
must be combined with marginalization, linguistic distance and a not-early-entry in the
system, in order to produce the outcome. On the contrary, for the new immigration
countries, the simple fact that pupils are tracked (for Italy at early age, for Portugal
later), is suﬃcient to bring severe penalties, provided that entry-age is not early. In
other words, EARLY-TRACKED—although being a subset of TRACKED, then already
a more restrictive case of penalizing institution—emerges in the more complex path as
opposed to the simple path characterized by TRACKED. Therefore, I decided to take
EARLY-TRACKED out of the streamlined model. On the other hand, the joint pres-
ence of EARLY-ENTRY and LATE-ENTRY also appears redundant24. For the presence
of the outcome, LATE-ENTRY seems to be the decisive factor, because it is the only
institutional condition of the second path in Table 4.8, thus explaining the negative per-
formance of the Scandinavian countries. The absence of EARLY-ENTRY emerges in all
the components of the solution and was found as a quasi-necessary condition (consis-
tency: 0.894, coverage: 0.649). However, this might also be due to the fact that 15 out
of 17 countries are more out than in the set of EARLY-ENTRY. Moreover, as shown
below, EARLY-ENTRY does not emerge as part of any path leading to the absence of
the outcome. Therefore, I decided to take this condition out of my streamlined model,
and to keep LATE-ENTRY only.
Table 4.9 displays the first results of the truth table analysis on this streamlined
model, without any assumption on the logical remainders, i.e. by using the conservative
strategy to deal with limited diversity. The corresponding truth tables for the presence
and the absence of the outcome are reported in the Appendix B in Tables B.5 and B.11.
As expected, these results are very similar to those of the initial model, with two
slight diﬀerences. Now, the mere tracking of students into diﬀerentiated curricula, rather
than the age when this tracking occurs, is a component of two configurations that are
suﬃcient to produce the outcome (path 1 and 3). The second diﬀerence concerns the
importance of the dimension of entry age into the educational system: in the previous
24As mentioned in Section 4.4, EARLY-ENTRY and LATE-ENTRY are the product of a dual calibra-
tion of the same source variable, “Entry-age”. This choice was motivated by the fact that the distribution
of “Entry-age” is not polarized: rather, in most of the countries children enter the educational system
when aged 4 to 4.5, thus making it diﬃcult to set a crossover point for a unipolar calibration. Hence, for
EARLY-ENTRY the crossover was set at 4.00, with two countries (England and Wales and the Nether-
lands) more in than out of the set; for LATE-ENTRY, the crossover was set at 4.677, with four countries
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Portugal) more in than out.
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Path cons. cov. Cases
(TRACKED * marginal) * NEW IMM *
late entry
1.000 0.161 PRT, ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) *
(MARGINAL * tracked) * NEW IMM
0.999 0.173 DNK, SWE
(TRACKED * MARGINAL) * 0.862 0.405 AUT, BELF, CHE, DEU,
LANG DIST * late entry * new imm NLD
Whole solution 0.918 0.727
Table 4.9: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the ab-
sence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.85. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1.
Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced
Quine McCluskey algorithm).
results, all the paths of the solution shared the element of not-early entry; now, this
dimension emerges only in the second path in the form of late-entry. Denmark and
Sweden belong to a configuration of institutional and contextual elements suﬃcient in
bringing about severe penalties: they are new immigration countries where the majority
of immigrants speak a language that is distant from the national one. Their educational
systems cannot counterbalance these negative structural factors, because they include
immigrant children too late, and, subsequently, they marginalize them in low-quality
schools, despite the fact that no tracking occurs in lower-secondary schooling.
From a theoretical point of view, some elements of the solution are superfluous. While
it is interesting to have a descriptive account of the characteristics common to Denmark
and Sweden, it is evident that, in the respective configuration, the absence of tracking
should not be seen as a constitutive element of an institutional mix leading to severe
penalties. It is reasonable to presume that if there existed a tracking system similar
to Denmark and Sweden in all other respects, it would display at least equally severe
migrant penalties. Hence, as before, I introduce directional expectations in the model
and derive the intermediate solution by using the easy counterfactuals in the truth table
minimization process. Table 4.10 displays the intermediate solution.
It should be noted that these intermediate and conservative solutions are much more
similar than those based on the initial model (cf. Tables 4.6 and 4.7). This suggests
that the results of the streamlined model are quite robust to the use of simplifying
assumptions. This element derives from the fact that, even if limited diversity is still
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Path cons. cov. Cases
TRACKED * NEW IMM 0.977 0.220 PRT, ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) *
MARGINAL * NEW IMM
0.999 0.185 DNK, SWE
(TRACKED * MARGINAL) * 0.851 0.405 AUT, BELF, CHE, DEU,
LANG DIST NLD
Whole solution 0.911 0.786
Table 4.10: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the ab-
sence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying assumptions: TRACKED, LATE-
ENTRY, MARGINAL, LANG DIST contribute to the presence rather than the absence of the outcome. Con-
sistency cutoﬀ: 0.85. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine
McCluskey algorithm).
present in the streamlined model, it is dramatically reduced: the number of logical
remainders goes from 115 in the original model to 22 in the new model.
Unfortunately, model parsimony comes to the cost of a reduced accurateness of the
solution. Indeed, when comparing the solution presented in Table 4.10 to the correspond-
ing intermediate solution based on the initial model and displayed in Table 4.7, one can
see that the explanatory model has lost in consistency. This is not so much due to the
slight decrease of the consistency value (0.936 to 0.911), but rather to the fact that the
third path of the streamlined model is based on a configuration of the truth table that
constitutes a substantive contradiction. While Austria, Flemish Belgium, Switzerland,
and Germany are positive instances of the outcome, the Netherlands is not, because its
fuzzy-set membership score to the set of countries with severe penalties is lower than 0.5.
This is apparent in the fuzzy-set plot shown in Figure 4.9, which displays the Netherlands
as a clear inconsistency in kind, since it lies in the bottom-right part of the graph. This
inconsistency directly derives from the exclusion of EARLY-ENTRY from the model.
Indeed, in the Netherlands children enter school and preschool at a very early age, while
this is not true for the other countries of the configuration. In the initial model, then,
EARLY-ENTRY could single out the Netherlands from the cases displaying the out-
come. However, when analyzing the combinations of factors suﬃcient for the absence of
the outcome with the initial model, EARLY-ENTRY did not prove helpful and indeed
the Netherlands remained unexplained as a negative case (see later in this section, in
particular Table 4.14 and Figure 4.11). Therefore, getting back to the initial model is
not the concluding strategy to overcome this inconsistency.
135
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
WHOLE SOLUTION
SE
VE
RE
 M
IG
RA
NT
 P
EN
AL
TY
Consistency = 0.911
Coverage = 0.786
AUT
BELF
BELW
CHE
DEU
DNK
ENGWA
ESP
FIN
FRAGRC
ITA
LUX
NLD
NOR
PRT
SWE
Figure 4.9: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the presence of the outcome. Solution: refer to Table 4.10
In order to solve the contradictory configuration, I reconsidered the calibration of the
outcome, and in particular the fuzzy-set membership of the Netherlands. As discussed
in Chapter 3 (see in particular Figure 3.1), the Netherlands is not a clear-cut case when
considering the extent to which second-generation immigrants suﬀer from achievement
penalties. In order to set the critical thresholds for the fuzzy-set calibration of the set
SEVERE PENALTIES, I relied on meaningful breaks in the distribution of the source
variable. While the thresholds of 30th and 40th percentiles came forth as rather good
candidates for the cutoﬀs of full-membership and full-non-membership, respectively, the
potential threshold for the cross-over was less discernible. Therefore, I performed cluster
analysis in order to identify clear discontinuities in the data structure and concluded
that the 35th percentile was the right threshold for the cross-over. This led Germany
to be classified as a positive case with respect to the outcome, while the Netherlands
became a negative case. However, as mentioned above, from an institutional point of
view, the Netherlands is very similar to the positive cases of Austria, Flemish Belgium,
Switzerland, and Germany, except for the fact that the previous belongs to the set of
early-entry educational systems, while the latter do not. However, EARLY-ENTRY
cannot explain the absence of severe penalties in the Netherlands (nor elsewhere). What
is more, the country-level literature reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests that, when compared
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to their Dutch counterparts, second-generation immigrants perform rather poorly at
school. Therefore, the classification of the Netherlands as an educational system where
migrant achievement penalties are not severe can be reconsidered.
Table 4.11 displays the results of the truth table analysis for the streamlined model,
where the outcome was defined in a more inclusive way, in order to include the Nether-
lands as a positive case25. The recalibration of the outcome has led to an improved
Path cons. cov. Cases
TRACKED * NEW IMM 1.000 0.183 PRT, ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) *
MARGINAL * NEW IMM
1.000 0.150 DNK, SWE
(TRACKED * MARGINAL) *
LANG DIST
0.994 0.384 AUT, BELF, CHE, DEU, NLD
Whole solution 0.997 0.699
Table 4.11: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying assumptions: TRACKED,
LATE-ENTRY, MARGINAL, LANG DIST contribute to the presence rather than the absence of the outcome.
Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.99. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine
McCluskey algorithm).
consistency of the model, now reaching the extremely high level of 0.997. Moreover,
given that the Netherlands is now a positive case, its configuration is not a substantive
contradiction anymore. Hence, no contradictions in kind exist. However, the fact that
the the outcome is more inclusive also means that there is more to explain. Consequently,
the coverage score declined from 0.786 to 0.699. Most importantly, just like before the
outcome recalibration, the model fails to explain the case of Finland, which is a perfect
member of the outcome. By lowering the consistency threshold from the very restric-
tive value of 0.99 to the less stringent threshold of 0.779, it is possible to include the
configuration corresponding to Finland in the analysis. I present the conservative and
25In Table 4.11, the intermediate solution is shown. The conservative solution is reported in the
Appendix B, Table B.7. The cross-over point for the fuzzy-set calibration of SEVERE PENALTIES
was set to the 36th percentile. Thus, the last positive case becomes the Netherlands, while the first
negative case is Spain. Figure B.3 in the Appendix B plots the recalibrated outcome against the source
variable: membership scores are now more skewed towards 1 than before. As discussed below, this
produces slightly less satisfying results of the analysis for the absence of the outcome. The truth tables
for the presence and the absence of the outcome, given its more inclusive recalibration, are reported in
the Appendix B, Tables B.6-B.12.
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intermediate solutions resulting from the latter choice in the Section 4.6.4, dedicated
to illustrate the final results of the fs-QCA. Indeed, compared with the other solutions
presented in this section, they display the best balance of accurateness and explanatory
power, both in terms of consistency and coverage values, and in terms of substantially
explained cases.
Introducing directional expectations and streamlining the explanatory model are not
the only strategies to deal with limited diversity. In their “two-step QCA” Schneider
and Wagemann (2006) suggest to decompose the truth table analysis in two moments,
hence limiting the logically possible combinations of conditions. First, by selecting only
remote structural factors and by keeping the model deliberately underspecified; second,
by looking for the proximate factors that trigger the causal mechanisms within the con-
texts identified in the first step as outcome-enabling. From a theoretical point of view,
this strategy is very appropriate for my research question, since my explanatory model
includes some conditions that refer to the structural context and can then be labeled as
remote factors, and some others that refer to the educational system and are therefore
more proximate to the outcome of severe penalties in educational achievement. Unfortu-
nately, the remote conditions are just two (LANG DIST and NEW IMM). Hence, in the
first step no limited diversity exists, because the four combinations of factors all display
empirical instances. Moreover, the first step of the analysis identifies both LANG DIST
and NEW IMM as outcome-enabling contexts. Consequently, in the second step no gain
is made in terms of reduction of limited diversity. Therefore, the results of the two-step
QCA (reported in Table B.8 in the Appendix B) do not constitute an improvement with
respect to the conservative solutions displayed in Tables B.7 and 4.11.
Absence of the outcome
Since set-theoretical relations are asymmetrical by definition, results of the minimization
for the absence for the outcome cannot simply be derived from the solution for its pres-
ence. Most importantly, from a substantive and theoretical point of view, it does not
make sense to assume that the same underpinning causal mechanisms can be called for
to explain why some in some educational systems children of immigrants dramatically
lag behind their native peers, while in other ones they perform quite as well. Hence, I
performed separate analyses on the configurations leading to the absence of the outcome.
Like before, I move from a complex model and reach a solution with an acceptable cov-
erage, and subsequently I streamline the model by taking out the conditions that prove
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less explanatory.
Path cons. cov. Cases
(late entry * early entry) * new imm * lang dist *
(EARLY TRACKED * MARGINAL)
0.997 0.387 BELW
(late entry * early entry) * NEWIMM * tracked *
marginal
0.966 0.481 ESP; GRC,NOR
late entry * lang dist * new imm * tracked *
marginal
0.923 0.479 FRA; ENGWA
Whole solution 0.998 0.541
Table 4.12: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.95. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis performed
with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
Table 4.12 displays the results for the first model, obtained by analyzing the truth
table for the absence of the outcome (see Appendix B, B.9), and without making any
assumption on the logical remainders. Again, the solution produced by the most con-
servative strategy to deal with limited diversity is quite a complex one. Moreover, while
displaying an almost perfect consistency (0.998), it fails to account for roughly half of
the outcome (coverage: 0.541). Once more, theoretical knowledge can improve our un-
derstanding of configurational analysis by helping us to distinguish “easy” from “diﬃcult”
counterfactuals26. For instance, the first solution path clearly contains some redundant
elements. Severe penalties are avoided by Walloon Belgium—an old immigration coun-
try with limited linguistic distance, where children of immigrants enter the system at an
intermediate age, and where early tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula is accompanied
by a high degree of marginalization of immigrant students in low-quality schools. If this
is the case, we can reasonably assume that severe penalties could also be avoided by a
similar system where, however, no early tracking nor marginalization are in place. The
same can be said for entry age: a system similar in all respects to Walloon Belgium
26As mentioned above, there exists a strategy to deal with limited diversity without the need to rely on
easy counterfactuals, i.e. two-step QCA. This procedure requires to identify first the remote conditions
behind the outcome and then the proximate conditions in each of these outcome-enabling contexts. The
application of the two-step procedure to my fs-QCA unfortunately did not prove helpful in reducing
limited diversity, as documented in the Appendix B, Table B.14. Therefore, I do not discuss these
results here.
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except for the fact that children of immigrants enter it at early age is allegedly equally
able to prevent severe penalties. Table 4.13 displays the intermediate solution, for which
easy counterfactuals, defined by directional expectations, are used in the minimization
procedure.
Path cons. cov. Cases
late entry * new imm * lang dist 0.997 0.387 FRA; ENGWA; BELW
late entry * tracked * NEW IMM * marginal 0.962 0.288 ESP; GRC,NOR
Whole solution 0.982 0.665
Table 4.13: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying
assumptions: tracked, late entry, marginal, langdist contribute to the absence rather than the presence of the
outcome. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.95. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced
Quine McCluskey algorithm).
The use of theoretical assumptions has substantially improved the parsimony of the
solution, which now displays only two pretty simple paths, and its explanatory power,
since coverage has increased from 0.541 to 0.665. The causal paths to avoid migrant
penalties appear here quite simple. The prerequisite to avoid them is the absence of a
late entry system, as already emerged from the analysis of necessary conditions (consis-
tency: 0.933, coverage: 0.602). Besides the dimension of entry age, two alternative paths
exist. On the one hand, we find France, England and Wales, and Walloon Belgium as
old immigration countries where linguistic distance is low. These countries mainly incor-
porated second-generation immigrants from former colonies where the host language is
widely spoken. On the other hand, we find new immigration countries like Spain, Greece,
and Norway, where tracking occurs after the age of 15 and pupils of immigrant origin are
not marginalized in low-quality schools.
Although this solution is quite appealing in its simplicity, it still explains only a
limited proportion of the outcome (coverage: 0.665). Most importantly, as can be seen in
Figure 4.10, two cases are left substantially unexplained by the solution: the Netherlands
and Luxembourg. Once again, it is worth to refer to the truth table (see Table B.9 in
the Appendix B) in order to better understand the reasons behind this lack of coverage.
The two unexplained cases belong to two configurations that are imperfect subsets of the
negated outcome, i.e. the absence of severe penalties. However, while the configuration
corresponding to the Netherlands has a very low row consistency score (0.581), the one
corresponding to Luxembourg is more borderline (row consistency: 0.758). By setting
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Figure 4.10: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the absence of the outcome. Solution: refer to Table 4.13
a less stringent row consistency threshold of 0.75, I code the second configuration as a
belonging to a positive configuration (i.e., displaying the negated outcome), which makes
it amenable to be minimized. Results of this additional analysis are reported in Table
4.14, which displays three possible paths to avoid severe migrant penalties27.
Path cons. cov. Cases
late entry * new imm * lang dist 0.997 0.387 FRA; ENGWA; BELW
late entry * tracked * marginal 0.966 0.481 FRA; ENGWA; ESP; GRC,NOR
late entry * marginal * new imm 0.923 0.479 FRA; ENGWA; LUX
Whole solution 0.937 0.843
Table 4.14: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying
assumptions: tracked, late entry, marginal, langdist contribute to the absence rather than the presence of the
outcome. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.75. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced
Quine McCluskey algorithm).
By comparing the fit parameters from Table 4.14 and Table 4.13, we can easily see
that the gain in coverage (0.843 as opposed to 0.665) comes to the cost of a slight loss
27The relative conservative solution is reported in Table B.10 in the Appendix B.
141
in consistency (0.937 as opposed to 0.982). However, the new consistency score is still
suﬃciently high to conclude that the overall solution represents an accurate subset of
the negated outcome. It should be also noted that the complexity of the solution has
increased: now three paths are detected and two cases (France and England and Wales)
are overdetermined, in the sense that they can be explained by several paths.
From a substantive point of view, it is interesting to point out that EARLY-ENTRY—a
condition that characterizes two countries that do not display the outcome (England and
Wales and the Netherlands)—is not part of any suﬃcient configuration to avoid severe
penalties. Therefore, in an attempt to reduce the complexity of the explanatory model,
this condition could be easily taken out. On the contrary, it seems important to keep
LATE-ENTRY, whose absence emerges in all the three paths. Like in the analysis for the
presence of the outcome, the age at which students are tracked into diﬀerentiated curric-
ula does not seem decisive. In other words, the absence of EARLY-TRACKING per se
does not emerge as a relevant condition. Indeed, part of the second path to avoid severe
penalties is the absence of tracking altogether. Instead, in paths 1 and 3, not-tracking
systems like England and Wales and France are grouped together with countries that
not only track their students, but they do so when they are quite young. Hence, in the
streamlined model I keep TRACKED and exclude its subset EARLY-TRACKING. Given
these premises, it should not be surprising that the streamlined model produces exactly
the same results as those displayed in Tables 4.14 and B.10. However, the gain in ro-
bustness is considerable, because the intermediate solution derived from the streamlined
model requires fewer simplifying assumptions. Overall, the number of logical remainders
decreased from 115 to 22 when improving the parsimony of the model.
As shown in Figure 4.11, the intermediate solution of the streamlined model based
on the less stringent consistency threshold of 0.75 does not display any inconsistency in
kind. The model explains almost all the cases where the outcome is absent and indeed
has a satisfactory coverage score (0.84). However, the Netherlands remains substantially
unexplained by this model. As discussed earlier, the classification of the Netherlands
as a negative case is not obvious. The fact that the models presented so far are not
able to account for its position is a first hint that its fuzzy-set membership should be
reconsidered. Most importantly, even if the analyses of suﬃciency for the presence and
the absence of the outcome must be carried out separately from each other, it is important
that the calibration of the outcome and the conditions is consistent for the two analyses.
Since the recalibration of the outcome in order to make it more inclusive was needed
to solve a contradictory row in the analysis for the presence of the outcome, the same
142
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
WHOLE SOLUTION
N
O
 S
EV
ER
E 
M
IG
RA
NT
 P
EN
AL
TY
Consistency = 0.94
Coverage = 0.84
AUT
BELF
BELW
CHE
DEU
DNK
ENGW
ESP
FIN
FRA
GRC
ITA
LUX
NLD
NOR
PRT
SWE
Figure 4.11: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the absence of the outcome, Solution: refer to Table 4.14
should be done when analyzing its absence.
First results of the truth table analysis where the Netherlands is classified as a negative
case are reported in Table 4.15. For the relative truth table and conservative solution,
refer respectively to Tables B.12 and B.13 in the Appendix B.
Path cons. cov. Cases
late-entry * new imm * lang dist 0.897 0.467 FRA; ENGWA; BELW
late-entry * (tracked * marginal) * 0.861 0.228 GRC,NOR
LANG DIST * NEW IMM
Whole solution 0.883 0.695
Table 4.15: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying assumptions: tracked,
late entry, marginal, langdist contribute to the absence rather than the presence of the outcome. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.85. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey
algorithm).
As expected, with the recalibration of the outcome, the model is much less consistent
in explaining its absence. Indeed, a more inclusive outcome facilitates the identification
of a configurational explanation for its presence. The other side of the coin, however, is
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that all cases display a lower membership score in the set of the negated outcome, while
keeping the same memberships in the sets of the conditions. As a consequence, it is harder
to find configurations that are consistent subsets of the negated outcome. Nevertheless,
the solution reported in Table 4.15 is overall suﬃciently consistent with the absence of
the outcome (consistency score: 0.883). As can be seen in Figure 4.12, three cases belong
to configurations that are not good subsets of the outcome, as opposed to England and
Wales and Greece, which are perfectly consistent. As expected, the Netherlands is not
an unexplained case anymore. However, two other substantially unexplained cases have
surfaced: Luxembourg and Spain. This corresponds to a quite low value for coverage:
more than 30% of the outcome is still unexplained by this solution.
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Figure 4.12: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the absence of the outcome (recalibrated), Solution: refer to
Table 4.15
In order to improve the explanatory power of the model, it is possible to lower the
consistency threshold for the inclusion of rows to be minimized in the truth table from
0.85 to 0.7. This allows to use the configuration corresponding to Spain in the truth
table analysis. While such a threshold lies at the lower bound of acceptable consistency
levels for suﬃciency, the configuration does not correspond to a substantive contradiction,
because it displays only one case, with membership higher than 0.5 in both the outcome
and the configuration. Since the overall consistency of the corresponding solution is still
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rather good (0.825) and the improvement in coverage is significant, I decided to discuss
this solution as a final result in the section 4.6.4. However, would the reader prefer to opt
for a more conservative solution in terms of consistency, he or she can stick to the one
presented above. In terms of suﬃcient configurations, the solution chosen is extremely
similar to the one displayed in Table 4.15, but slightly more parsimonious. The second
path, indeed, does not include the presence of LANG DIST anymore.
4.6.4 fs-QCA results and discussion
In this section, I address the main research questions of my dissertation: which kinds of
educational systems produce severe achievement penalties for second-generation immi-
grants, and which kinds, on the contrary, are able to avoid them? The “dialogue between
ideas and evidence” documented in the previous section brought forth some answers to
these questions, which I will present in what follows.
Presence of the outcome
To start with, fsQCA revealed that very diﬀerent educational systems can produce equally
severe migrant penalties in educational achievement. However, not all institutional fea-
tures are equally inegalitarian: there is a limited number of paths leading to severe
penalties. As shown in Table 4.16, Western European countries displaying severe penal-
ties can be grouped in three configurational clusters. In the simplest configuration, we
Path cons. cov. Cases
(TRACKED * marginal) * 1.000 0.131 PRT, ITA
NEW IMM * late-entry
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) *
NEW IMM * tracked
0.878 0.235 FIN; DNK, SWE
(TRACKED * MARGINAL) *
LANG DIST * late-entry * new imm
0.994 0.379 AUT, BELF, CHE, DEU, NLD
Whole solution 0.955 0.736
Table 4.16: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.77. Frequency
cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis performed with the R package QCA
(Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
find Portugal and Italy, two countries of recent immigration where children of immigrants
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enter (pre)school at a relatively early age. Students are subsequently tracked into diﬀer-
entiated curricula, though this does not lead to a marginalization of immigrant students
in low-quality sectors of the school system. This path is a perfect subset of the outcome
(1.00). Hence, such combination of institutional and contextual factors is suﬃcient to
generate severe penalties. However, it is not a necessary configuration of conditions, be-
cause only two countries are explained by it (coverage: 0.131), and, most importantly, two
other paths are identified by the analysis. The second path groups some Scandinavian
countries: Finland, Denmark and Sweden. Just like the two Southern European coun-
tries of the first path, they have experienced mass immigration only in the last decades.
However, their educational systems—diﬀerently from Italy and Portugal—do not track
students during lower-secondary education. However, compulsory schooling in this coun-
tries starts quite late, so that children of immigrants enter the educational system rather
late. This aspect is likely to be detrimental to their school performance compared with
their native peers, especially considering the fact that the languages spoken by most of
the immigrants residing in those countries are very distant from the host-country lan-
guages. The consistency of this path with respect to the outcome is not perfect, but still
considerably high (0.878). Moreover, the path explains a rather important proportion
of the outcome (coverage: 0.235). Indeed, three cases are substantially explained, and
these cases—and especially Finland—are particularly good instances of countries suﬀer-
ing from severe migrant penalties. Finally, the last path comprises the largest number of
positive cases: three mainly German-speaking countries (Austria, Switzerland, and Ger-
many) and two Dutch-speaking countries (Flemish Belgium and the Netherlands). The
language is a relevant dimension, since in all of these countries there is a high linguistic
distance between the languages spoken by the majority of immigrants on the one hand,
and the national languages on the other hand. Another contextual aspect that these
countries have in common is the fact that they have a considerable experience with mass
immigration flows, which started already in the post-war period. Most importantly, these
countries share three key aspects of the educational system: pupils generally do not enter
(pre)school too late; however, towards the end of primary school, they are tracked into
diﬀerentiated curricula. As a consequence, during lower-secondary education, students
of immigrant origin end up being marginalized in schools with low-performing peers.
This solution component shows again a very high consistency as a subset of the outcome
(0.994) and, clearly, a very good coverage (0.387), since five out of ten positive cases are
explained by this configuration.
By using theoretical knowledge, it is possible to get to a more parsimonious account
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Path cons. cov. Cases
TRACKED * NEW IMM 1.000 0.183 PRT, ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) *
NEW IMM
0.886 0.254 FIN; DNK, SWE
(TRACKED * MARGINAL) *
LANG DIST
0.994 0.384 AUT, BELF, CHE, DEU, NLD
Whole solution 0.958 0.793
Table 4.17: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying assumptions: TRACKED,
LATE-ENTRY, MARGINAL, LANG DIST contribute to the presence rather than the absence of the outcome.
Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.77. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine
McCluskey algorithm).
of the institutional configurations suﬃcient to produce severe penalties. The three paths
displayed in Table 4.17 derive from a truth table minimization which made use of some
logical remainders, i.e. configurations that lack empirical instances. However, only logical
remainders that can be theoretically justified—the so-called “easy counterfactuals”—were
used in the minimization process. In order to distinguish “easy” from “diﬃcult” coun-
terfactuals, I set some directional expectations on the role of explanatory conditions.
More specifically, I assume that if they had any impact on the outcome, TRACKED,
LATE-ENTRY, MARGINAL, and LANG DIST would lead to the presence, rather than
the absence, of severe migrant penalties. With respect to the relevant truth table (refer
to Table B.6 in the Appendix B), setting these directional expectations means that seven
logical remainders—the easy counterfactuals, reported in Table B.15 in the Appendix
B—were associated to a positive outcome. Instead, to the other remainders no outcome
value was assigned. Hence, they were not used in the minimization process.
The three paths of this “intermediate solution” altogether are jointly suﬃcient for the
occurrence of severe penalties. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 4.13, the whole solution
is a very good subset of the outcome (consistency: 0.958), and no inconsistencies in
kind exist: all the cases belonging to one of the three configurations have a membership
score higher than 0.5 in the outcome and in the respective path. In almost all cases,
the fuzzy-set membership with respect to the configuration is higher than the fuzzy-set
membership with respect to the outcome. Only the case of the Netherlands displays a
slightly lower membership in the configuration than in the outcome. The proportional
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reduction of inconsistency (PRI index)28 is also very high (0.955), confirming that the
solution is indeed a consistent subset of the outcome. The explanatory power of this
solution is rather high. Beyond the high value of the coverage parameter (0.793), from
Figure 4.13 we can see that all the cases are substantially explained by this intermediate
solution. The empty upper-left corner of the plot indicates that there is no positive
instance of the outcome that does not belong to one of the three configurations that
constitute the solution.
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Figure 4.13: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the presence of the outcome (recalibrated), Solution: refer
to Table 4.17
The scheme represented in Figure 4.15 summarizes the theoretical argument resulting
from the truth table analysis presented above. Two dimensions of the educational system
are of key importance for the emergence of severe achievement penalties among second-
generation immigrants: on the one hand, the existence of a tracking system in primary
or lower-secondary schooling. On the other hand, the delayed start of (pre)school. For
28The PRI index, proposed by Ragin in unpublished works and reported by Schneider and Wagemann
(2012, 242), is computed as
P
min(xi;yi) 
P
min(xi;yi;yi)P
(xi) 
P
min(xi;yi;yi) where xi are membership scores in a given
condition or configuration X, yi are membership scores in the outcome Y , and  yi are membership
scores in the negated outcome y. The index is especially useful to detect problematic simultaneous subset
relations, i.e. when X appears to be a consistent subset of the outcome Y and of its negation y. The
PRI varies from 0 to 1, with lower values corresponding to more problematic situations.
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new immigration countries, tracking is suﬃcient in bringing about severe penalties. For
post-war immigration countries, however, it should be combined with another contextual
feature, i.e. the presence of a high linguistic distance between the immigrants’ and the
natives’ languages. Moreover, for post-war immigration countries only, tracking leads
to severe penalties only when it marginalizes second-generation immigrants into schools
where the lowest performing students are concentrated. Among new immigration coun-
tries, late entry into the educational system broadly conceived constitutes an alternative
path towards the outcome, though in a diﬀerent context. If children of immigrants
predominately speak a language that is very distant from the one of the host country,
the simple fact that their entrance into preschool or compulsory schooling is delayed is
suﬃcient to produce severe achievement penalties.
Absence of the outcome
Given the asymmetrical nature of set-theoretic methods, the results of truth table analysis
for the absence of the outcome do not necessarily mirror those of the analysis for its
presence. Indeed, my findings show that, while the elements of the causal paths leading
to not-severe penalties are often the negation of the conditions leading to severe penalties,
their interrelations diﬀer.
Path cons. cov. Cases
late entry * lang dist * (tracked * marginal) 0.872 0.373 FRA, ENGWA; ESP
late entry * (tracked * marginal) * 0.737 0.296 GRC,NOR; ESP
NEW IMM
late entry * (TRACKED * MARGINAL) *
lang dist * new imm
0.938 0.135 BELW
Whole solution 0.847 0.707
Table 4.18: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.7. Frequency
cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis performed with the R package QCA
(Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
Table 4.18 depicts three causal paths suﬃcient to bring about the absence of the
outcome. The three paths share a common condition: the fact that the entry into the
(pre)school system for children of immigrants is not late. The first path groups France,
England and Wales, and Spain, three countries where most immigrants speak the host
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language or a language that is close to it. They are able to avoid severe penalties in
reason of their comprehensive school systems, which do not separate students into tracks
and do not marginalize second-generation immigrants in low-quality schools. Moreover,
just like all the other countries not displaying the outcome, they are not late in including
children of immigrants in the (pre)school system. This first path is quite consistent
with respect to the outcome (0.872) and it explains more than a third of it (coverage:
0.373). The second path is considerably less consistent (0.737). As I have explained in
Section 4.6.3, this is due to the low consistency of the configuration corresponding to
Spain. I chose to use this configuration in the minimization process because it is not a
true logical contradiction, and at the same time its inclusion permits to explain a greater
proportion of the outcome. Spain, together with Norway and Greece, is a country of
new immigration. The educational systems of these three countries include children of
immigrants at a rather early age. Moreover, in these systems students are not tracked into
diﬀerentiated curricula and no serious marginalization of immigrant students take place.
Finally, the third path refers to a single case only. Hence, no parsimony is attained by
truth table analysis in what concerns this configuration, which is the simple description
of the relative case, Walloon Belgium. This is an old immigration region where most
immigrants speak French or a similar language. In its educational system, children of
immigrants do not enter (pre)school too late. In such a context, this factor is suﬃcient
in order to avoid the emergence of severe migrant penalties (consistency: 0.938), despite
the presence of a tracking and marginalizing system.
Path cons. cov. Cases
late-entry * new imm * lang dist 0.897 0.467 FRA; ENGWA; BELW
late-entry * (tracked * marginal) 0.737 0.296 GRC,NOR; ESP
* NEW IMM
Whole solution 0.825 0.767
Table 4.19: Intermediate solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying assumptions: tracked,
late entry, marginal, langdist contribute to the absence rather than the presence of the outcome. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.7. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey
algorithm).
By making use of counterfactual thinking, it is possible to increase the parsimony of
this solution. Table 4.19 reports the intermediate solution resulting from a truth table
minimization that included some directional expectations derived from theory. In par-
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ticular, I assume that the absence of tracking, late-entry, marginalization, and linguistic
distance contribute to the absence—rather than the presence—of severe penalties. In-
cluding these assumptions in the model allows to classify plausible logical remainders as
easy counterfactuals. Although only two easy counterfactuals were used in the minimiza-
tion process (see Table B.16 in the Appendix B), the intermediate solution is a consid-
erable improvement in terms of parsimony. Indeed, the third path—which was a mere
description a single case—has disappeared. Walloon Belgium is now grouped together
with France and England and Wales in the first path, which is additionally simplified.
For these three countries, what appears to matter are not so much the characteristics of
the educational system, but rather the structural context of immigration. Provided that
entry age in (pre)school is not late, in order to avoid severe penalties it is suﬃcient to
be a country of old immigration where linguistic distance is low. In eﬀect, the student
population of second-generation immigrants in Walloon Belgium, France, and England
and Wales is mainly constituted by oﬀspring of individuals who immigrated from former
colonies, where the host language is widely spoken. Moreover, many of these parents
are probably quite integrated because they have possibly arrived at young age, since in
these three countries mass immigration started in the post-war period. The second path,
involving Greece, Norway and Spain as new immigration countries with a not-tracking
and not marginalizing system is left unchanged in the intermediate solution.
The fuzzy-set plot depicted in Figure 4.14 shows that this solution suﬀers from some
inconsistencies in degree, represented by the distance of the cases of Spain, Norway,
Walloon Belgium, and France from the bisector. However, such cases are not inconsistent
in kind, because they all substantially belong to the set of the negated outcome. The
overall consistency of the model is aﬀected by these slight discrepancies but it has still an
acceptable value (0.825). When many insuﬃciencies in degree arise, the model may be
undermined by the existence of simultaneous subset relations. However, the PRI index
relative to this solution is reasonably high (0.767), supporting its overall soundness29. The
29More precisely, the second path of the solution (late-entry*tracked*marginal) has a PRI of 0.583.
The value is quite low but still higher than 0.5. So far, in the QCA literature no indication has been
set on the acceptable thresholds for the PRI. Hence, in order to interpret this parameter, I go back
to the cases involved by this possibly problematic path: Spain, Greece, and Norway. By comparing
the truth tables for the presence and the absence of the outcome (cf. Table B.6 and Table B.12 in
the Appendix B), we notice that the configuration corresponding to Greece and Norway is clearly not
a subset of the outcome (consistency: 0.383), while it is a subset of its negation (consistency: 0.861).
The configuration corresponding to Spain is more problematic because formally its consistency values
are both over 0.5 (0.588 for the outcome, 0.701 for its negation). However, as discussed earlier, the
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Figure 4.14: Fuzzy-set plot of the whole solution for the absence of the outcome (recalibrated), Solution: refer to
Table 4.19
explanatory power of the solution is quite good, since it accounts for a great proportion
of the negated outcome (coverage: 0.767), even if one case (Luxembourg) is substantially
unexplained. All things considered, the solution for the absence of the outcome is less
satisfying than the one for its presence, but still provides convincing configurational
arguments.
Again, I represent the main theoretical arguments of this solution by means of a
synthetic diagram in Figure 4.16. In Western Europe, there exist two alternative paths
to avoid severe achievement penalties for students of immigrant origin. A prerequisite
of both is the fact that children of immigrants should not enter the educational system
broadly conceived when they are too grown up. Besides this aspect, the two paths
diverge considerably according to the immigration history of the country involved. For
old immigration countries, in order to avoid severe penalties, it is suﬃcient that most of
the immigrant population speaks a language that is not too distant from the national
one. However, this path is made of structural contextual factors that are less amenable
to change than educational systems. From a policy-making perspective, the remaining
exclusion of this configuration from the minimization for the absence of the outcome does not produce
substantially diﬀerent results (cf. Table 4.15). Therefore, I believe that the issue of simultaneous subset
relations poses no serious threat to the interpretation of these results.
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path is more interesting. New immigration countries have to combine a wider range of
institutional features not to end up with severe penalties. Besides the not-late entry
system, they need to abstain from tracking their students into diﬀerentiated curricula,
and to structure their educational systems in a way that second-generation immigrants
are not relegated in marginalized schools where the great majority of students is low
achieving.
By reading these findings together with those relative to the minimization for the
presence of the outcome, it is possible to reconsider the validity of the theoretical hy-
potheses that I put forward in Section 4.2. My first hypothesis was that low preschool
rates and/or late entry into compulsory schooling contribute to the creation of severe mi-
grant penalties. Indeed, fs-QCA results indicate that a late entry age in the (pre)school
system is a possible path towards severe penalties. More specifically, this path con-
cerns Sweden, Norway, and Finland, where compulsory schooling starts at age seven and
preschool is far from universal. On the other hand, analyses have shown a not-late en-
try age is a essential element of all the institutional configurations able to avoid severe
migrant penalties. Hence, Hypothesis 1 on the importance of preschool and compulsory
schooling start is empirically supported, although analyses indicate that the context may
be decisive. Indeed, late entry contributes to severe penalties only in new immigration
countries with high linguistic distance between the immigrants’ languages and the na-
tional one. This finding is understandable if we consider that a delayed entry in the
educational system is likely to be especially harmful to children who encounter linguistic
diﬃculties. Contextual elements are even more important in order to assess my second
hypothesis, in which I argued that early tracking brings forth severe penalties only when
students of immigrant origin are marginalized in “bad” schools. In eﬀect, the joint influ-
ence of tracking and marginalization explains no less than five out of ten positive cases.
However, in new immigration countries such as Portugal and Italy, tracking is detri-
mental per se. Therefore, results from fs-QCA supported Hypothesis 2, but also allowed
to define its scope conditions more precisely. Hypothesis 2 can be then respecified as
follows: “in post-war immigration countries, early tracking into diﬀerentiated curricula
produces severe penalties through the marginalization of second-generation immigrants
in second-tier tracks, and consequently low-performing schools”. My third hypothesis was
that a high proportion of immigrants speaking a language that is distant from that of
the host society brings about severe penalties. Empirical evidence surely indicates that
linguistic distance is an important contextual element to account for. Indeed, in almost
all countries with severe penalties—with the exception of Portugal—the majority of im-
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migrants speak a distant language. However, this finding does not qualify high linguistic
distance as a suﬃcient condition for the presence of severe penalties, but rather as an
almost necessary condition. Hypothesis 3 is then only partially supported and has to be
restated as follows: “a high distance between the language spoken by most immigrants
and the oﬃcial one is an essential element of several configurational paths leading to
severe migrant penalties”. Finally, concerning the role of immigration history, I had a
general expectation that migrant penalties would be diﬀerent according to the timing of
mass immigration start, although from a theoretical point of view it was unclear whether
countries with a longer experience of immigration would perform better or worse than
new immigration countries. Hypothesis 4 also found empirical support, because history of
immigration is a key discriminating factor between paths towards the outcome, as well as
between paths towards its absence, as can be seen in Figures 4.15 and 4.16. The findings
indicate that, although severe migrant penalties are found in both post-war immigration
countries and new-immigration countries, the former generally have rather simple insti-
tutional explanations. On the contrary, it seems that, in order to avoid severe penalties,
new immigration countries have to combine a multiplicity of institutional factors. Hence,
history of immigration matters for the institutional capability of educational systems to
promote the integration of second-generation immigrants. On the whole, it seems that
tackling migrant learning disadvantage is more challenging for new immigration societies.
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Chapter 5
Discussion and outlook
5.1 Substantive contributions
Migrant achievement penalties in Western Europe
A first order of contributions made by this dissertation relates to the descriptive em-
pirical analyses. By examining standardized assessments of 15-year-old students on the
literacy domains of mathematics, reading, and science, I have provided a detailed picture
of the educational achievement of second-generation immigrants and natives in Western
Europe near the end of compulsory schooling. Empirical findings indicate that, although
they were born and socialized in the destination country—as well as fully exposed to
its educational system—second-generation immigrants dramatically underachieve their
native peers. In most countries, the average second-generation immigrant is positioned
below the 30th percentile of the achievement distribution of natives. This underachieve-
ment can be partially explained by traditional mechanisms of stratification by social
class broadly defined. Indeed, in some countries the relative educational disadvantage of
second-generation immigrants is more than halved when accounting for social, economic,
and cultural resources diﬀerentials. Moreover—as the novel procedure of fuzzy-set coin-
cidence unveiled—second-generation immigrants disproportionately cumulate factors of
socio-economic disadvantage compared to natives. This pattern is particularly evident
in countries where their educational underachievement is more severe.
However, the relative disadvantage of students with an immigrant background can-
not be completely explained by diﬀerent socio-economic and cultural status (henceforth,
SES ). Therefore, migrant-specific penalties in educational achievement are in place. In
some countries, second-generation immigrants experience negative diﬀerential returns to
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SES. In other words, they benefit less than natives from favorable endowments in socio-
economic or cultural resources. Possibly, in order to navigate these educational systems,
country-specific cultural capital is particularly important, so that the cultural capital of
immigrant parents is more easily devalued.
Yet, diﬀerential returns to SES are generally small in size. What really drives
migrant-specific achievement penalties is the lack of other kinds of resources by students
of immigrant origin. Drawing from theoretical and empirical literature on the social in-
tegration of children of immigrants, we can envisage what these resources might be. As
suggested by “new assimilation” theorists, second-generation immigrants face an initial
disadvantage deriving from a lack of linguistic skills (Esser, 2004, 2006) and of country-
specific cultural capital, as well as from poor social networks in the host society (Alba and
Nee, 1997; Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Farley and Alba, 2002). Conversely, according
to “segmented assimilation” scholars, children of immigrants may experience a process of
downward assimilation if they fail to preserve community values and to take advantage
of their ethnic networks (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001;
Rumbaut and Portes, 2001). Testing the appropriateness of either theory goes beyond
the scope of this dissertation. Indeed, this task requires an in-depth inquiry of micro-level
mechanisms that cannot possibly be attained by a comparative study. The point that I
want to make is that, whatever the reason, my empirical analyses revealed that, in all
Western European countries, second-generation immigrant students suﬀer from a form
of educational underachievement that is specifically related to their migratory status.
Moreover, the size of this migrant-specific achievement penalty is considerable: as for
mathematics achievement—a literacy domain that is less aﬀected by linguistic skills—in
most countries second-generation immigrants lag behind the 35th percentile of natives
with the same socio-economic and cultural resources. Equally alarming levels of migrant
achievement penalties are found in the literacy domains of reading and science.
Another interesting aspect that emerged from my empirical analyses is the distinc-
tive character of the relative educational disadvantage of second-generation immigrants.
Among Western European countries, migrant-specific penalties are negatively related to
SES penalties. Therefore, these two lines of stratification openly came forth as distinct
dimensions of educational inequalities. By empirically documenting this dissimilarity, I
contribute to the literature on migrant learning disadvantage, too often conceptualized
as just another facet of educational inequalities by social class.
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Cross-country diﬀerences
Through my comparative examination of educational achievement in 17 Western Eu-
ropean countries, I have also provided new descriptive evidence on the variability of
migrant-specific penalties across countries. Analyses reveal that—while all Western Eu-
ropean countries experience some degree of migrant penalties—sharp cross-country dif-
ferences exist in their intensity. Just to mention two extreme cases, in Finland the
average second-generation immigrant achieves below the 22nd percentile of the distribu-
tion of comparable natives, while in England and Wales he scores only below the 44th
percentile.
In principle, these cross-country diﬀerences may be attributable to the more or less
favorable compositions of immigrant populations. In particular, immigrants have diﬀer-
ent origins—entailing diﬀerent linguistic and cultural diﬀerences—and diﬀerent reasons
to migrate—influencing their skills and ambitions. Immigrants might also diﬀer in terms
of length of residence in the host society. In order to address these potential composi-
tional issues, I have focused on second-generation immigrants strictly defined, i.e. those
individuals who were born in the receiving society from parents born abroad. Hence,
they have resided in the host society for the whole duration of their life. Moreover,
Western European countries are fundamentally comparable in terms of history of immi-
gration, since they did not experience mass immigration until the post-war period and
they prevalently host economic migrants and their families. In order to deal with the
diﬀerent origin compositions of immigrant populations in Europe, I performed additional
analyses by restricting my sample to children of Turkish immigrants only. These findings
proved to be very consistent with those based on the whole sample of immigrants. Yet,
since this robustness check was possible only for a limited number of destination coun-
tries, in the explanatory phase of my dissertation I introduced an aggregate indicator of
linguistic distance between origin-country’s and destination-country’s oﬃcial languages.
Overall, my analytical strategy makes possible to conclude that cross-country diﬀerences
in migrant-specific achievement penalties cannot be reduced to compositional issues, but
rather reflect diﬀerences in the host-country capability of integrating children of immi-
grants in the school system.
I have empirically shown that migrant-specific penalties and SES penalties do not
coincide, and instead are negatively related in my sample of countries. This finding
contributes to a better understanding of the egalitarian character of Western European
educational systems. Based on the kind and level of educational inequalities they pro-
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duce, I identified four types of educational systems. On one side of the spectrum, we
have countries—such as Spain, Norway, Luxembourg, and Greece—that are able to limit
migrant-specific penalties and SES penalties at the same time. On the other side of the
spectrum, we find countries like Germany, Flemish-Belgium, Austria, and Sweden, where
both kinds of educational inequalities are severe. The other two types regroup the ma-
jority of countries, and are most interesting because they combine severe migrant-specific
penalties with mild SES penalties (Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal), or
vice versa (England and Wales, France, Walloon-Belgium, the Netherlands). Despite
its essentially descriptive character, this typology can contribute to the comparative
literature on educational systems, because it unveils the interconnections between two
apparently similar, yet distinct, dimensions of educational inequality.
Egalitarian and inegalitarian aspects of educational systems
In the second part of this dissertation, I moved from a descriptive perspective to an ex-
planatory one, by investigating the macro-level determinants of the diﬀerent achievement
penalties experienced by second-generation immigrants in Western Europe. I developed
a theoretical framework moving from the manifest functions of educational systems iden-
tified by Turner (1960) and their institutional traits disclosed by Sorensen (1970) and
Allmendinger (1989). Within this framework, I singled out four dimensions of educa-
tional systems as especially relevant for migrant-specific penalties: (i) the duration of
schooling, i.e. the amount of time pupils spend in the educational system; (ii) its degree
of stratification, i.e. the structural diﬀerentiation of students within given grades; (iii)
the allocation of human and financial resources; (iv) the degree of standardization in the
quality of education provided nationwide.
My empirical findings indicate that all these institutional dimensions are to some ex-
tent important in explaining the existence of severe migrant-specific penalties. However,
in some contexts the dimension of stratification is preponderant, while in others that of
duration prevails. Still, in other contexts the dimension of stratification interacts with
those of standardization and resources to produce severe penalties. Likewise, in the ex-
amination of systems able to avoid the occurrence of severe penalties, I found a complex
interplay of the four dimensions altogether. Contextual elements—and in particular the
history of immigration and the degree of linguistic distance—emerged as relevant aspects
to account for, since they set the conditions under which diﬀerent kinds of educational
systems are beneficial or detrimental to children of immigrants.
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More specifically, I found several pathways leading to the presence of severe migrant
achievement penalties in Western European countries. For the new-immigration coun-
tries, tracking students into diﬀerentiated curricula before the age of 15 is suﬃcient to
create an institutional environment where second-generation immigrants suﬀer from se-
vere educational disadvantage relative to their native peers. In this path, exemplified
by the cases of Italy and Portugal, the dimension of stratification is clearly preeminent.
Conversely, another explanatory configuration pertaining to new-immigration countries is
primarily characterized by the importance of the school duration dimension. In Finland,
Denmark, and Sweden, the delayed entry into the (pre)school system brings about severe
achievement penalties. This institutional aspect is critical, given that in these countries
immigrants prevalently speak a language that is very distant from the national one. The
dimension of stratification comes back as central for the pathway involving Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, Flemish-Belgium and the Netherlands. In these post-war immigra-
tion countries characterized by high linguistic distance, severe migrant penalties are the
product of an educational system that, by tracking students into diﬀerentiated curricula,
marginalizes second-generation immigrants in the worst schools. Hence, these systems
are not only highly stratified, but they also distribute human and financial resources
unevenly across schools, so that the overall system suﬀers from a lack of standardization
in the provision of schooling.
The systematic comparison of countries where migrant achievement penalties are not
severe led to the identification of two pathways for the integration of second-generation
immigrants in the school system. These are alternative pathways which nevertheless
share an institutional element connected to duration: in order to avoid severe penalties,
educational systems should be organized in a way to include children at a relatively young
age. Indeed, having not-late entry system also emerged in previous analyses as a neces-
sary condition for not-severe migrant penalties. Besides this factor, the first path does
not comprise any other institutional element. What appears to matter for England and
Wales, France, and Walloon-Belgium are rather contextual elements: in these post-war
immigration countries, a large proportion of immigrants originates from former colonies
where the host language is widely spoken. Presumably, their oﬀspring do not suﬀer from
serious underachievement risks in the first place, so that the structure of the educational
system is less relevant. At the same time, this prevalently contextual explanation may
suggest that in England and Wales, France, and Walloon-Belgium immigrant parents are
relatively well integrated in the host society. For new-immigration countries, avoiding se-
vere migrant penalties seems to be more complicated. In Spain, Greece, and Norway too,
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children enter (pre)school at a relatively young age. However, these countries combine
two additional institutional characteristics: students are not tracked into diﬀerentiated
curricula up to the age of 16, and second-generation immigrants do not disproportion-
ately end up in marginal sectors of the school system. Hence, in this second path towards
not-severe penalties, we can see surfacing school duration, lack of stratification, national
standardization, and resources as meaningful institutional dimensions.
All things considered, my findings on the role played by educational systems in pro-
ducing more or less severe migrant achievement penalties are innovative in several re-
spects. First of all, empirical analyses are based on an explicit theoretical framework. In
order to derive my working hypotheses, I focused on institutional dimensions that might
be specifically relevant for the relative educational disadvantage of second-generation
immigrant students. In this perspective, the present work contributes to the emerging
literature on the macro-level determinants of migrant learning disadvantage, so far mainly
driven by empirical concerns. Secondly, by unveiling the complex interactions leading
to more or less severe penalties, I have called attention to the structure of educational
systems as configurations of institutional elements embedded in given national contexts.
Again, this is important given that comparative research in general considers educational
systems as a sum of independent features, with additive eﬀects on students’ achievement.
Thirdly, by focusing on a limited number of cases and keeping an eye on the countries to
which the configurational explanations were applicable, I have shown that country speci-
ficities matter. For instance, for Scandinavian countries the dimension of school duration
proved especially relevant to explain severe penalties, while for Mediterranean countries
the preeminent dimension was that of stratification. This attention to specific cases also
allowed me to refine my theoretical argument on the role of educational systems in a way
that is not context-blind.
5.2 Methodological contributions
Research design
In this dissertation, I adopted a two-step, mixed-methods research design. In the first
step, I examined migrant achievement penalties in Western Europe and documented how,
in diﬀerent countries, second-generation immigrants fare diﬀerently at school relative to
their native peers. The diﬀerent degrees of migrant achievement penalties constituted the
explanandum for the second step of the analysis, when I investigated potential explanantes
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of severe penalties focusing on the institutional configurations of Western European ed-
ucational systems, embedded in national contexts. At each step of the analysis, I relied
on methodological triangulation—by using statistical and set-theoretic analysis—in or-
der to improve the overall robustness of the empirical findings. Despite this deliberately
pluralistic strategy, each analytical moment saw a clear prevalence of one methodological
approach over the other, as better suited to address the research questions at stake.
First step
In the first step, I mainly relied on multivariate regression analysis in order to define
the relative educational achievement of second-generation immigrant students compared
to their native peers. This approach fits the data structure best, since analyses were
based on a large-N comparative survey of randomly-sampled individuals. Moreover, it is
coherent with the research goal of identifying the eﬀect of migratory status on educational
achievement net of other background diﬀerences existing between the two categories of
students. Based on the estimates obtained with multilevel regressions, I put forward
a new measure of migrant-specific penalty, revealing the relative position of immigrant
students within the achievement distribution of natives sharing the same socio-economic
background. Thanks to the straightforward metric of this measure, I could easily convey
the magnitude of migrant educational disadvantage in Western Europe. Moreover, by
accounting for the variability in natives’ performances, this index is consistent with the
concept of integration in the host society, and could be employed also to assess integration
in other policy domains.
Although much of the analyses carried out in the first step were based on regression
analysis, in this phase I also partially relied on set-theoretic methods. In particular, I
developed the novel procedure of fuzzy-set coincidence analysis in order to systematically
assess the degree to which immigrants and natives cumulate factors of socio-economic
advantage and disadvantage. This procedure allowed to uncover an asymmetrical pattern
that was invisible to correlational analysis. Fuzzy-set coincidence analysis is likely to be
particularly helpful in social stratification studies, but could also be employed in other
research fields.
Second step
Conversely, in the second step of analysis, statistical methods played a limited role.
I adopted a variable-oriented approach only in order to explore whether theoretically
163
relevant dimensions of educational systems are associated with a higher degree of migrant
achievement penalty. More specifically, with ordinary-least-squares regressions I have
looked for net eﬀects of institutional variables, while with regression-tree analysis I have
looked for interaction patterns between these variables in aﬀecting the degree of migrant
penalties. Regression trees proved useful in hinting at the complex interplay operating
between institutional features of educational systems, whose role I then systematically
assessed with fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs-QCA).
By resorting to comparative configurational methods, I shifted my perspective from a
variable-oriented to a diversity-oriented approach. In doing so, I recognized that Western
European countries are not homogeneous units with respect to the diﬀerent institutional
mechanisms that might produce inequalities in educational achievement. Therefore, in
order to discern the causal paths leading to severe migrant achievement penalties, it is
essential to consider each case in its specificity. In my analyses, educational systems were
conceived as configurations of institutional and contextual attributes. In the definition
of these attributes, not all variation was considered as equally meaningful; rather, they
were qualified based on substantive and theoretical knowledge. Beyond the attention
devoted to the kinds of cases and their qualitative properties, the application of fuzzy-set
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs-QCA) constitutes an improvement for comparative
educational research, because it allows to systematically assess the role of institutional
configurations as leading to a given outcome, by unveiling patterns of complex causation.
In eﬀect, my analyses showed that diﬀerent combinations of institutional and contextual
factors can lead to equally severe migrant penalties (equifinality). Moreover, I found
that no single condition is decisive per se. On the contrary, features of educational sys-
tems combine with each other in order to produce severe penalties. Moreover, some
institutional characteristics proved to be relevant in some contexts, but not in others
(conjunctural causation). Finally, my findings also indicate that the institutional config-
urations to avoid severe penalties do not merely mirror those leading to severe penalties
(causal asymmetry). Although statistical techniques could partially detect the interplay
between explanatory variables, only with fs-QCA I could provide the comprehensive pic-
ture necessary to understand the role of institutional and contextual elements in the
creation of migrant achievement penalties.
Overall, in the explanatory phase of my dissertation, I have used several methods to
investigate the role played by educational systems for migrant learning disadvantage in
Western Europe. Strictly speaking, all these methods are descriptive and exploratory,
and should be seen as aiding causal interpretation, rather than testing specific hypotheses.
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In fact, generally we cannot infer causal relations between institutional characteristics
and policy outcomes from cross-country investigations. More in-depth research on single
cases is necessary in order to discern the causal impact of educational systems in diﬀerent
receiving societies. However, given the large institutional variability at the international
level, cross-country analyses based on international data constitute an important first
step towards the identification of policy eﬀects. In particular, in the present dissertation,
I have shown that diversity-oriented methods are especially apt to suggest credible and
convincing causal arguments to account for the diﬀerent degrees of educational disad-
vantage experienced by second-generation immigrants.
5.3 Policy implications
In Europe, the social investment strategy is becoming increasingly popular as way to
recalibrate the welfare state from compensation towards prevention. In this framework,
educational policy is crucial because it can anticipate social risks by investing in individ-
ual skills and capabilities, and at the same time address the demands of the knowledge-
based economy. According to the social investment perspective, educational systems
should provide equal learning opportunities to all, and adequate investments should tar-
get vulnerable groups, including students of immigrant origin (European Commission,
2013). In a life-course perspective, a successful integration of children of immigrants
in the school system is likely to increase collective well-being for several reasons. First,
education plays an important role in the process of socialization of individuals and would
therefore facilitate the active participation of second-generation immigrants into the so-
ciety they live in. Second, such process could indirectly benefit immigrant parents by
helping children of immigrants to bridge the gap between their families and the host
society. Third, in industrialized societies educational attainment is one of the most im-
portant predictors of labor-market participation and occupational status; socio-economic
integration, in turn, is an important precondition for further social, cultural and political
integration of immigrants.
But how can educational systems be actually improved in order to ensure a better
integration of children of immigrants? This dissertation provides a first series of answers
to this question by comparatively assessing the relative performance of second-generation
immigrants in 17 Western European countries.
Possibly, the most important indication emerging from my results is that—when
designing institutional instruments to facilitate the educational integration of children
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of immigrants—context should be adequately taken into account. A general contex-
tual element that emerged from this dissertation is that history of immigration matters
to a great deal. Indeed—although both egalitarian and inegalitarian countries include
countries with diﬀerent migration histories—tackling migrant learning disadvantage was
found to be more challenging for newer immigration societies. Indeed, in order to pro-
tect second-generation immigrants from severe penalties in educational achievement, they
have to combine a multiplicity of institutional factors. For instance, in Norway, Spain,
and Greece, where second-generation immigrants do not suﬀer from severe penalties,
the educational systems include children at a relatively young age; moreover, in these
systems students are tracked into diﬀerentiated curricula only after the age of 16 and
second-generation immigrants are not disproportionally concentrated in bad schools. At
the same time, in new-immigration countries where migrant penalties are particularly
severe, often a single institutional element emerges as a decisively detrimental factor: in
Portugal and Italy, it is the simple fact that students are tracked before the age of 15,
while for Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, it is the late entry of pupils into (pre)school.
On the contrary—despite the many criticisms made to the various “modes of integra-
tion” adopted by post-war labor immigration countries—the latter, when compared to
new-immigration countries, enjoy a comparative advantage that could be exploited by
policy makers. In England and Wales, France, and Walloon-Belgium, second-generation
immigrants are well integrated in the school system, while in other Continental European
countries with a long history of immigration the relative bad performance of immigrant
students can be explained by the cumulation of a number of inegalitarian aspects of the
school system. From a policy-learning perspective, this means that governments that
want to improve their institutional setting in order to better integrate second-generation
immigrants should look for successful cases among the countries with a similar immigra-
tion history to their own.
A second order of reasons why policy makers should devote appropriate attention to
the context relates to the finding that some features of the educational system can become
disruptive for children of immigrants if they find themselves in already adverse conditions
with respect to linguistic diﬃculties. In particular, despite the extremely comprehensive
character of Scandinavian school systems, here second-generation immigrants suﬀer from
severe achievement penalties because these systems do not oﬀer suﬃcient opportunities
to learn the host languages at young age. Hence, even when dealing with individuals
who were born in the host country, policy makers should make sure that the educational
system is designed in a way to include children as soon as possible, especially if the
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immigrant population is mainly composed by individuals who speak a language that is
very distant from the national one.
Yet, when linguistic distance is high, the simple fact of including children at a rela-
tively young age is not suﬃcient to prevent severe penalties for second-generation immi-
grants if the latter are subsequently marginalized in low-performing schools. Indeed, the
final indication for policy makers concerns the structure of lower-secondary education. It
is generally assumed that systems where students are already separated in diﬀerent tracks
during lower-secondary schooling are inherently inegalitarian. While this is most likely
to be the case when talking about class-driven educational inequalities, my empirical
analyses show that this is only partially true when focusing on educational inequali-
ties associated with migratory status. Sure enough, in Italy and Portugal educational
systems should be redesigned in a more comprehensive way to enhance the educational
opportunities of children of immigrants. In their case, tracking students at early age
produces severe migrant penalties. However, the simple postponement of tracking does
not warrant mild penalties. Indeed, in new-immigration societies like Spain, Greece, and
Norway, mild penalties correspond not only to a tracking at later ages, but also to a low
degree of marginalization of second-generation immigrants in bad schools. Therefore,
even if the moment students are tracked into diﬀerentiated curricula is undoubtedly very
important for equality of educational opportunity, standards of teaching quality, disparity
in the allocation of resources, and school segregation are equally important aspects to be
monitored in the lower-secondary school system.
5.4 Outlook
From the work presented so far, some potentially interesting issues surfaced but were not
properly developed, as being beyond the scope of this dissertation. In this last section,
I will briefly recall some of these topics in order to build bridges for future research.
In this dissertation I have taken a country-level perspective to examine the relation
between the relative performance of second-generation immigrants in a given school sys-
tem on the one hand, and its institutional structure on the other hand. In deriving
my theoretical hypotheses on the role of diﬀerent characteristics of the school system, I
have tried to focus on the behavior of individual actors, notably students, parents, and
teachers. However, in the empirical analyses I did not directly test these micro-level mech-
anisms, but rather assessed the extent to which the related institutional configurations
systematically led to a given outcome. Testing the micro foundations of my country-level
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findings could be the task for future research, possibly based on other sources of data,
providing more information on the micro-level actors (e.g. previous achievement levels of
students). For instance, a promising line of research could be the investigation of possi-
ble micro-level mechanisms underlying the negative impact of marginalization in schools
with low-performing peers. If these schools really suﬀer from a deprivation of human and
material resources, to what extent can the lower achievement of second-generation im-
migrants be ascribed to low-quality teaching, and to what extent are instead peer-eﬀects
responsible? Can compensatory policies targeting disadvantaged schools even up the sit-
uation of marginalized students, or does the stigma associated to such schools discourage
learning anyway?
Along the same line, the causes of marginalization deserve more attention. In Ger-
many, Austria, Switzerland, Flemish-Belgium, and the Netherlands, due to early track-
ing, the structure of lower-secondary schooling is rather diﬀerentiated between low-
performing and highly performing schools. In some of these countries the sorting of
pupils into tracks is almost completely driven by ability (e.g. the Netherlands), while
in others this is only partially the case (e.g. Germany). Nevertheless, previous research
has shown that migrant/native diﬀerences in track placement are prevalently ascribable
to ability diﬀerences (Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen, 2007; Kristen et al., 2008;
Cebolla Boado, 2011; Jackson et al., 2012). Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that in
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Flemish-Belgium, and the Netherlands the marginaliza-
tion of second-generation immigrants in schools with low-performing peers is a product of
the early tracking system. However, also Sweden and Denmark—two extremely compre-
hensive systems—came out as highly marginalizing. Given the high levels of residential
segregation experienced by immigrants in these countries (Szulkin and Jonsson, 2007;
Andersen et al., 2013), I suspect that here marginalization in low-performing schools
is mainly due to school segregation by immigrant background. Another—possibly con-
curring—explanation could be related to a lack of standardization in the provision of
high-quality schooling. Future research—taking a deeper look at national and regional
specificities—could further investigate the roots of school marginalization.
Finally, we have seen that the empirical findings of this dissertation also speak to
broader debates on the overall egalitarian or inegalitarian character of educational sys-
tems. More precisely, the negative correlation between SES penalties and migrant penal-
ties in educational achievement has revealed that educational systems that are more
successful in reducing traditional forms of inequality are generally less capable to deal
with inequalities associated to migratory status. This negative correlation could signal
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a negative tradeoﬀ between the impact of given features of educational systems on dif-
ferent students’ categories, or it could instead be spurious. While this was not the focus
of the present dissertation, my empirical results suggest that the second hypothesis is
more realistic. Indeed, the dimensions of stratification, standardization, resources, and
school duration aﬀect the relative disadvantage of immigrant students in a way that is
similar to what previous research has found for socio-economically disadvantaged stu-
dents. However, a closer examination of single educational policies potentially having
opposite eﬀects on immigrant and socio-economically disadvantaged students constitutes
a promising direction for future research.
I conclude with a note on the potential and limitations of the data sources used. In
order to measure migrant-specific penalties in educational achievement, I relied on the
information provided by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
PISA is an extremely valuable data source to compare students’ performance across
countries because of its highly comparable framework, of the rich information collected
on students’ background, and of the number of countries involved. Moreover, its focus on
15-year-old individuals is especially appealing for scholars interested in the competences
acquired by students through the whole period of compulsory schooling. Nevertheless,
as advocated by a number of scholars, the potential of the PISA surveying scheme is
not fully developed. First of all, as noted earlier, cross-country comparisons are limited
if one is interested in policy outcomes, because the ceteris paribus conditions usually
does not hold. This limitation could be addressed if the PISA scheme contained some
longitudinal elements—notably, students’ performance at previous point(s) in time. In
this dissertation, I investigate the role of the context, rather than treating it as noise.
However, if international panel data were made available in the future, scholars could
raise and address new research questions, more specifically connected to the identification
of the causal eﬀects of educational systems. More modestly, the potential of the PISA
data could be improved if more information, currently collected only on a voluntary basis,
were made completely available. From the point of view of this dissertation, the most
striking example of this lack of information is that the question on birth place is specific
to national questionnaires and consequently missing in many countries. If forthcoming
waves of PISA made this information available for all countries, it would be possible
to contrast immigrant students from the same origin country across several destination
countries, thus extending the “divergent strategy” presented in this dissertation to the
whole Western Europe.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 3
country Natives G2 migrants (all origins) Turkish G2 migrants
Austria 9838 869 330
Bel. Flanders 8859 380 104
Bel. Wallonia 5277 683 123
Switzerland 18333 3066 368
Germany 7692 763 370
Denmark 8633 1109 375
England+Wales 13117 556
Spain 41778 396
Finland 10228 69
France 7722 831
Greece 9004 194
Italy 18729 306
Luxembourg 5658 1910
Netherlands 8414 764 124
Norway 8606 307
Portugal 10701 247
Sweden 7900 609
Table A.1: Source: PISA 2006-2009, unweighted. Sample sizes used for individual-level analyses in Chapter 3, by
country and migratory status.
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country Natives G2 (all origins) Turkish G2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Austria 511.1 89.8 444.2 88.9 406.5 77.9
Bel. Flanders 547.7 92.0 465.1 88.9 451.7 85.8
Bel. Walonia 507.3 96.2 453.0 95.6 430.7 84.2
Switzerland 548.3 86.3 489.8 91.0 454.0 88.9
Germany 521.8 91.2 450.3 92.4 425.6 80.4
Denmark 514.6 78.6 450.3 79.9 423.9 73.3
England+Wales 497.4 82.1 480.0 82.5
Spain 487.5 83.7 457.3 81.2
Finland 546.3 75.4 490.3 79.9
France 505.2 90.5 451.8 93.1
Greece 467.4 83.8 449.7 86.5
Italy 506.3 82.9 459.3 95.1
Luxembourg 509.9 83.1 459.5 84.5
Netherlands 536.3 83.6 474.3 77.7 462.9 69.9
Norway 498.3 81.8 456.7 90.6
Portugal 480.1 86.0 440.6 97.4
Sweden 506.5 83.6 456.2 83.2
Table A.2: Source: PISA 2006-2009, weighted. Mean and standard deviations of math score, by country and
migratory status.
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country Natives G2 (all origins) Turkish G2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Austria 0.226 0.8 -0.477 0.8 -0.850 0.8
Bel. Flanders 0.256 0.9 -0.637 1.0 -0.978 0.9
Bel. Wallonia 0.291 0.9 -0.285 1.0 -0.773 0.9
Switzerland 0.208 0.8 -0.340 0.9 -0.688 0.9
Germany 0.367 0.9 -0.476 1.0 -0.703 0.9
Denmark 0.370 0.8 -0.446 1.0 -0.885 0.9
England+Wales 0.221 0.8 0.056 0.9
Spain -0.278 1.1 -0.366 1.1
Finland 0.322 0.8 0.246 0.9
France -0.032 0.8 -0.627 1.0
Greece -0.041 1.0 -0.258 0.9
Italy 0.053 1.0 -0.500 1.1
Luxembourg 0.489 0.9 -0.487 1.1
Netherlands 0.361 0.8 -0.515 1.0 -0.656 0.9
Norway 0.482 0.7 0.036 0.9
Portugal -0.459 1.2 -0.321 1.3
Sweden 0.334 0.8 -0.043 0.8
Table A.3: Source: PISA 2006-2009, weighted. Mean and standard deviations of ESCS, by country and migratory
status.
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country (M   N ) N (M   N )
Austria -37.13** (7.00) 43.81** (1.95)
Bel. Flanders -61.31** (8.63) 42.43** (1.76) -15.61** (5.77)
Bel. Wallonia -25.71** (7.51) 51.84** (1.96) -20.39** (5.91)
Swizterland -26.06** (2.64) 34.28** (1.25)
Germany -40.08** (5.25) 44.14** (1.96) -8.92** (3.92)
Denmark -31.40** (5.14) 32.20** (1.29)
England+Wales 0.74 (5.14) 43.83** (1.46)
Spain -6.75 (8.27) 27.18** (1.00)
Finland -47.66** (11.76) 27.65** (1.07)
France -25.27** (6.41) 51.66** (2.00) -21.14** (4.79)
Greece -10.89 (8.25) 35.13** (1.58)
Italy -36.84** (9.39) 27.78** (1.44)
Luxembourg -27.95** (3.00) 32.63** (1.09)
Netherlands -25.00** (6.44) 38.42** (1.54) -12.13* (5.18)
Norway -23.56** (7.06) 36.48** (1.80)
Portugal -32.25** (7.48) 31.77** (1.27)
Sweden -26.20** (4. 69) 36.39** (1.73)
Table A.4: Source: PISA 2006-2009. Country-specific regressions of reading scores estimated using replicate
weights and plausible values. ** Sig. at 0.01 level * Sig. at 0.05 level. Standard errors in parentheses. Model:
refer to Equations 3.7 and 3.8. Controls: female, ESCS, ESCS*G2.
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country (M   N ) N (M   N )
Austria -53.67** (5.73) 42.24** (1.82)
Bel. Flanders -66.25** (7.90) 43.39** (1.54) -19.92** (6.15)
Bel. Walonia -29.58** (7.48) 51.44** (2.02) -23.43** (5.57)
Swizterland -45.42** (2.87) 35.58** (1.28)
Germany -57.03** (4.87) 44.25** (1.70) -11.62** (3.45)
Denmark -48.85** (5.28) 36.00** (1.40)
England+Wales -10.32* (4.73) 47.61** (1.64)
Spain -13.68 (7.13) 28.54** (0.97)
Finland -59.81** (13.47) 28.85** (1.16)
France -34.92** (6.79) 54.03** (1.74) -21.21** (4.26)
Greece -16.83** (6.05) 33.79** (1.55)
Italy -46.63** (8.68) 25.39** (1.29)
Luxembourg -33.78** (3.01) 32.15** (0.96)
Netherlands -42.77** (7.93) 42.02** (1.49) -16.73** (4.45)
Norway -41.90** (7.27) 35.17** (1.59)
Portugal -33.69** (7.65) 29.61** (1.13)
Sweden -41.22** (5.08) 36.98** (1.46)
Table A.5: Source: PISA 2006-2009. Country-specific regressions of science scores estimated using replicate
weights and plausible values. ** Sig. at 1% level * Sig. at 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Model: refer
to Equations 3.7 and 3.8. Controls: female, ESCS, ESCS*G2.
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A
ustria
49.66
16.25
39.31
14.45
4.33
1.17
3.80
1.45
0.00
0.97
-0.44
0.88
0.22
0.76
-0.26
0.69
B
elgium
F
landers
50.29
16.50
38.04
14.96
4.79
1.15
3.39
1.93
-0.21
0.96
-0.63
0.86
0.19
0.81
-0.06
0.81
B
elgium
W
allonia
52.11
16.87
43.70
16.99
4.91
1.18
4.14
1.76
-0.29
0.94
-0.42
0.88
-0.07
0.79
-0.35
0.77
Sw
itzerland
51.79
15.42
43.41
15.62
4.34
1.43
3.68
1.79
-0.20
0.96
-0.36
0.94
0.01
0.71
-0.16
0.68
G
erm
any
50.62
15.64
39.54
14.25
4.35
1.40
3.46
1.96
0.05
0.94
-0.30
0.87
0.28
0.75
-0.23
0.65
D
enm
ark
50.89
16.63
41.78
17.18
4.70
1.11
3.71
1.79
-0.19
1.05
-0.82
0.98
0.68
0.98
-0.12
0.91
E
ngland+
W
ales
50.47
15.51
48.87
17.06
4.53
1.28
4.44
1.61
-0.14
0.95
-0.17
0.95
0.37
0.82
0.13
0.82
Spain
45.84
17.08
45.85
17.39
3.83
1.84
4.08
1.84
0.18
0.86
-0.24
0.91
-0.13
0.75
-0.34
0.77
F
inland
51.03
16.53
52.68
17.40
5.09
1.15
5.06
1.50
0.17
1.00
-0.14
0.96
0.32
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able
B
.1:
D
istribution
of
the
source
variables
by
country.
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ge
at
tracking
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diﬀerentiated
curricula
(E
urydice,
2009,
2-7);
R
elative
risk
of
m
arginalization:
relative
risk
for
G
2
(vs.
natives)
of
attending
the
w
orst-perform
ing
group
of
schools
(situated
in
the
1
0
th
percentile
of
the
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ent
distribution
according
to
P
ISA
average
scores
on
all
literacy
dom
ains);
(P
re)school
entry:
average
entry
age
of
G
2
in
the
school
or
preschool
system
(P
ISA
2006-2009
and
E
urydice
(2000,
65-66);
(iv)
G
2
w
ith
high
lang
distance:
proportion
of
G
2
w
ith
high
linguistic
distance
(refer
to
footnote
5
in
C
hapter
4);
M
ass
im
m
igration:
starting
decade
of
m
ass
im
m
igration
(Freem
an,
1995;
B
auer
et
al.,
2000).
180
 Lang 
dist = 0 
Root (17 countries) 
12 countries 5 countries 
Lang 
dist = 1 
ENGWA 
(0.12) 
PRT (0.46) 
Entry age > 
4.5 
Entry age < 
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GRC (0.21) 10  countries 
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Marginalization > 
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(0.61) AUT (0.63), BELF (0.67) 
NLD (0.41), LUX (0.42) 
5  countries 
Entry age  < 4.2 Entry age > 4.2 
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(0.51), ITA (0.58) 
ESP (0.18),  FRA 
(0.25), BELW (0.27) 
4 countries 
Entry age < 
3.7 
Entry age < 
3.7 
Figure B.1: Results of regression tree analysis of “Migrant achievement penalty in science literacy” on “Age at
tracking”, “G2 average (pre)school entry age”, “Marginalization in low-performing schools”, “Proportion of G2 with
high linguistic distance”. Analyses performed with the R package rpart. Method: “anova”, complexity parameter
0.01. To improve the readability of the graph, migrant achievement penalties are reported as absolute values.
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 Entry age 
>4.5 
Entry age 
< 3.7 
Lang dist 
= 0 
Root (17 countries) 
12 countries 5 countries 
Lang dist 
= 1 
4 countries PRT (0.42) 
Entry age 
< 4.5 
Entry age > 
3.7 
ESP (0.09), 
FRA (0.14), 
BELW (0.23) 
FIN (0.67) 11 countries 
Marginalization 
> 1.2 
Marginalization 
< 1.2 
Marginalization 
< 3.3 
Marginalization
>  3.3 
4 countries 7 countries 
Marginalization < 
1.57 Marginalization > 
1.57 
GRC (0.13) 
NLD (0.23), NOR 
(0.28), SWE (0.32), 
CHE (0.34), LUX (0.34), 
ITA (0.46) 
Entry age < 4.2 
BELF (0.62) 
Entry age > 4.2 
AUT (0.42), DEU 
(0.42), DNK 
(0.42) 
ENGWA (+0.01) 
Figure B.2: Results of regression tree analysis of “Migrant achievement penalty in reading literacy” on “Age at
tracking”, “G2 average (pre)school entry age”, “Marginalization in low-performing schools”, “Proportion of G2 with
high linguistic distance”. Analyses performed with the R package rpart. Method: “anova”, complexity parameter
0.01. To improve the readability of the graph, migrant achievement penalties are reported as absolute values.
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Path cons. cov. Cases
(late entry * early entry * lang dist) * NEW IMM 1.000 0.065 PRT
* (TRACKED * marg * early tracked)
(late entry * early entry * LANG DIST) * NEW IMM 1.000 0.103 ITA
(TRACKED*marg*EARLY TRACKED)
(LATE ENTRY*LANG DIST) * NEWIMM
* tracked
0.876 0.288 FIN;
DNK,SWE
(early entry*late entry*LANG DIST) * 0.956 0.328 AUT, BELF
(MARGINAL * EARLY TRACK) CHE, DEU
Whole solution 0.932 0.766
Table B.4: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.75. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis perfomed with
the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
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Figure B.3: Recalibration of outcome. Source variable against fuzzy-set. Solid lines indicate critical thresholds
for cross-over (0.5). Dotted lines indicate critical thresholds for full membership (0.99) and full non-membership
(0.01).
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Path cons. cov. Cases
(TRACKED * marginal) * NEW IMM *
late entry
1.000 0.131 PRT, ITA
(LATE ENTRY * LANG DIST) *
(MARGINAL * tracked) * NEW IMM
1.000 0.141 DNK, SWE
(TRACKED * MARGINAL) * 0.994 0.379 AUT, BELF, CHE, DEU,
LANG DIST * late entry * new imm NLD
Whole solution 0.996 0.642
Table B.7: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the presence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency cutoﬀ: 0.99. Frequency
cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis perfomed with the R package QCA
(Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
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Path cons. cov. Cases
late entry * new imm * lang dist * (tracked *
marginal)
1.000 0.196 FRA; ENGWA
(late entry * early entry) * tracked * NEW IMM *
marginal
1.000 0.263 ESP; GRC,NOR
(late entry * early entry)* new imm * LANG DIST
* EARLY TRACKED * marginal
0.758 0.673 LUX
(late entry * early entry)* new imm * lang dist *
EARLY TRACKED * MARGINAL
0.989 0.092 BELW
Whole solution 0.942 0.647
Table B.10: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome. Model:
TRACKED, EARLY-TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, EARLY-ENTRY, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW
IMM. Lower-case letters indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.75. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Logical remainders were not used in the minimization. Analysis perfomed with
the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey algorithm).
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Path cons. cov. Cases
TRACKED * MARG * late entry * lang dist * new
imm
0.938 0.135 BELW
late entry * NEWIMM * tracked * marginal *
LANG DIST
0.861 0.228 GRC,NOR
late entry * lang dist * new imm * tracked *
marginal
0.957 0.289 FRA; ENGWA
Whole solution 0.915 0.652
Table B.13: Conservative solution of the minimization of the truth table for the absence of the outcome (recali-
brated). Model: TRACKED, MARGINALIZING, LATE-ENTRY, LANG DIST, NEW IMM. Lower-case letters
indicate the absence, while upper-case letters the presence of the condition. Simplifying assumptions: tracked,
late entry, marginal, langdist contribute to the absence rather than the presence of the outcome. Consistency
cutoﬀ: 0.85. Frequency cutoﬀ: 1. Analysis performed with the R package QCA (Enhanced Quine McCluskey
algorithm).
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Tracked Late-entry Marginal Lang dist New imm Reference configuration
1 0 1 0 1 100-1 (PRT, ITA)
1 0 1 1 1 100-1 (PRT, ITA)
1 1 0 0 1 01-11 (SWE, DNK, FIN)
1 1 0 1 1 01-11 (SWE, DNK, FIN)
1 1 1 0 1 1 01-11 (SWE, DNK, FIN)
1 1 1 1 0 10110 (AUT, BELF, CHE,
DEU, NLD)
1 1 1 1 1 01-11 (SWE, DNK, FIN)
Table B.15: Easy counterfactuals used in the truth table minimization to produce the intermediate solution for
the presence of the outcome. Solution: refer to Table 4.17. Reference configuration defined as the most similar
configuration leading to the outcome in the conservative solution (Table 4.16).
Tracked Late-entry Marginal Lang dist New imm Reference configuration
0 0 1 0 0 0000- (ENGWA, FRA, ESP)
1 0 0 0 0 10100 (BELW)
Table B.16: Easy counterfactuals used in the truth table minimization to produce the intermediate solution for
the absence of the outcome.Solution: refer to Table 4.19. Reference configuration defined as the most similar
configuration leading to the outcome in the conservative solution (Table 4.18).
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